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Hub Story: India Deepens Africa Ties Under MAHASAGAR Maritime Vision

India has launched its largest-ever joint naval exercises with Africa (AIKEYME), co-hosted by Tanzania and involving eight other nations, as part of a broader effort to expand its maritime presence and counter growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The six-day drills included both port and sea phases, aiming to boost regional security cooperation, enhance counter-piracy operations, and position India as a preferred security partner for the eastern Africa coast.

In 2015, Prime Minister Modi announced one of his core foreign policy initiatives, Security and Growth Across Regions (SAGAR). India’s SAGAR initiative reflects a strategic shift toward a more proactive maritime posture, aiming to strengthen regional security, advance bluewater ambitions, and address complex challenges across its maritime domain. SAGAR compliments India’s other maritime-centric foreign policy initiatives like Act East Policy, Project Sagarmala, Project Mausam, India as ‘net security provider’ and its focus on Blue Economy.

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Modi elevated SAGAR to a broader vision—Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR)—during a visit to Mauritius. For India, maritime cooperation with Africa is central to this expanded framework. Exercise AIKEYME 2025 plays a key role in advancing MAHASAGAR’s objectives by deepening regional partnerships and enhancing maritime interoperability. It reflects India’s growing commitment to a more active and inclusive maritime security posture. AIKEYME brought together Indian Ocean partners to enhance regional maritime security through coordinated naval drills and operations. The exercise featured activities such as Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS), Replenishment at Sea, ship maneuvers, and towing drills—demonstrating the growing depth of cooperation and interoperability among participating navies. While the exercises reflect New Delhi's strategic ambitions, analysts note that India still faces significant gaps in matching China’s commercial and military capabilities on the continent.

Since gaining independence in 1947, India has traditionally prioritized funding its army over its navy, largely due to ongoing border tensions with Pakistan and China. However, in recent years, New Delhi has gradually shifted focus toward strengthening its maritime capabilities. This recalibration reflects growing recognition of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean amid China’s expanding presence and ambitions in the region. As a result, India has increasingly invested in naval modernization and deepened military diplomacy across the Indo-Pacific.

Most recently, on January 15, 2025, India commissioned three major warships—INS Nilgiri (a Project 17A frigate), INS Surat (a Project 15B destroyer), and INS Vagsheer (a Scorpene-class submarine)—in a landmark ceremony attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These vessels, built entirely at Mazagon Dock, represent significant strides in India’s naval modernization, featuring advanced sensors, weaponry, and indigenous design tailored for multi-domain warfare. The triple commissioning marks a major boost to India's maritime capabilities amid regional naval competition, particularly with China's growing presence and Pakistan’s modernization efforts. Additionally, Modi approved plans last year to significantly expand India’s fleet of nuclear-powered attack and missile submarines.

New Delhi is harnessing this naval power to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. In 2024, India positioned itself as a key naval security provider in the Indian Ocean through expanded cooperation with South Africa and intensified joint operations with the United States. During the 12th India–South Africa Navy Staff Talks, the two sides agreed to increase joint training, establish secure information-sharing protocols, and deepen collaboration through exercises like IBSAMAR. At the same time, India and the US conducted their largest-ever amphibious drill, Tiger TRIUMPH 2024, integrating all service branches and focusing on humanitarian and disaster relief. India also launched its biggest naval deployment in response to rising piracy off Somalia, filling a regional security gap as US and UK forces prioritized the Red Sea. Altogether, these moves signaled India’s growing strategic confidence and alignment with US goals to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.

India’s recent exercises with eastern African nations are an important step toward strengthening Indo-Pacific security. While many in Washington define the Indo-Pacific as stretching from eastern India to Japan, it’s worth remembering that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo first unveiled his Indo-Pacific vision not in New Delhi, but in Nairobi, Kenya. The strategic importance of Africa’s eastern coast—underscored by recent hostilities in the Red Sea—makes it a critical, yet often overlooked, part of the Indo-Pacific landscape. The United States should find ways to support India’s growing engagement with the region, even if it lacks the bandwidth to pursue deeper ties itself. Ultimately, closer cooperation between eastern African nations and a trusted U.S. partner like India serves American strategic interests.

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Forging Regional Readiness: US Military Exercises with Indo-Pacific Allies

Exercise Balikatan 2025, the 40th iteration of the largest annual U.S.-Philippines bilateral military exercise, officially began with a ceremony at Camp Aguinaldo, featuring over 14,000 participants and observers from more than 20 nations. U.S. and Philippine military leaders emphasized the exercise's role in strengthening interoperability across all domains—including space and cyber—and reaffirming a shared commitment to peace and regional security. The event highlights the enduring U.S.-Philippine alliance and growing multilateral cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

As part of Exercise Salaknib 2025, U.S. and Philippine Army troops conducted joint training on anti-armor tactics and jungle tracking to enhance interoperability and strengthen tactical skills. Philippine soldiers gained hands-on experience with U.S. anti-armor systems like the Javelin and TOW, while U.S. troops learned jungle warfare techniques from Philippine instructors seasoned in tropical environments. These exchanges fostered trust, mutual learning, and readiness for future joint operations in complex terrain.

Over 300 Navy Reserve Sailors participated in MAKO Sentry 2025-2, a large-scale training exercise held across multiple U.S. locations to boost readiness for maritime operations and crisis response. The exercise focused on integrating reservists into Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs) alongside active-duty forces, simulating realistic conflict scenarios with new participation from information warfare units. Leaders emphasized the training’s critical role in preparing the Reserve Force to rapidly mobilize and operate as a cohesive, warfighting-ready team in the Indo-Pacific.

The USS Blue Ridge and 7th Fleet staff completed a port visit to Cairns, Australia, from April 16–20, marking the ship’s first stop there since 2013 as part of ongoing Indo-Pacific patrols. The visit supported replenishment and strengthened U.S.-Australia ties through cultural exchanges, ship tours, and local sports events with Royal Australian Navy personnel and Cairns community members.

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Alliance Insights: Recent Articles on Alliance Cooperation

Japan:

• AP News: New US ambassador to Japan says he’s optimistic a tariffs deal can be reached

• TWZ: Railgun Installed On Japanese Warship Testbed

• Nikkei Asia: Getting the Quad ready for a protracted war

• Naval News: Japan could licence produce Mk70 containerized missile launcher

• USNI News: Japan Tests Railgun at Sea; Repositions V-22 Osprey Fleet

• Nikkei Asia: Japanese minesweepers dock at controversial Cambodian naval base

South Korea:

• Korea Pro: From populist firebrand to centrist: Lee Jae-myung’s reinvention for 2025 race

• Yonhap News Agency: Hanwha Systems supplies key component for S. Korea's 4th military spy satellite

• Yonhap News Agency: Senior S. Korean, U.S. Army officials discuss security cooperation in video talks

• Yonhap News Agency: Army holds live-fire artillery drills at Paju firing range for 1st time in 7 years

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea's 4th spy satellite lifts off from U.S. space base

Taiwan:

• War on the Rocks: Taiwan’s Biggest Problem in Steeling Itself for War with China is Cultural

• Digitimes Asia: Taiwan accelerates unmanned vehicle push amid global defense and tariff tensions with the US

• Defense Post: Taiwan Launches New Tactical Ambulance for Armed Forces

• ABC News: US lawmakers' bipartisan Taiwan visit signals support despite harsh words, tariffs

Philippines:

• TWZ: USMC Anti-Ship Missile Deployment To Highly Strategic Luzon Strait Is Unprecedented

India:

• Bloomberg: India’s Military is Unprepared for a Dangerous Future

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Hub Story: Japan’s One-Theater Strategy Aims to Boost US Alliance

When US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited Asia, Japan proposed a new “one-theater” security concept to the United States that would treat the East China Sea, South China Sea, Korean Peninsula, and surrounding areas as a single operational theater to counter growing threats from China. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani emphasized the need for stronger regional defense cooperation among allies like the US, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines, a proposal welcomed by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. This marks an extraordinary shift for Japan, signaling a willingness to expand its defense role beyond traditional geographic limits and adopt a more integrated regional strategy.

Theater strategy is a core organizing concept for defense planning. Essentially, theater strategy is the planning and execution of military operations within a specific geographic area, known as a theater of operations. It bridges national strategic objectives and operational-level actions, aligning military resources and activities to achieve political and strategic goals within that region.

US Army War College: An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security:

Theater strategy directs military activities ranging from peacetime cooperation with other countries, to meeting potential threats through contingency planning (previously known as deliberate planning) and crisis action planning. Theater strategy organizes a theater’s forces and operational areas, and arranges the relationship among them to ensure unified action. Theater strategy also ensures adequate logistics and other support for theater activities, and synchronizes joint, multinational, and interagency operations and training. All of this maintains military unified action within a geographic region to achieve strategic goals.

Japan’s offer to Hegseth is particularly notable given the country’s traditionally restrained defense posture. While Tokyo has pledged to increase defense spending, it has historically maintained low levels of investment and fielded a force geared primarily toward homeland defense. This approach has been shaped by pacifist public sentiment and legal constraints under Japan’s constitution, which permits only strictly defensive military operations. Over the past 15 years, Japan has taken steps to reform and reinterpret its legal framework to enable a more “normal” defense posture and expanded operational flexibility. These efforts reflect a gradual shift away from strict self-defense limitations toward a more proactive security role in the region.

If Japan is serious about the proposed “one-theater” concept, it would mark a dramatic shift in how Tokyo approaches military operations. While details remain unclear, reporting suggests Japan is now willing to plan and operate beyond its immediate homeland and territorial waters—extending its focus to the East China Sea, South China Sea, Korean Peninsula, and possibly beyond. This would represent a significant boost to US war planning and operational capacity in the Indo-Pacific.

Recent actions indicate Tokyo may be committed to expanding its regional military role. Last September, a Japanese naval vessel transited the Taiwan Strait for the first time alongside Australian and New Zealand warships—an important signal of support for peace and stability in the region. Japan has also deepened security ties with the Philippines, which continues to face Chinese coercion in the South China Sea, and has worked to strengthen defense cooperation with South Korea. Just recently, the three countries held a meeting where leaders discussed enhancing space security collaboration.

US Department of State: Joint Statement on the Trilateral – United States, Japan, Republic of Korea – Meeting in Brussels:

The United States reiterated its ironclad commitments to the defense of Japan and the ROK, backed by America’s unmatched military strength, including its nuclear capabilities. All sides confirmed that US extended deterrence commitments to Japan and the ROK remain critical to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and the ROK expressed their support for US efforts to engage the PRC and Russia on reducing nuclear risks. They reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering defense and deterrence by advancing robust security cooperation and strengthening their respective defense capabilities.

In many ways, the “one-theater” proposal may be a strategic effort to keep the Trump administration engaged in the Indo-Pacific. Despite initial declarations that the region would be a top priority, the administration’s attention has largely been consumed by crises in Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, Greenland, and Panama. Japan may be offering new incentives to encourage Washington to refocus on Asia. While trade tensions have strained the alliance, early negotiations suggest a potential deal may be within reach.

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Spoke Story: US-ROK Hold Civil Space Dialogue

The United States and South Korea held their fourth Civil Space Dialogue in Washington, D.C., reaffirming their commitment to expanding cooperation in space exploration, Earth observation, satellite navigation, and space weather. The two sides discussed joint projects including Artemis missions, lunar payloads, human spaceflight, and regulatory alignment, while also highlighting growing commercial and scientific collaboration. They agreed to meet biennially, with South Korea set to host the next dialogue in 2027.

South Korea has approved new space strategies aimed at making it one of the world’s top five space powers, with flagship projects including reusable launch vehicles, ultra-high-resolution satellites, and a space observatory at the Sun-Earth L4 point. The Korea AeroSpace Administration (KASA) is shifting its next-generation launch vehicle program toward reusability by 2035, promoting private-sector innovation, and planning major lunar exploration and satellite initiatives. To support these goals, South Korea significantly boosted its space R&D budget and announced plans to build a new national aerospace hub by 2030.

The United States and South Korea have not always worked deeply on space cooperation, in fact Washington has historically taken steps to limit South Korean space innovation.

Korean Economic Institute: US-South Korea Relations in Space: A New Era for Partnership:

Starting in the 1970s, the United States and South Korea entered into an agreement that authorized exchanging details on US missile technology while restricting the range and payloads authorized for South Korean missile launches. Although the primary motivation of these restrictions was to limit the range and destructiveness of South Korea’s missile strike systems to prevent crisis escalation, it also had the effect of restricting South Korea’s launch technology development, including prevent the use of solid fuels in rockets.”

In 2021, South Korea and the United States finally revised their agreement on sharing missile technology to allow for technology exchange to assist with launch-vehicle development. When President Yoon came into office, he outlined an ambitious plan for South Korean space expansion under the fourth Space Development Promotion Plan. The strategy articulated a path to make South Korea a globally recognized space power by landing a robot on the Moon in 2032 and on Mars in 2045 while doubling the government’s space investments by 2027.

Additionally, the South Korean government created a new agency, the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) to help over see and facilitate the Space Development Promotion plan.

Since the announcement of the new plan, the South Korean space budget has climbed and the new US-ROK dialogue suggests the two countries will work together to make more progress.

South Korea’s growing space capabilities has obvious security benefits. During a visit to South Korea, US Space Force Chief Gen. Chance Saltzman emphasized the growing role of space cooperation in the US-ROK alliance. At Osan Air Base, he highlighted the integration of US and Korean space personnel through joint exercises, shared operations, and expanded missile warning and ISR capabilities. The visit underscored both nations’ commitment to advancing space development and strengthening deterrence through deeper collaboration in the space domain. There is also the possibility of South Korean contributions to Trump’s Golden Dome initiative will require significant investment in space capabilities. Seoul should think creatively about how they can leverage their space program to offset American security costs on the Korean Peninsula.

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Forging Regional Readiness: US Military Exercises with Indo-Pacific Allies

In April 2025, the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners conducted a series of high-impact bilateral and multilateral exercises aimed at strengthening military interoperability, improving crisis response capabilities, and reinforcing regional security cooperation. From combined airpower drills on the Korean Peninsula to large-scale amphibious operations with India, these exercises highlight a shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. Below is a summary of key engagements across the region involving the United States, South Korea, the Philippines, India, Japan, and Guam.

In mid-April 2025, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces conducted a series of joint exercises to strengthen military readiness and interoperability. B-1 bombers, F-16s, and ROKAF F-35As and KF-16s trained together in combined air operations over the western ROK, demonstrating tactical integration and alliance commitment. Meanwhile, the US and ROK navies completed SALVEX Korea 2025, an intensive salvage and diving exercise that included deep-sea dives, use of advanced underwater technologies, and joint recovery missions. Simultaneously, Korean Spring Exercise 2025 focused on combined mine countermeasures, with both navies practicing mine detection, neutralization, and clearance to enhance port and sea lane protection. These exercises underscore the strength of the US-ROK alliance and their shared commitment to regional stability and a free and open Indo-Pacific.

As part of Salaknib 2025, Philippine Army soldiers from the First Scout Regiment and US Army soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division conducted a jungle tracking course on April 9 to improve jungle warfare skills and enhance bilateral interoperability. Led by experienced Philippine instructors, the training focused on tracking, camouflage detection, and ambush avoidance in challenging tropical terrain. The exercise strengthened operational coordination and supported broader efforts to boost combat readiness and alliance cooperation between the US and the Philippines.

During Exercise Tiger Triumph 2025, US and Indian forces conducted extensive joint operations in the Bay of Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, India, aimed at enhancing interoperability in humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and maritime security. Highlights included anti-submarine warfare training between US and Indian P-8 aircraft, a large-scale amphibious landing drill involving over 1,000 personnel, and data-gathering support from US Navy assets like the P-8A Poseidon. The exercise demonstrated growing operational integration, command-and-control coordination, and a shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, marking the fourth iteration of the US-India Tiger Triumph series.

On April 3, 2025, US Navy Electronic Attack Squadron VAQ-131, under Task Force 70, conducted bilateral training with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) forces south of Okinawa, following the signing of the Fujin memorandum of understanding in December 2024. The exercise enhanced joint electronic warfare capabilities, integrating JMSDF destroyers and reconnaissance aircraft with US EA-18G Growlers to strengthen interoperability in electromagnetic and information warfare. Leaders from both navies emphasized the importance of seamless coordination and battlespace awareness in crisis scenarios, underscoring growing US-Japan cooperation under the Fujin pact.

From March 24 to April 4, 2025, the US Coast Guard partnered with the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators (NASBLA) to provide intensive maritime training for local emergency responders in Guam. The courses, held at Port Authority facilities and Station Apra Harbor, focused on key skills like boat handling, navigation, and search and rescue, enhancing interoperability between the Coast Guard and local agencies. This effort strengthened interagency coordination, built operational trust, and laid the groundwork for future joint operations, including a planned mass rescue drill with the US Navy in May.

US Air Force Airmen from the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base and the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base, along with Republic of Korea Air Force personnel, are conducting Combined Search and Rescue Training Event (CSARTE) 25-2 at Osan AB from April 7–18. The exercise aims to enhance joint CSAR capabilities and interoperability across the Indo-Pacific, involving approximately 13 aircraft types and showcasing the scalable, flexible nature of combined US-ROK personnel recovery operations.

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Alliance Insights: Recent Articles on Alliance Cooperation

Japan:

• Breaking Defense: Enter AJUS? Australia, Japan, US must boost trilateral intel, industrial cooperation: Experts

• Naval News: Japanese Warships Preparing for Pacific Deployment Later This Month

• Nikkei Asia: Japan's defense budget nears 2% of GDP as Trump pressure looms

South Korea:

• Breaking Defense: South Korea’s Hanwha and Poland’s WB Group agree to guided missile joint venture in Poland

• Yonhap News Agency: Hanwha Aerospace teams up with Romanian univ. to expand defense cooperation

• Yonhap News Agency: Naval chiefs of S. Korea, U.S., Japan discuss trilateral cooperation against N.K. threats

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, UAE ink deal on cooperation on KF-21 jets

Philippines:

• Naval News: U.S. Deploys Anti-Ship Missiles Near Taiwan in the Luzon Strait

Australia:

• Breaking Defense: Beyond ‘branding’: AUKUS nations look to outside partners for Pillar II tech

• Nikkei Asia: Trump spurs doubts over Australia's $234bn nuclear submarine plan

• The Interpreter: China’s “spy ship” that wasn’t off the coast of Australia

• The Strategist: The Spirit for Australia: why Canberra should pursue the B-2 bomber

• The Strategist: Strengthening Australia’s space cooperation with South Korea

New Zealand:

• Breaking Defense: New Zealand pledges to double defense spending to modernize ships, surveillance, networks

India:

• Reuters: India offers cheap loans for arms, targeting Russia's traditional customers

• All Israel News: Israel and India strengthen defense cooperation with successful Barak missile interception tests

• The Strategist: Flexibility and awareness will help India deal with Trump (again)

United States:

• House Armed Services: Statement of Admiral Samuel Paparo

Other:

• Breaking Defense: Indonesia eyes joining Turkish 5th-generation fighter jet program KAAN

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Since the end of the Cold War, New Zealand has largely prioritized territorial defense over expeditionary capabilities or collective defense commitments. This posture—characterized by modest defense spending and limited global engagement—has drawn criticism as a form of strategic apathy. Critics argue that Wellington has effectively freeridden on the security umbrella provided by stronger partners like the United States, Australia, and Japan.

The consequences of this approach are visible. Regular Force personnel declined from 12,400 in 1985 to just 8,946 in 2024. New Zealand retired its air combat wing in 2001, leaving a significant capability gap. Most recently, in October 2023, one of New Zealand’s nine naval vessels ran aground and sank near Samoa—an incident that raised concerns about both training and readiness. Additionally, defense spending as a share of GDP has also fallen sharply since 1980, reinforcing perceptions that New Zealand’s defense posture has not kept pace with evolving regional threats.

New Zealand’s newly announced Defence Capability Plan, if implemented, aims to reverse years of underinvestment in its military. This plan reflects a broader strategic realignment in Wellington. Like many countries, New Zealand long attempted to balance deep trade ties with China and a security partnership with the United States. But growing security concerns—and a rising perception that economic dependence on China is a vulnerability—have prompted a significant strategic shift.

A recent shock to New Zealand’s regional influence underscored these concerns. Despite New Zealand’s constitutional responsibility for the foreign and defense policy of the Cook Islands, the territory unexpectedly entered into a strategic partnership with Beijing. The move blindsided Wellington and revealed how Chinese influence can undermine New Zealand’s role in the Pacific. The episode has deepened concerns about Beijing’s encroachment and accelerated New Zealand’s pivot toward greater defense preparedness. The US-China competition underscores New Zealand’s recent shift.

New Zealand Government: Defence Capability Plan:

The Indo-Pacific is a primary geographical theatre for strategic competition, most visibly between China and the United States. China’s assertive pursuit of its strategic objectives is the principal driver for strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, and it continues to use all of its tools of statecraft in ways that can challenge both international norms of behaviour and the security of other states. Of particular concern is the rapid and non-transparent growth of China’s military capability.

As New Zealand looks to dramatically increase defense spending, it has identified three key areas of investment to deliver a Defense Force that is:

1. Combat capable with enhanced lethality and deterrent effect

2. A force multiplier with Australia and interoperable with partners

3. Innovative and has improved situational awareness

The $12 billion over the next four years will be broken down by these areas:

Below are some of the investments that NZDF outlines from 2025 to 2028:

• $100-300M for enhanced strike capabilities

• $300-600M for frigate sustainment program

• $50-100M for uncrewed autonomous vessels

• Up to $50M for javelin anti-tank missile upgrade

• $300-600M for upgraded Army network capability

• Up to $50M for counter uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)

• $100-300M for long-range remotely piloted aircraft

• $100-300M for enhancing cyber security capabilities

• $1B plus for modern military enterprise resource management software

• Up tom $50M for defense science and technology

• $100-300M for technology accelerator

• $100-300M for digital modernization

• $100-300M for information management

A cornerstone of New Zealand’s implementation strategy is deepening defense ties with Australia. Notably, the United States is only briefly mentioned in the Defence Capability Plan—and only in the context of broader Indo-Pacific security dynamics. Instead, New Zealand places primary emphasis on advancing joint procurement, interoperability, and strategic alignment with Canberra.

This approach carries indirect but meaningful benefits for Washington. Australia is a key and increasingly capable ally of the United States. Enhanced cooperation between Australia and New Zealand on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), maritime domain awareness, and defense industrial collaboration not only strengthens regional security but also supports U.S. strategic objectives. While direct U.S.–New Zealand engagement will continue, a more integrated and capable ANZAC defense partnership ultimately serves American interests in the Indo-Pacific.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• Naval News: Japan starts production of a new fleet of OPV

• Nikkei Asia: Japan and NATO to ramp up defense industry cooperation

• Nikkei Asia: Japan-U.S. missile defense project is 'model for cooperation': Northrop CEO

South Korea:

• Army Recognition: South Korea offers to build five Aegis destroyers per year to help the US counter China at sea

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, U.S. hold joint air exercise involving B-1B bomber

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, U.S. inked new joint wartime contingency plan last year amid advancing N.K. threats: USFK commander

Philippines:

• Naval News: Philippine Coast Guard, OCEA sign vessel maintenance contract

• Breaking Defense: Philippines cleared to buy F-16s at estimated $5.6B

India:

• Breaking Defense: India puts Metrea on contract for commercial air refueling, invests in helicopters

• Breaking Defense: India to double Hanwha self-propelled howitzer buy, will manufacture locally

• Nikkei Asia: India's Modi agrees to step up defense cooperation with Sri Lanka

• Financial Times: India launches biggest-ever joint naval exercises in Africa

New Zealand:

• NZDF: New Zealand Defence Force deepens commitment to the South East Asian region

Great Power Competition:

• National Institute for Public Policy: Deterring the New Pacing Threats: Opportunistic and Coordinated Aggression

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Hub Story: Australia Releases 2024 Independent Intelligence Review

Last week, the Australian government released its 2024 Independent Intelligence Review (IIR). The IIR provides a comprehensive analysis of Australia’s national intelligence community and offers recommendations for improving its effectiveness and strategic alignment. The IIR was tasked with first, gauging the effectiveness with which the Australian national intelligence community serves the national interest and meets the needs of government; and, second, examining how well positioned the community is for the future.

The 2024 IIR builds on the foundation of the original 2017 IIR, serving as a follow-up assessment of Australia’s national intelligence community. The 2017 IIR focused on recommending the integration of institutions and processes to better connect Australia’s dispersed intelligence agencies into a more coordinated and cohesive national intelligence community.

The central recommendation of the 2017 IIR was for the Australian government to create an Office of National Intelligence (ONI) within the Prime Minister’s portfolio, led by a Director-General who would serve as the Prime Minister’s chief adviser on intelligence matters. While not directing individual agency operations, the Director-General would coordinate the national intelligence community to ensure integrated strategies. ONI would manage the intelligence enterprise at a strategic level, including setting national intelligence priorities, evaluating agency performance, planning workforce and capabilities, and fostering data sharing and collaborative analysis. It would also absorb the Office of National Assessments, expanding its role in intelligence assessment through greater contestability and external engagement.

The recommendations in this 2024 Review are informed by the following principal findings:

• First, the 2024 IIR notes meaningful progress since the 2017 Review toward building a world-class intelligence community, with improved integration and coordination across Australia’s national intelligence enterprise. However, challenges remain in fully aligning ONI’s responsibilities with its capacity to lead the broader community. While ONI’s role has expanded, there is still room to deepen collaboration and foster a more cohesive, community-driven culture across the intelligence agencies.

• Second, while the 2017 Review emphasized enterprise-level management within the intelligence community, the 2024 Review highlights the importance of better integrating intelligence with other parts of government. Strengthening these cross-government relationships will help align intelligence outputs with national priorities and enable intelligence to function more effectively as a tool of statecraft in an increasingly competitive global environment.

• Third, the report stresses the need for innovation to address evolving national security threats. Intelligence agencies must be prepared for future crises, effectively adopt emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, strengthen both international and non-governmental partnerships, and build a resilient workforce. Meeting these four interrelated challenges is essential to ensuring the intelligence community remains agile, capable, and fit for purpose in a rapidly changing world.

The 2024 Review’s recommendations are summarized below:

Role of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI):

• Establish clearer expectations for the intelligence community through a statement from the Prime Minister at the start of each term.

• Include the Director-General of National Intelligence (DGNI) as a member of key government subcommittees to enhance integration.

Enterprise Management:

• Increase resources for the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) to support enterprise management responsibilities.

• Conduct annual evaluations of intelligence support for policymaking.

• Improve the allocation and prioritization of resources against intelligence missions.

• Conduct capability reviews following the appointment of new NIC agency heads.

Intelligence Support for Ministers:

• Develop an ‘Introduction to Intelligence’ briefing for new ministers and their staff after government changes or reshuffles.

• Provide regular, dedicated briefings to the full Cabinet on shifts in Australia’s security environment.

• Strengthen intelligence support to a broader range of ministers, including timely advice beyond Canberra.

Policy and Intelligence:

• Strengthen the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s coordination of national security policy.

• Invest in classified infrastructure to improve the use of intelligence in policymaking.

• Develop a coordinated intelligence outreach and education initiative for the policy community.

Economic Security:

• Treasury should lead a review of economic security functions across government.

• Establish a dedicated economic security function within the Treasury, with input from NIC agencies.

• Enhance ONI’s capacity to support economic security decision-making.

Value of Contestability:

• Improve contestability in intelligence assessments through roundtable discussions, analytical techniques, and acknowledgment of different perspectives.

• Require ONI to produce at least two National Assessments annually.

Public Release of Intelligence:

• Develop a policy for the declassification and public release of intelligence to increase transparency and public trust.

Preparedness:

• Set clear expectations for NIC preparedness for regional crises or conflicts through a Prime Ministerial directive.

• Conduct regular exercises with policy agencies to improve preparedness.

• Establish a warning cell within ONI to bolster warning functions.

• Increase resilience and engagement outside Canberra to maintain operational continuity.

NIC Investment:

• Provide a holistic overview of major NIC programs and their risks to the National Security Committee annually.

• Detail current and future capability gaps and investment needs.

• Narrow the scope of the Joint Capability Fund to focus on key enterprise-level capabilities.

Collective Capabilities and Shared Services:

• Adopt a more systematic approach to identifying and pursuing collective capabilities and shared services across NIC.

Technology:

• Develop transition strategies for all relevant NIC agencies to move to TOP SECRET Cloud.

• Prioritize data cataloging to improve data interoperability.

• Establish AI governance principles and frameworks across the intelligence community.

• Develop a national security-focused technology investment fund.

• Create a technology strategy to address future risks and technological priorities.

Insight and Advantage Through Open Source:

• Strengthen the federated approach to open-source intelligence with additional investment.

• Ensure future intelligence reviews assess the organization of open-source functions for optimal outcomes.

Collective Action on People and Skills:

• Develop a NIC-wide employee value proposition to improve recruitment and retention.

• Standardize workforce data collection and security clearance processes to enable mobility within NIC.

• Identify and nurture future NIC leaders through Australian Public Service Commission talent programs.

• Establish a NIC Chief People Officer within ONI.

Partnerships:

• Create a public-private talent exchange to deepen partnerships with private industry through knowledge sharing.

Legislation:

• Implement recommendations from the 2019 Comprehensive Review of intelligence legislation, especially on holistic electronic surveillance reform.

• Update legislative frameworks to enable NIC agencies to act more effectively in national security contexts.

• Review legislative settings for foreign intelligence requirements onshore and assess legal barriers for conflict response.

Oversight:

• Expand oversight jurisdiction of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.

• Empower the Commonwealth Ombudsman to oversee the proportionality of covert and coercive powers.

• Enable the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to conduct inquiries on counter-terrorism and national security legislation.

• Allocate additional vetted staff to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security leadership.

• Establish a panel of technological advisers to support intelligence oversight bodies.

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Spoke Story: Pete Hegseth’s Trip to Micronesia, Philippines, and Japan

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had a successful trip to the Philippines and Japan. In contrast to his recent visit to Europe, where he criticized European allies for not contributing enough to their own security, Hegseth emphasized the importance of US allies in Asia and announced several new initiatives to strengthen American cooperation in the region. While the visit followed a familiar pattern seen in previous secretarial trips to Asia, it underscored a continued US commitment to deepening regional ties.

The trip began with a visit to the Federated States of Micronesia, one of the three island nations that are part of the Compact of Free Association (COFA), alongside the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. During his visit, Hegseth announced $2 billion in new infrastructure projects, which will provide a significant boost to the American ally.

US Department of Defense: Joint Statement on the United States Department of Defense and Federated States of Micronesia Understanding on Shared Force Posture and Infrastructure Priorities:

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) announced today that they reached a mutual understanding to enable the U.S. Department of Defense to begin planning and construction on key infrastructure projects in the State of Yap.

This effort is the product of several years of close collaboration, and its conclusion reflects the close and enduring partnership between the United States and FSM, underpinned by the Compact of Free Association.

Future investments in FSM and Yap State by the U.S. Department of Defense are estimated to exceed two billion dollars. These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for U.S. forces.

These projects will strengthen our deterrence and regional posture and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Hegseth’s next stop was the Philippines, where he reaffirmed strong US support for the Southeast Asian nation. His emphasis on “re-establishing” deterrence suggests that the Defense Department is serious about prioritizing the Indo-Pacific. Hegseth delivered strong statements backing the Philippines, explicitly affirming that the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty covers recent tensions between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea. Additionally, the two nations announced new initiatives aimed at strengthening their defense partnership.

US Defense Department: United States–Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary Hegseth's Inaugural Visit to the Philippines:

Secretary Hegseth and Secretary Teodoro reiterated both countries' shared commitment to the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in an increasingly complex security environment. The Secretaries also reaffirmed that the MDT extends to armed attacks against either country's armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels – including those of their coast guards – anywhere in the South China Sea.

Key new initiatives include:

• Deploying more advanced U.S. capabilities in the Philippines, including the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and highly capable unmanned surface vessels. Exercising with the NMESIS – a mobile, ground-based anti-ship missile launcher – as part of Exercise BALIKATAN and other service-to-service activities will improve interoperability and strengthen deterrence by providing coverage of strategic sea lanes from coastal positions. Training and testing on NMESIS and unmanned surface vessels as part of realistic exercises in the Philippines will increase the interoperability and operational readiness of U.S. and Philippine forces to leverage cutting-edge military capabilities in Indo-Pacific operational environments.

• Conducting advanced bilateral Special Operations Forces training in the Batanes Islands. U.S. Special Operations Forces and Philippine Marines will train together on complex landing scenarios to enhance interoperability between U.S. forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines and improve combined capability to conduct high-end operations in the Indo-Pacific region.

• Publishing a bilateral defense industrial cooperation vision statement. The United States and the Philippines continue to advance their alliance through closer defense industrial base cooperation. This is intended to promote more robust military and industry partnerships, build supply chain resilience, strengthen our readiness, and bolster both nations' economies. The Secretaries announced the release of a defense industrial cooperation vision statement that identifies priority areas for near-term cooperation, including potential co-production of unmanned systems and more robust logistics support. The statement includes lines of effort that the United States and the Philippines will explore to advance these priority areas, namely seeking to: reduce barriers, collaborate on new technology, and identify discrete opportunities for collaboration. Both countries intend for this vision statement to serve as a basis to advance regional security, economic security, and Indo-Pacific prosperity.

• Launching a bilateral cybersecurity campaign. The DoD and DND will collaborate to reduce cyber vulnerabilities and enhance resilience across the alliance. This campaign intends to address three primary lines of effort: establishing a secure defense network, developing a capable cybersecurity workforce, and enabling advanced operational cooperation. Enhanced cyber capability and capacity will enable greater information and intelligence-sharing, improve our lethality, and facilitate increasingly advanced operational coordination.

As outlined in the joint statement, the United States and the Philippines announced a new joint vision on defense industrial cooperation, a priority that saw meaningful progress under the Biden Administration. This new vision highlights how the Defense Department is actively working to strengthen partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, marking a notable contrast to US engagement in Europe.

US Department of Defense: Joint Vision Statement on U.S.-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation:

To focus defense industrial cooperative efforts, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) have identified the following priority areas with the greatest potential for near-term cooperation, and intend to explore additional areas in future discussions: • Unmanned systems (production; logistics)

• Ammunition components/energetics (storage; All-Up Round production, logistics)

• Critical minerals (refinement)

• Logistics support

• Ship maintenance and repair

• Airspace integration

• Additive manufacturing (3-D printing)

• Aircraft maintenance and repair

• System components and spare parts production

DoD and DND intend to further explore the following lines of effort to advance defense industrial cooperation:

1. Seek to remove barriers, incentivize participation, and increase compatibility of industrial regulations and processes, including regarding technology transfer.

2. Seek to recognize and include enablers to ensure resilience of industrial cooperation initiatives.

3. Seek opportunities and incentives to collaborate on new technology, innovation, and demonstrations.

4. Seek to identify distinct opportunities for military co-production, storage, refinement, and logistics.

After his visit to the Philippines, Hegseth traveled to Japan. Early reports suggesting that the Defense Department was considering scaling back new US initiatives with the Japanese military ultimately did not materialize. In fact, the opposite occurred. Hegseth oversaw the establishment of a new US Joint Force Headquarters in Japan, a development that will significantly enhance American warfighting capabilities and deepen US-Japan military collaboration.

US Defense Department: Defense Secretary Announces U.S. Forces Japan's Upgrade to Joint Force Command:

Hegseth said the USFJ upgrade will help improve the command's ability to operate with Japan's Joint Operations Command, which was just established March 24, 2025, and is responsible for commanding branches of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

"We certainly welcome JJOC's establishment this past week," Hegseth said during his opening remarks.

"It's more urgency [and] it's more cooperation in real time. It also increases our readiness to respond to [any] contingency or crisis, support U.S. operations and help Japan and U.S. forces defend [Japan's] territory," he added.

As part of the USFJ's upgrade, Hegseth said DOD will soon add additional personnel to both Tokyo and USFJ headquarters at Yokota Air Base to conduct activities aimed at strengthening bilateral bonds with the U.S. military's Japanese counterparts, as well as deepening operational cooperation…

Regarding China's growing threat in the Indo-Pacific region, Hegseth said America is committed to sustaining a ready, robust and credible deterrence throughout the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations, including across the Taiwan Strait…

"Our job at the Defense Department … is to build an alliance so robust that both the reality and the perception of deterrence is real and ongoing so that the Communist Chinese don't take the aggressive action that some have contemplated they will," Hegseth said.

"Japan would be on the front lines of any contingency we might face in the Western Pacific, and we stand together in support of each other."

Hegseth’s trip was a success. It is reminiscent in many ways of visits by former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin or former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. It included strong reaffirmations of US mutual defense commitments, the announcement of new initiatives to expand allied cooperation, and a clear signal that the United States remains committed to the region. However, the positive momentum from the trip is somewhat undermined by the Trump administration’s aggressive tariffs on American allies and broader concerns about the unpredictability of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the trip was a welcomed development and reinforced America’s enduring presence in the Indo-Pacific.

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Spoke Story: Key Findings From New Defense Industrial Base Report

The National Defense Industrial Association released their Vital Signs 2025 report recently. NDIA’s Vital Signs 2025 report highlights a positive shift in Washington’s policy discourse, emphasizing bipartisan recognition of the US Defense Industrial Base's (DIB) critical role in national deterrence. However, despite favorable political conditions, reforms to accelerate defense acquisition and innovation face challenges, requiring balanced policies that reduce regulatory burdens and share risk between the government and contractors. To sustain readiness, increased and stable defense funding is essential, as failure to maintain a resilient DIB could jeopardize US security, prosperity, and values.

Finding One: Government and Industry Largely Agree on the Problem

NDIA conducted a survey of relevant government and industry individuals to assess views about the US DIB from their perspectives. The two camps largely agree on the challenges holding the DIB behind on its full potential.

Find Two: Government Regulation and Budgeting Makes it Difficult for Defense Companies to Reinvest

The US government creates conditions that place the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) at a competitive disadvantage for three key reasons.

1. First, the US defense sector is not driven by traditional market forces, as the government is often the sole customer, limiting profits and controlling prices based on costs rather than value.

2. Second, the US DIB is heavily regulated, which increases operating costs, requires specialized systems, and limits the available talent pool due to security clearance requirements.

3. Finally, the DIB is constrained by the US government’s complex and unpredictable budget and acquisition processes, which create demand uncertainty and business risk, especially during changes in presidential administrations.

Finding Three: Fear Over IP Protection Prevents Companies From Working With US Government

Companies are increasingly concerned about losing their intellectual property (IP) rights when contracting with the Department of Defense (DoD), which discourages them from bidding on contracts. Many fear that DoD requirements, such as offering Government Purpose Rights (GPR), could jeopardize the future value of their innovations in the commercial market. As a result, 36 percent of private sector respondents chose not to bid on certain DoD contracts, while 37 percent withheld certain technologies from bids due to IP concerns, limiting DoD’s access to cutting-edge innovations and advanced technologies.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles From This Week

Australia:

• Defense News: Aussie spy planes worked overtime during nearby Chinese naval drills

• Defense News: US Army plans Australia test of missile launcher that has irked China

• Breaking Defense: Australian air force bullish on Ghost Bat ahead of production decision

South Korea:

• Brookings: Is South Korea ready to define its role in a Taiwan Strait contingency?

• Global Asia: How South Korea’s Political Crisis Could Affect Regional Security

• Yonhap News Agency: Defense ministry reaffirms USFK's role in keeping peace on Korean Peninsula

• Nikkei Asia: South Korea watchdog blocks Hanwha $2.5bn capital plan

• Yonhap News Agency: Arms agency chief visits Romania for talks on defense industry cooperation

India:

• TechnoSports: India to Establish Maitri-2 Antarctic Research Station by 2029

• The Print: India & African nations to hold 1st joint naval exercise in Indian Ocean

The Philippines:

• USNI News: SECDEF Hegseth Announces Marine Anti-Ship Missile Deployment to Balikatan, Defense Industrial Base Cooperation with Manila in Philippines Visit

• USNI News: Report to Congress on U.S. Army’s Typhon Strategic Mid-Range Fires System

US Indo-Pacific Command:

• IISS: Reinforcement and redistribution: evolving US posture in the Indo-Pacific

• INDOPACOM: President of the Republic of Palau visits Hawaii

• INDOPACOM: US and ROK Marines Conclude Freedom Shield 25

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Hub Story: Taiwan’s 2025 Quadrennial Defense Review

Taiwan’s new Quadrennial Defense Review (unofficial English translation provide by Taiwan Security Monitor) highlights the escalating geopolitical risks posed by US-China strategic competition, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the PRC’s military expansion, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing’s growing military capabilities and aggressive posture present a direct threat.

Taiwan is strengthening its military preparedness through asymmetric defense strategies, national defense reforms, and international partnerships to deter PRC aggression and ensure regional stability. The Four-Year Defense Review reflects the government’s commitment to enhancing national defense through modernization, personnel development, and engagement with the global defense supply chain, all while upholding democratic values and demonstrating a firm resolve for self-defense. This review’s theme is “Building Agile Response Capabilities and Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience to Ensure National Security.”

The review offers a broad overview, touching on many topics but without in-depth analysis. While much of the content will be familiar to those well-versed in Taiwan’s defense policy, certain focus areas provide insight into the new government’s priorities. The white paper is structured into the following sections:

1. Security in the Taiwan Strait under Shifting Global Dynamics

2. Strategic Guidance for National Defense Security

3. Building a Force That Can Defeat the Enemy

4. Priority Tasks in Advancing Defense Reforms

5. Nationwide Defense Mobilization to Support Sustained Operations

6. Regional Linkages to Strengthen Collective Deterrence

Here are some key takeaways:

1. Taiwan Connects Ukraine and Middle East to the Taiwan Strait

The white paper underscores the growing ties between great-power rivalry and regional conflicts, stressing their impact on Taiwan’s security and autonomy. It highlights how adversarial states like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are deepening their cooperation, creating a more precarious security landscape for Taiwan and its Western partners.

Republic of China: Quadrennial Defense Review 2025:

The PRC continues to accelerate the modernization of its armed forces and has repeatedly taken unilateral actions in an attempt to alter the international order and the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and other regional strife in the Middle East, the United States, Europe, and Indo-Pacific countries—seeking to counter the increasingly close collaboration among Russia, the PRC, North Korea, and Iran—have been boosting defense spending, enhancing military preparedness, intensifying defense technology R&D, and expanding military security cooperation. This heightened military strengthening among nations to ensure their own security underscores the interlinked nature of global security affairs, which depend on a concerted international response…

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, there has been a profound effect on security in Europe and worldwide. NATO members have adjusted their foreign and defense policies, substantially increasing defense budgets and reinforcing collective defense mechanisms. In response to varying degrees of sanctions imposed by Western nations, China, Russia, and North Korea have sought even closer strategic collaboration…

Recent hostilities among Israel, Hamas, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have deteriorated security in the Middle East, triggering a humanitarian crisis and exerting a negative impact on the global economy. In the South China Sea, the PRC continues its militarization efforts and has confronted the Philippines in multiple territorial disputes, making the region a hotspot of conflict. Meanwhile, North Korea amended its constitution to designate South Korea as its top adversary, supplies military aid to Russia in order to deepen their alliance, and continues to develop nuclear weapons and test intercontinental ballistic missiles—factors that further destabilize Northeast Asia.

2. Budget Growth, Defense Reforms, and Innovation Procurement

The defense review also outlines the Ministry of National Defense’s approach to budget growth, defense reform, and innovation-driven procurement. According to the document, the ministry will place more emphasis on asymmetric capabilities and resilience. With a second Trump Administration taking shape, Taipei is likely to face heightened pressure to boost defense spending—especially as key figures like Bridge Colby have urged an increase from 2.5% to 10% of GDP. The white paper places significant emphasis on broader reforms and the integration of emerging technologies, aligning with the Executive Yuan’s strategic focus on the “Five Trusted Industry Sectors”: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, military, security and surveillance, and next-generation communications.

Republic of China: Quadrennial Defense Review 2025:

• Forward-Thinking, Pragmatic Budget Planning

  • Future budget priorities include building asymmetric capabilities, strengthening defense resilience, enhancing reserve force capabilities, and bolstering gray-zone response capacities.

  • In line with project timelines, the MND will maintain an overall upward trend in defense budgets.

  • As declared by the President, a special budget will be prioritized to bring defense expenditures above 3% of GDP, providing a boost to defense force development…

• Applying Key Innovative Technologies

  • Leverage the private sector’s R&D and production strengths to accelerate defense innovation, thereby establishing an asymmetric edge in defending the Taiwan Strait.

  • Form a National Defense Innovation Task Force, prioritizing unmanned systems, counter-unmanned systems, AI applications, communications, and cybersecurity—fields where civilian research efforts are already substantial. By conducting industrial capability assessments, business intelligence analyses, and technological exchanges, the MND monitors domestic and international trends in emerging technologies, informing the acquisition needs of the Armed Forces…

• To bolster self-sufficient production capabilities, the MND implements the “Advanced National Defense Technology Research Program.” Under the oversight of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and leveraging the seven “Defense Technology Research Centers”…

• NCSIST is establishing an “Aerospace and UAV Industrial Park,” encouraging aerospace and UAV firms to set up operations there, in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Asia UAV-AI Innovation Application R&D Center. This initiative promotes UAV and aerospace industry growth and participation in the “Non-Red UAV International Supply Chain.”…

• Enforce the “National Defense Industry Development Act,” establishing a certified vendor system and offering grants or subsidies to encourage R&D and promote industrial upgrading.

3. Mobilization and Civil Defense

In recent years, Taiwan has faced challenges in sustaining a sizeable and professional force structure. Although it maintains a mandatory conscription program, its historically short duration and limited rigor have done little to enhance overall warfighting capability. This defense review signals an intent to strengthen interoperability between the armed forces and local governments, particularly in preparing for coordinated responses in the event of a PRC attack.

Republic of China: Quadrennial Defense Review 2025:

Nationwide Defense Mobilization to Support Sustained Operations

To cultivate a robust democratic society and safeguard national security, our nation established the All-Society Defense Resilience Committee on June 19, 2024 under the Office of the President. This committee conducts a holistic review and proposes countermeasures. In alignment with this vision, and referencing the approaches of Western democracies, the Armed Forces have built an interagency military-civil coordination mechanism to support disaster relief and military operations. Through regular exercises, they validate mobilization systems and emergency response capabilities.

In accordance with the All-Out Defense Mobilization Preparatory Act, the Armed Forces continually collaborate with government agencies and local authorities to integrate national defense resources and conduct drills. This cooperation strengthens civil defense education and response training, facilitating a swift transition from peacetime to wartime and harnessing the collective might of society.

• If there are clear signs that the enemy will invade, an exercise order will be issued immediately to call up reserve 55 servicemembers from the three services. Under the guidance of each theater command, reserve units will be augmented to join active-duty forces, expediting personnel and materiel preparations for combat…

• Mandatory military training now includes civil defense courses, teaching conscripts self-help and mutual assistance skills. Upon returning home after discharge, they continue to contribute to local defense.

Government strategy papers are often a mixed bag—more like a Christmas tree, where every agency adds its own ornament, making it hard to discern clear priorities. The result is a blend of well-meaning aspirations and actual, resourced initiatives, with little distinction between the two on paper. In the end, only time will tell how closely Taiwan follows through on the goals outlined in this review.

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Spoke Story: EU Defense Readiness White Paper

The European Commission has released its Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, presenting a sobering evaluation of the continent’s defense industrial base and a roadmap for its revitalization. To support this mission, the EU is opening $163 billion in loans for joint procurements. Underpinning this effort is a fundamental shift in Europe’s strategic outlook—an explicit recognition that the post-war, rules-based international order is coming undone. The paper begins with a stark warning: Europe must brace for a more contested, unstable world and take urgent steps to adapt.

European Commission: European Defence Readiness 2030:

The political equilibrium that emerged from the end of the Second World War and then the conclusion of the Cold War has been severely disrupted. However much we may be wistful about this old era, we need to accept the reality that it is not coming back. Upholding the international rules-based order will remain of utmost importance, both in our interest and as an expression of our values. But a new international order will be formed in the second half of this decade and beyond. Unless we shape this order – in both our region and beyond – we will be passive recipients of the outcome of this period of interstate competition with all the negative consequences that could flow from this, including the real prospect of full-scale war. History will not forgive us for inaction.

The European Commission faces a fundamental challenge: the European Union is a confederation, not a centralized authority, and lacks the power to unilaterally direct defense policy for the continent. Its role is primarily one of coordination and support. Ultimately, the future of the European defense industrial base will depend on the political will and commitment of individual member states. Recognizing this, the Commission outlines several ways it can assist and empower national efforts.

The EU is bringing value by:

• facilitating greater collaboration and efficient scale for the European defence industry in developing, producing and marketing weapons systems,

• facilitating efficiencies, interchangeability and interoperability, lowering costs by avoiding competitive purchasing and improving purchasing power for Member States, while helping to generate stability and predictability with multi-year industrial demand,

• supporting dual-use infrastructure for mobility and space-based communications, navigation, and observation,

• enabling partnerships.

These tools inform the EU’s key priority areas for strengthening its defense readiness.

European Commission: European Defence Readiness 2030:

Based on the defence capability gaps already identified by Member States, this White Paper sets out seven priority areas which are critical to build a robust European defence. The priority capability areas are the following:

Air and missile defence: an integrated, multi-layered, air and missile defence that protects against a full spectrum of air threats (cruise missiles, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, aircraft and UAS).

Artillery systems: advanced fire systems including modern artillery and long-range missile systems designed to deliver precise, long-range attacks against land targets (deep precision strike).

Ammunition and missiles: building on the European External Action Service initiative “Ammunition Plan 2.0”, a strategic stockpile of ammunition, missiles and components along with sufficient defence industrial production capacity to ensure timely replenishment.

Drones and counter-drone systems: unmanned systems, including aerial, ground, surface and underwater vehicles that can be controlled remotely or operate autonomously using advanced software and sensors and enhance the capabilities that these technologies enable (e.g. situation awareness, surveillance, …).

Military Mobility: an EU-wide network of land corridors, airports, seaports and support elements and services, that facilitate the seamless and fast transport of troops and military equipment across the EU and partner countries.

AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare: defence applications using military AI and quantum computing; EU-wide advanced electronic systems designed to a) protect and ensure the unhindered use of the electromagnetic spectrum for land, air, space and naval forces and operations; b) suppress, disrupt and deny the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by an opponent; and c) protect the freedom to operate in cyber space and ensure unhindered access to cyber capabilities. Both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are needed to ensure the protection and freedom of manoeuvre in cyberspace. There is a need to develop together with Member States a voluntary support scheme for offensive cyber capabilities as credible deterrence.

Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection: including but not limited to Strategic Airlift and Air-to-Air refuelling aircraft, intelligence and surveillance, maritime domain awareness, use and protection of space and other secure communications assets and military fuel infrastructure

The EU hopes to leverage these priority areas to continue to support Ukraine. The white paper explains its goals for EU support to Ukraine:

1. The provision of large-calibre artillery ammunition with a minimum objective of 2 million rounds per year.

2. The provision of air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strike) and drones are priorities shared by Ukraine and Member States.

3. Drones are an indispensable capability in redressing the asymmetry of military resources in the field. The EU and its Member States should continue to support Ukraine’s procurement of drones and further support the development of its own production capacity, including through joint ventures between European and Ukrainian industries.

4. EU and Member States’ efforts to train and equip Ukrainian brigades and actively support the regeneration of battalions must consolidate and continue to develop further and evolve into an essential element of the future military capacity development of Ukraine after any ceasefire.

5. Direct support to Ukraine’s defence industry is the most effective and cost-efficient way to support Ukraine’s military efforts, notably through direct procurement orders from its defence industry by Member States for donation to Ukraine.

6. Enhanced Military mobility is needed to ensure smoother deliveries of military assistance.

7. Enhanced access to EU space assets and services could be a key enabler to enhance Ukraine’s defence capacities.

Notably, the plan excludes the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey from participating in joint procurements—an exclusion that may undercut Europe’s ability to stay competitive. The broader challenge facing the EU is its declining edge in economic growth, productivity, and technological innovation. One report highlights that Europe significantly trails the US in investment in frontier technologies—receiving less than 10 percent of global synthetic biology investment and producing half as many patents per capita in areas like digital tech, quantum computing, and big data. Europe is also falling behind in artificial intelligence, having focused more on regulation than advancement. As French President Emmanuel Macron cautioned, “We are regulating ourselves out of the market.” By sidelining key partners like the US and UK from its innovation strategy, Europe risks further weakening its technological and industrial base.

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Spoke Story: Australia’s Opposition Leader Outlines Foreign Policy Vision

Australian Opposition Leader Peter Dutton delivered a major foreign policy address at the Lowy Institute, outlining his strategic vision ahead of the upcoming federal election in May. The upcoming election remains highly competitive. While Dutton’s Coalition currently holds a slight lead over the incumbent Labor Party, head-to-head polling shows a 50-50 split. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese maintains an edge in personal popularity, with 45 percent of voters preferring him as Prime Minister compared to 40 percent for Peter Dutton. Given how close the race is, Dutton could be leading Australia in the next few months. Understanding his views on foreign policy are important to understand.

Dutton sharply criticized Prime Minister Albanese for what he described as a weak and reactive foreign policy that fails to safeguard Australia’s national sovereignty. His speech followed a recent Chinese live-fire naval expedition circumnavigating Australian territory—an act of deliberate intimidation. Public concern over national security is also mounting, with just 62 percent of Australians now saying they feel safe, a steep decline from 92 percent in 2010. Dutton argues that he has the right policies to protect Australia.

Dutton criticized the Albanese Government’s support for Ukraine as inconsistent and inadequate, pointing to several failures: the refusal to donate decommissioned MRH-90 Taipan helicopters—instead opting to dismantle and bury them; the dismissal of repeated Ukrainian requests for thermal coal; the failure to deliver promised M1 Abrams tanks; and the prolonged closure of Australia’s embassy in Kyiv, which remained shut for nearly three years while other nations quickly re-established their diplomatic presence.

Dutton emphasized the importance of maintaining a stable and mutually beneficial trading relationship with China, acknowledging the contributions of Australia’s Chinese diaspora and the value of bilateral ties. However, he strongly criticized the Albanese Government for failing to confront the Chinese Communist Party’s military aggression, including the recent unannounced naval exercise around Australia. He argued that this silence reflects political self-interest at the expense of national security and vowed that a Coalition Government would take a firmer stance against foreign interference and regional destabilization, making clear “red lines” and defending democratic values in concert with like-minded allies.

On the Pacific, Dutton underscored the Coalition’s legacy of deepening partnerships through initiatives like the Pacific Step-up, record aid contributions, and maritime security programs. While welcoming the continuation of some Coalition initiatives by the Albanese Government, he accused Labor of politicizing Pacific diplomacy for domestic gain—an approach he believes has weakened Australia's position amid rising competition from China. Dutton pledged that a future Coalition Government would intensify engagement, seek to finalize delayed agreements, and ensure Australia remains the “partner of choice” for Pacific nations by clearly communicating the risks posed by alternative security arrangements that could undermine regional stability.

Finally, Dutton argued that Australia must significantly boost its defense capabilities to both strengthen its alliance with the United States—particularly in the Indo-Pacific, the “theatre of mutual interest”—and enhance national self-reliance in an increasingly volatile strategic environment. He criticized the Albanese Government for stagnant defense spending, excessive reviews, and capability delays, including leaving the Navy with only one operational Collins-class submarine. In contrast, he pledged that a Dutton Coalition Government would make major investments in defense, beginning with $3 billion to reinstate a squadron of F-35s, while revitalizing the domestic defense industry to produce affordable, asymmetric capabilities like drones, missiles, and uncrewed vessels. Framing AUKUS as the linchpin for a seamless US-Australia defense production partnership, Dutton called for rethinking the country’s defense posture through industrial retooling, strategic clarity, and urgent action.

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Spoke Story: US Holds Exercises with Indo-Pacific Allies

This week, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) special operations forces (SOF) participated in Exercise Freedom Shield 2025 (FS25), an 11-day training series aimed at enhancing joint combat readiness and interoperability across a range of missions. The training included direct action raids, counter-WMD operations, and coordination across multiple domains, culminating in a high-stakes simulated raid on an underground facility. Brig. Gen. Derek Lipson emphasized the legacy of the Korean War and the need to maintain a credible deterrent force, noting that exercises like FS25 strengthen the Alliance’s ability to defend both nations and ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Simultaneously, Exercise Sea Dragon 2025 (SD25) concluded at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, where maritime patrol aircraft and crews from Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States engaged in advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) drills. Hosted by Commander, Task Force 72, the exercise included live tracking of a US Navy submarine, use of the MK-30 “SLED” training target, and a competitive phase where the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) secured the “Dragon Belt” award for tactical excellence. The event underscored the high level of coordination and shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific among participating nations.

In a further show of regional alignment, the US, Japan, and South Korea conducted a trilateral naval exercise from March 17–20, building on prior operations such as Freedom Edge and January’s trilateral bomber escort flights. The exercise involved the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and focused on maritime interdiction, air combat drills, and advanced communications—strengthening interoperability and readiness across all warfare domains. Meanwhile, US Indo-Pacific Command’s Adm. Samuel Paparo traveled to India for the Raisina Dialogue, reinforcing US-India defense ties and promoting the COMPACT initiative, which seeks to deepen cooperation across defense, technology, and economic domains.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• The Diplomat: Japan to Pay First Visit to Cambodian Naval Base Funded by China

• The Strategist: Japan and Australia can fill each other’s defence gaps

• Maritime Link: JAMSTEC Launches Japan’s First Arctic Research Vessel

• USNI News: Japan Still Deciding Where to Base New Anti-Ship Missiles; China Surges Military Aircraft Near Taiwan

• Stars and Stripes: Japan launches Joint Operations Command as US restructuring plan faces uncertainty

Australia:

• Australian Government: 2024 Independent Intelligence Review

• The Strategist: Australia needs greater defence self-reliance, and extra funding

• UWA Security and Defense: Targeted Interoperability: A New Framework for Australia in South East Asia

• Breaking Defense: Australia, Canada announce $4B over horizon radar agreement

• The Interpreter: Australian defence and the nebulous “archipelago”

• Naval News: Australia fires LRASM missile from Super Hornet

South Korea:

• Reuters: Russian warplane entered South Korean air defence zone, Seoul says

• Yonhap News Agency: Acting president stresses need for strong joint defense posture with visit to Combined Forces Command command post

• Yonhap News Agency: Arms agency chief discusses defense industry cooperation with Philippine defense chief

• Yonhap News Agency: USFK general vows to maintain 'strong, forward-deployed force' in S. Korea

The Philippines:

• Reuters: Philippines eyes transforming islands of former U.S. base into military reservation

• USNI News: U.S. Marines to Stage Equipment at Subic Bay Under New Prepositioning Plan

• Reuters: Philippines eyes expansion of Squad group to India, South Korea

Taiwan:

• Taiwan News: Defense ministry says Taiwan to receive HIMARS order ahead of schedule

• Bloomberg: Taiwan Names Japan’s Ex-Defense Chief as Cabinet Consultant

• Taiwan News: Belgian Chamber of Representatives passes pro-Taiwan resolution

• Taiwan News: Taiwan raises military bonuses amid tension with China

India:

• Reuters: India grants initial approval for $6 billion defence purchases

• The Times of India: Modernisation Proposals Worth Rs 54000 Crore Get Ministry of Defences Initial Nod

• The Tribune: Chinese vessels engaging in military work in Indian Ocean: Navy Chief

• Reuters: India signs $248 million deal with Russia for advanced battle tank engines

Pacific Islands:

• Australian Government: Joint Communiqué of the Seventh Annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security

• PINA: Top Pacific diplomats ready for direct talks on Bougainville independence

• PINA: Pacific’s top diplomat urges new cooperation amid U.S aid freeze

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Hub Story: South Korea’s Naval Export Boom

The USNS Wally Schirra (T-AKE-8) completed a seven-month overhaul at Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard in South Korea, marking the first large-scale maintenance of a US naval vessel in the country as part of efforts to expand repair options in the Indo-Pacific. The successful maintenance demonstrated South Korea’s growing role in US naval logistics, with Hanwha Ocean showcasing its ability to reverse engineer components and handle complex repairs. This effort aligns with broader US initiatives to develop ship maintenance hubs across the region, including in India, the Philippines, and Japan, to enhance operational readiness and reduce downtime. South Korean shipbuilding is a critical allied capability that Washington has only recently begun to leverage.

The decline of American shipbuilding has been steep, stagnating at around five ships per year for decades, leaving the industry a shadow of its former self. The consolidation of the shipbuilding industrial base combined with other government restrictions has resulted in increased costs. Meanwhile, Asian nations have steamed ahead on shipbuilding. The three largest shipbuilding firms in China, Korea, and Japan (nine firms in total) account for 75 percent of world shipbuilding capacity.

South Korea in particular has played a leading role in supporting allied shipbuilding needs.

South Korea has become the primary supplier of naval vessels for the Philippine Navy, playing a central role in its modernization efforts under the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP). By 2028, the Philippine Navy is expected to operate at least 12 South Korean-built ships, including frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol vessels, as Manila shifts toward territorial defense operations amid rising regional tensions. This deepening defense relationship reflects South Korea’s cost-effective shipbuilding capabilities and strategic proximity, allowing the Philippines to rapidly expand its maritime forces while balancing budget constraints and operational demands.

Seoul is also courting NATO countries as these nations look to increase defense spending. South Korea is actively positioning itself as a key defense supplier for Canada, offering advanced military equipment, including KSS-III submarines, as an alternative to U.S. defense systems amid growing concerns over American reliability. With a proven track record of supplying NATO-compatible weapons to European allies and a willingness to establish local production and maintenance facilities, South Korea presents Canada with a cost-effective and strategically independent option for its naval modernization efforts.

Additionally, South Korea's Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) is positioning itself as a key partner for Poland’s Orka submarine program, offering advanced Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines with significant technology transfer and industrial cooperation. If selected, HHI’s HDS-2300 or KSS-III PL submarines would not only enhance Poland’s naval capabilities but also enable domestic shipbuilding and maintenance, potentially making Poland an exporter of submarines in the future.

In recent years, Washington has increasingly sought to harness South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding capabilities. In early 2024, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro visited South Korea, urging its top shipbuilders to invest in the US, a call that led Hanwha Ocean to acquire a major Philadelphia shipyard, bringing critical expertise and resources. This aligns with the Defense Department’s broader push to strengthen allied industrial partnerships, as outlined in the 2024 Regional Sustainment Framework, which prioritizes deeper cooperation with key partners.

US Defense Department: Regional Sustainment Framework:

Goals:

1. Prevail in Contested Logistics
The DoD will create a resilient, distributed Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) network to sustain operations in peacetime and meet surge demands during crises by expanding partnerships with allies across all domains.

2. Enhance Readiness
By aligning sustainment strategies with allied defense priorities, the DoD will strengthen joint capabilities to rapidly restore readiness, counter threats, and deter aggression.

3. Strengthen Regional Partnerships
The DoD will foster a collaborative, regional MRO ecosystem to expand repair capacity and enhance co-sustainment across warfighting domains.

South Korean shipbuilding is poised to expand its global influence and reshape the industry. South Korea’s leading shipbuilders, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean, have joined forces under the “One Team” initiative to strengthen their position in the global naval export market. This partnership, supported by the government, aims to maximize efficiency by dividing responsibilities—HD Hyundai leading surface vessel exports and Hanwha Ocean focusing on submarines—while fostering collaboration and technology sharing. By presenting a unified front in major international competitions like Poland’s Orka Program and Canada’s Patrol Submarine Project, this initiative is expected to enhance South Korea’s competitiveness, drive innovation, and expand its influence in global maritime security.

​The recent political developments in both the United States and South Korea have introduced significant uncertainties that may hinder US-Republic of Korea (ROK) collaboration. President Donald Trump's re-election is expected to shift US foreign and security policies towards more transactional relationships, potentially challenging longstanding alliances, including that with South Korea. Concurrently, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment have led to domestic political turmoil, raising concerns about South Korea's political stability and its impact on international relations. These developments could strain diplomatic ties and complicate joint efforts in addressing regional security challenges, necessitating careful navigation to maintain the strength of the US-ROK alliance

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Spoke Story: US Supports Japanese Hypersonic Program

The US State Department has approved a potential $200 million sale to support Japan’s Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) program, an indigenously developed hypersonic missile designed for island defense and anti-ship operations. Japan has been advancing its hypersonic capabilities amid rising security concerns in the East China Sea and potential threats from China, with plans to deploy the weapon next year. The HVGP program includes multiple variants, with future versions expected to achieve ranges of up to 1,800 miles, reinforcing Japan’s broader counterstrike strategy alongside missile procurements and regional force enhancements.

In 2020, Japan announced the development of its HVGP, a supersonic glide weapon designed to enhance island defense, particularly against potential threats in the East China Sea. The program includes two phases—Block 1 as an early capability and Block 2 with advanced "wave-rider" technology for greater range and precision, including anti-ship capabilities against large targets like aircraft carriers. As Japan moves toward deploying these weapons, potential US-Japan collaboration could help overcome technical challenges, strengthen deterrence, and integrate the HVGP into a broader regional security framework.

The pursuit of counterstrike capabilities has become a key priority for Japan as it reshapes its defense strategy.

Japanese Ministry of Defense: Defense Buildup Program:

Counterstrike capabilities are the Self-Defense Force’s capabilities that leverage standoff defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three Conditions for Use of Force. Operation of this counterstrike capability will be conducted under unified command and control based on joint operations.

Beyond hypersonic capability, Japan is also expanding its strike capabilities with the upgraded Type-12 anti-ship missile, set for deployment this year. This road-mobile system extends its range to over 900 kilometers, up from the original 200 km, and features a reduced radar cross-section and datalink for real-time targeting updates. It is expected to strengthen Japan’s defense posture, particularly across the Ryukyu Islands, where it aims to counter growing Chinese naval activity. To fully leverage its extended range, Japan is also enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure while deepening defense cooperation with the United States and South Korea under new security frameworks like Freedom Edge and trilateral intelligence-sharing initiatives.

In addition, Japan plans to deploy long-range missiles on Kyushu by March 2026 as part of its counterstrike strategy. The upgraded Type-12 land-to-ship missile will have the ability to strike North Korea and China’s coastal areas. Unlike hypersonic weapons, the subsonic Type-12 is designed for both anti-ship and land-attack roles, featuring improved stealth and targeting. Potential deployment sites include GSDF garrisons in Yufu, Oita Prefecture, and Kumamoto City, though Okinawa is unlikely due to regional tensions. This deployment strengthens Japan’s defenses in the Nansei island chain, a key area for deterring threats near Taiwan.

Japan’s expanding missile capabilities are crucial to reinforcing its role as the shield in the shield-and-spear alliance framework with the United States, providing a credible deterrent against regional threats. By enhancing its counterstrike and standoff defense capabilities, Japan not only strengthens its own security but also ensures greater stability in the Indo-Pacific, complementing the U.S. military’s forward-deployed posture.

Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• YCAPS: The Australia-Japan Special Strategic Partnership

• Nikkei Asia: Japanese frigate Noshiro makes Australian port call amid bidding

• Naval News: Japan commissions fourth Awaji-class minesweeper

• Nikkei Asia: U.S. Congress studies Japan's fixed submarine production schedule

South Korea:

• KEI: South Korea Mulls Nuclear Latency

• Nikkei Asia: Hanwha aims to buy 9.9% of Australian shipbuilder Austal

Australia:

• Australian Manufacturing: Austal locks in $200M for US steel shipbuilding expansion

• War on the Rocks: When It Comes to Submarines, Australia Is Going to Be Left High and Dry

India:

• Nikkei Asia: India respects Mauritian sovereignty over Chagos Islands, Modi says

Technology:

• CSIS: Understanding U.S. Allies’ Current Legal Authority to Implement AI and Semiconductor Export Controls

Defense Industrial Base:

• USSC: Federation is deterrence: The US defence industrial and technology integration agenda in the Indo-Pacific

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Hub Story: Australia’s Emerging Hub-and-Spokes System in the Pacific

Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) are negotiating a security treaty to strengthen their security relationship, marking the most significant defense agreement between the two countries since PNG’s independence. The treaty is expected to cover military, police, cyber, and climate security, and may include provisions to prevent PNG from entering defense agreements with countries like China. This agreement follows similar moves by the U.S., which signed a deal with PNG last year, highlighting the growing competition for influence in the Pacific region amid shifting security dynamics. Australia’s new security treaty with Papua New Guinea mirrors similar agreements with Nauru and Tuvalu, marking a strategic shift for Australia. While not mutual defense treaties like those between the US and Australia or the US and Japan, these agreements reflect Australia’s adaptation of the US-led hub-and-spokes system that emerged in Asia after World War II. These bilateral arrangements enhance Australia’s influence and commitment to regional security, particularly in countering China’s growing presence.

Canberra has been courting deeper PNG security cooperation for a few years. On 7 December 2023, Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese and James Marape signed the Bilateral Security Agreement.

Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Delivering under the Australia-Papua New Guinea Bilateral Security Agreement:

The initiatives, to be delivered under Australia and Papua New Guinea's Bilateral Security Agreement, include:

• support for PNG's legal system to help PNG investigate and prosecute financial crime;

• investments in programs to improve access to justice for young people and remote and regional communities;

• support to make PNG's correctional facilities safer and more secure.

We will deliver additional support for stability in the PNG Highlands, including a new program to help PNG improve weapons management and a partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross…

These initiatives will be funded from the $200 million committed by Australia to support PNG's internal security priorities through our landmark Bilateral Security Agreement, announced by Prime Ministers Albanese and Marape in December 2023.

In recent months, we have made progress on delivering on our ambitions for our bilateral security partnership, including through:

• commencement of construction on new police housing in Port Moresby and Mount Hagen;

• additional Australian Federal Police support to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) on recruitment, training and forensics;

• RPNGC Officer Cadet placements in the Queensland Police Service in Far North Queensland;

• a new Police Patrol Vessel to enable the RPNGC to conduct long-range patrols of sea borders.

In addition, our flagship Australia-PNG Law and Justice partnership is expanding from five to seven PNG provinces and regions, strengthening service delivery and access to justice for Papua New Guineans.

In addition to defense and security cooperation, Australia has increased development cooperation. PNG is Australia's largest development partner, with an estimated $637.4 million in Official Development Assistance funding (2024-25), an expanding program of blended finance (loans and grants) for infrastructure development under the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, and $2.56 billion in budget support loans since 2019 (non-ODA), linked to fiscal repair and economic reform.

Australia’s – Papua New Guinea Development Partnership Plan 2024 – 2029:

• Objective 1: Building an Economic Partnership for Prosperity

• Objective 2: Promoting Improved Law, Order and Governance

• Objective 3: Investing in People and Building Resilient Communities

• Objective 4: Building Close Friendships and Enduring Ties

The new Australia-PNG defense treaty is unlikely to include a NATO-style Article 5 mutual defense clause. However, it is expected to feature an exclusionary clause, granting Australia the legal right to veto PNG from entering any other security or strategic agreements, such as with China. This treaty is part of Australia’s expanding security framework, with similar agreements already in place with Nauru and Tuvalu, reflecting Australia's efforts to strengthen its influence and ensure strategic alignment in the Pacific region.

In August 2024, a security treaty between Tuvalu and Australia came into effect, focusing on three key areas: climate cooperation, dignified mobility, and shared security. This agreement highlights Australia’s strategy to strengthen its security architecture in response to China’s growing assertiveness and the increasing unpredictability of the United States. The treaty not only commits Australia to provide support to Tuvalu in times of crisis but also grants Australia the power to veto any Chinese attempts to establish a security arrangement with Tuvalu. The same arrangement that will most likely develop between Australia and PNG.

Australian Government: Media Release:

From today, and for the first time ever, Australia is obliged to respond when Tuvalu calls for assistance in the face of a major natural disaster, health pandemic or military aggression. Tuvalu, in turn, will mutually agree any new third-party engagement on defence and security-related matters with Australia.

Similar to Tuvalu, Australia and Nauru signed the Nauru–Australia Treaty in December 2024, elevating their relationship to an integrated economic, social, and security partnership. Under the Treaty, Australia will provide $100 million over five years to strengthen Nauru’s economic resilience and ensure continued access to banking services, with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia set to commence operations in 2025. Additionally, Australia commits $40 million to support Nauru’s policing and security, with both nations agreeing to consult on security matters and restrict third-party involvement in critical infrastructure.

Australian Government: Joint Statement on Nauru-Australia Treaty:

To underpin this commitment, both countries will mutually agree on any engagement by others in Nauru’s security and key critical infrastructure sectors and have agreed that critical infrastructure shall not be used by any third party for security purposes. This reflects our understanding that as Pacific countries our interests are intertwined and decisions taken by one can affect the interests of the other.

As Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) negotiate their security treaty, it is likely to follow a similar structure to the agreements with Tuvalu and Nauru. Under the treaty, Australia could provide development, infrastructure, security, and economic aid, while PNG would designate Australia as its security guarantor of choice and effectively exclude China from entering any security arrangements. This approach reflects Australia’s broader strategy to solidify its influence in the Pacific region amid increasing competition from China.

As the Trump Administration develops its strategies for the Indo-Pacific, it should seek ways to support Australia’s diplomatic outreach. Canberra has established deep and enduring relationships with many Pacific Island nations, connections that Washington lacks. While the United States must continue to engage with Pacific Island partners independently, augmenting Australian initiatives would be a net positive for American security, strengthening the broader regional alliance system and countering rising geopolitical challenges.

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Spoke Story: Australia Seeks Deeper Economic Ties with India

Australia has unveiled an ambitious roadmap to strengthen trade and investment ties with India, focusing on clean energy, education, agribusiness, and tourism, with a USD 16 million investment in a Trade and Investment Accelerator Fund. The plan aims to boost bilateral economic cooperation, create job opportunities, and enhance cultural links. With a free trade agreement already saving Australian businesses USD 2 billion in tariffs, this initiative is poised to unlock further commercial opportunities in India’s rapidly growing market.

At the foundation’s Australia’s plan, titled “A New Roadmap for Australia’s Economic Engagement with India,” is the growing strategic alignment between Canberra and New Delhi.

A New Roadmap for Australia’s Economic Engagement with India:

India’s economic rise is also happening just as our geostrategic environment becomes more volatile. Our strategic interests are converging with India’s. This is becoming central to the way we engage each other. Our growing geopolitical alignment supports our economic partnership. We signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020. We are members of the Quad, the G20 and the Commonwealth. Our prime ministers meet each year. We are both working hard toward our shared vision for a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific. As neighbours, we see our neighbourhood – our region – in the same way. We share many of the same goals, and we are both focused on what needs to be done. This Roadmap outlines how the Government intends to seize the opportunity that our relationship with India presents.

Australia’s roadmap outlines four key areas for enhancing economic engagement with India: clean energy, education and skills, agribusiness, and tourism, with specific action plans developed for each sector to strengthen bilateral ties and promote mutual growth.

CLEAN ENERGY

India’s energy transition presents a significant opportunity for Australian businesses, particularly in sectors like solar, hydrogen, electric vehicles, and green steel. As India’s energy consumption grows, especially in clean energy, the country aims to become a key player in the global shift to renewables, providing a natural platform for collaboration with Australia. Both nations have aligned goals, with Australia’s Future Made in Australia plan and India’s Make in India initiative driving clean energy development and critical minerals production. The India-Australia Renewable Energy Partnership, launched in November 2024, focuses on key areas like solar photovoltaics, renewable hydrogen, and energy storage, positioning both countries to lead in the clean energy supply chain.

Clean Energy Action Plan:

• India-Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP)

• India-Australia Green Steel Partnership

• India-Australia Critical Minerals Research Partnership

• Australia-India Critical Minerals Investment Partnership

• Australia-India CEO Forum

• India-Australia Rapid Innovation and Startup Expansion (RISE) Accelerator

• India-Australia Minerals Scholar Network

• International Hydrogen RD&D Collaboration Program

• Quad Climate Working Group

• Quad Clean Energy Supply Chain Diversification Program

EDUCATION AND SKILLS

India’s large and growing youth population presents significant opportunities for Australia in education and skills development. As India expands its economy, particularly in sectors like electric vehicles, IT, and manufacturing, Australian universities and vocational training providers are increasingly partnering with Indian institutions to offer dual degrees and skills training programs. Notable initiatives, such as Australian universities establishing campuses in India and mutual recognition of qualifications, are strengthening educational ties and creating pathways for students and professionals between the two countries. These educational collaborations support both nations' economic ambitions and foster long-term cooperation across sectors like green energy, mining, and agriculture.

Education and Skills Action Plan:

• Maitri Scholarships Program

• Maitri Fellowships Program

• Maitri Grants

• Mobility Arrangement for Talented Early-professionals Scheme (MATES)

• Encourage further transnational education (TNE) investment

• Mapping Vocational Education and Training qualifications and/or occupational standards

AGRIBUSINESS

India's growing middle class and changing food preferences present significant opportunities for Australian agribusinesses, particularly in premium products like wine, seafood, and lamb. The Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) has already boosted exports, such as sheep meat and almonds, and facilitated better market access for Australian produce, with Australian wine benefitting from reduced tariffs. While market access remains a long-term challenge due to India's protected agricultural sector, Australia's expertise in agritech, including water management and grain storage, positions it well to assist India in enhancing productivity and food security, creating lasting trade relationships.

Agribusiness Action Plan:

• Seek improved agricultural market access to India through the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)

• Showcasing Australian produce at government-hosted events, and through promotion on social media

TOURISM

India's growing consumer class and rising purchasing power are driving a surge in outbound travel, with 50 million Indians projected to travel abroad by 2030, making India the fastest-growing outbound market. Australia is a top destination for Indian tourists, with increasing arrivals driven by the large Indian diaspora, cultural ties, and Australia’s appealing tourist experiences. Flight connectivity improvements, such as the Open Skies Agreement and the expansion of direct flights, are expected to further boost tourism, while Tourism Australia continues to engage the Indian market through events and industry collaborations, aiming for 1.2 million Indian visitors by 2035.

Tourism Action Plan:

• encourage additional direct flights

• Promote Australia as a tourist destination

• Investigate regional dispersal initiatives

• build and establish business relationships

• Collaborate with key distribution and airline partners

Alliance Insights: Key Article This Week

Australia:

• ABC: Coalition pledges $3 billion to acquire extra joint strike fighter jets

• Sky News: China alerted Papau New Guinea of warship exercises weeks in advance as 'courtesy' while keeping Australia in the dark

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Australia in the World - 2025 Snapshot

Japan:

• Defense News: The tiny Japanese island militarizing on Taiwan’s doorstep

• Breaking Defense: Japan targets weapons sales through Indo-Pacific, as industrial ties lag strategic ones

South Korea:

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea joins NATO science and technology body partnership

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, U.S. Marines stage joint reconnaissance drills

• Yonhap News Agency: Navy's new fleet command holds 1st major maritime drills

India:

• Economic Times: India, China militaries implementing resolutions to end Ladakh conflict in comprehensive, effective manner: Chinese Defence Ministry

• Defense News: For India, it’s ‘Pick your fighter,’ as Delhi weighs US, Russian bids

Pacific Islands:

• CSIS: Pacific Airwaves – Aid, Alliances, and Uncertainty

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Hub Story: Japan-ASEAN Defense Forum

The 14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, held on February 11, 2025, centered on advancing defense cooperation under Japan's "JASMINE" initiative, which aligns with both Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Launched in November 2023, JASMINE (Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation) is built on four pillars aimed at realizing a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific, reflecting the spirit of the "Vientiane Vision 2.0."

The Vientiane Vision on Japanese-ASEAN defense cooperation was updated in 2019, and outlines how Tokyo wants to grow its defense ties in the region. The key elements include:

• Heart-to-heart Cooperation: Upholding ASEAN’s principles, valuing people-to-people connections and listening sincerely to partners’ needs

• Tailored and Lasting Cooperation: Pursuing sustainable outcomes through well-planned, transparent and ongoing engagement

• Equal and Open Cooperation: Pursuing wide-ranging international collaboration that supports ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience

At the Forum, Japan emphasized ASEAN's growing role in regional security, and both sides discussed future projects to further strengthen defense ties, reaffirming their commitment to promoting a rules-based, free, and open Indo-Pacific, and ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. JASMINE is a Japanese initiative to focus defense cooperation with ASEAN.

JASMINE’s Four Pillars:

1. Japan-ASEAN to Carry Out Efforts to Create a Security Environment that Does Not Allow Any Unilateral Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force or Coercion

2. To Continue and Expand the Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation

3. To Pursue Further Friendship and Opportunities between Japan and ASEAN Defense Officials

4. To Support Defense Cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and the Pacific Island Countries

Japanese security engagement with Southeast Asia is long, deep, and consistent. JASMINE is a newer initiative meant to capture and augment the cooperation that has been ongoing for years. Japan can already boast several achievements in pursuit of JASMINE:

• Japan-ASEAN and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program (June 2024)

• Professional Airmanship Program (PAP) (July 2024)

• Japan-ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Program (Nov. 2023 and July 2024)

• Maritime Cooperation and Connectivity Conference (December 2024)

• Japan-ASEAN WPS Cooperation Program (October 2024)

• Defense Minister Nakatani joined the ADMM-Plus (Lao PDR 2024)

• Japan’s co-chairmanship of the EWG on Maritime Security (2024-2027)

Japan has made substantial strides in Southeast Asia and is widely regarded as a trusted partner. According to the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s annual survey, Japan enjoys the highest levels of trust in the region.

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute: The State of Southeast Asia 2024:

Japan remains the most trusted major power among Southeast Asians (58.9%). The US comes in a distant second (42.4%), outpacing the EU (41.5%) by a narrow margin. Half of the respondents (50.1%) express distrust towards China with 45.5% of them fearing that China could use its economic and military power to threaten their country’s interest and sovereignty.

US engagement in Southeast Asia has historically been insufficient, and Washington should leverage partners like Japan to enhance its credibility in the region. American policy should actively support and contribute to Japanese initiatives that already resonate with ASEAN countries. Collaborating with Japan, along with other key partners like India and Australia, serves as a force multiplier, allowing the US to expand its influence in this vital region without overstretching its limited resources.

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Spoke Story: US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Meeting

On February 15, 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, and South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul met in Munich to reaffirm their unshakable trilateral partnership and commitment to security, prosperity, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. They pledged to strengthen defense cooperation, address North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, and enhance economic resilience through collaboration on energy, critical technologies, and supply chain security. The leaders also emphasized the importance of democratic values, supporting Taiwan, and reinforcing a fair global economic order while standing united against efforts to destabilize international security.

US State Department: Joint Statement on the Trilateral United States – Japan – Republic of Korea Meeting in Munich:

The Secretary and Foreign Ministers underscored the necessity of enhancing the strength of the Alliances to ensure peace and prosperity, including through robust security cooperation among the three countries.

They reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering defense and deterrence, including by conducting trilateral exercises and strengthening the capabilities of Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. and ROK Armed Forces. The United States reiterated its ironclad commitments to the defense of Japan and the Republic of Korea, backed by America’s unmatched military strength, including its nuclear capabilities. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen extended deterrence cooperation through the ROK-U.S. and Japan-U.S. Alliances.

It is still too early to determine the future of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea under new leadership in each country. The current alignment was forged by former leaders Joe Biden, Fumio Kishida, and Yoon Suk Yeol, and while the recent trilateral meeting signals a promising continuation of cooperation, domestic politics in all three countries could challenge its stability. Continued and enhanced collaboration will depend on strong leadership in each nation to uphold and strengthen the trilateral partnership.

Alliance Insights: Key Articles From This Week

Australia:

• ABC: Three Chinese warships sailing east of Sydney being monitored, ADF says

Japan:

• Naval News: Japan launches fourth Hibiki-class auxiliary ocean surveillance ship for the JMSDF

• The Japan Times: With eye on contract, Japan to send Mogami-class frigate to Australia for drills

South Korea:

• Naval News: ROK Navy takes another step toward blue-water navy

• Breaking Defense: Army deploys first Athena-R spy plane to South Korea

• Yonhap News Agency: Marine Corps holds live-fire drills on Yellow Sea border islands

• Yonhap News Agency: Hanwha Group signs MOU with UAE's weapons evaluation authority

New Zealand:

• Naval News: New Zealand Fires Penguin Missile for the First Time

• The Diplomat: Cook Islands’ China Shock: A ‘Frog in the Pot’ Moment for Pacific Security

The Philippines:

• Naval News: Philippines to Procure Submarines for Archipelagic Defense

• Nikkei Asia: Japan, U.S. and France conduct first carrier drill off Philippines

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Spoke Story: New Zealand's Diplomatic Setbacks in the Pacific Islands

In the past week, New Zealand has faced two significant diplomatic challenges with its Pacific Island neighbors, raising critical concerns about regional stability and security. These developments underscore the growing geopolitical complexities in the Pacific, particularly amid escalating competition between China and Western powers for influence in the region.

A diplomatic dispute between New Zealand and Kiribati has raised concerns about the growing influence of China in the Pacific region. The dispute began when New Zealand's government announced it was reviewing aid to Kiribati after its president canceled a planned meeting with a New Zealand delegation. This has put Kiribati, a strategically significant but vulnerable nation, under the spotlight as it faces threats from climate change. Kiribati has pivoted toward China in recent years, notably switching diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019, while Western nations like New Zealand, Australia, and the US have struggled to maintain influence. With the region increasingly caught in the rivalry between China and the West, concerns are growing that Kiribati may turn further toward Beijing, especially as US aid and engagement in the Pacific face challenges.

New Zealand has expressed renewed concern over the Cook Islands' Prime Minister Mark Brown's upcoming trip to China to sign agreements, citing a lack of transparency and consultation despite the two nations' constitutional ties. New Zealand expects to be informed about the details of any agreements involving defense and security, given their constitutional arrangements. The Cook Islands, a self-governing nation in free association with New Zealand, has not fully consulted Wellington on the proposed partnership with China, which involves infrastructure, trade, and economic development. While China views the Cook Islands as an important partner, New Zealand officials and opposition leaders in the Cook Islands have raised concerns about the secrecy surrounding the agreements, urging more transparency in the decision-making process.

Climate change mitigation is a central priority for Pacific Island nations in shaping their security agendas. Alongside this, development, infrastructure, and economic aid play crucial roles in strengthening their resilience and addressing security challenges. The 2018 Pacific Islands Forum Boe Declaration on Regional Security underscores the region's deep concern over these interconnected issues.

Pacific Islands Forum: Boe Declaration Action Plan

The Boe Declaration is a call to action for stronger and cohesive regional security cooperation and coordination through the assertion of our collective will and collective voice as peoples of the Pacific.

It recognises that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific. It further recognises that the Pacific is faced with a regional security environment confronted with complex security challenges framed by an expanded concept of security, within a dynamic geopolitical environment.

The Boe Declaration affirms a revitalised approach to addressing regional security moving away from a narrow or traditional notion of security to an expanded concept of security. This expanded concept of security reaffirms the regions commitment to address emerging and contemporary security issues which directly impact upon the wellbeing of Pacific peoples.

While the United States maintains diplomatic engagement in the Pacific Islands region, it frequently depends on Australia and New Zealand to lead efforts in keeping many of these nations aligned with the West. New Zealand, in particular, has long-standing, strong relationships with these island nations, making its current challenges with Kiribati and the Cook Islands especially concerning. New Zealand’s white papers further highlight the alignment between its security priorities and those of the Pacific Island nations, underscoring the importance of maintaining this cooperative approach.

New Zealand Defence Ministry: Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023

New Zealand’s approach is informed by Pacific Island countries’ priorities in working to address underlying drivers of insecurity in the Pacific and supporting the resilience of the region against security challenges and threats. This includes the priorities set out in the Boe Declaration and the Pacific Island Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. Alongside other agencies, Defence will work with Pacific partners to build collective regional resilience and reinforce desired norms and practices. This includes, for example, working with Pacific partners to build overall regional capacity, supporting shared awareness of activities in our region, and deterring actions contrary to our shared interests.

In pursuit of these relationships, New Zealand puts a high priority on coordination with Australia. The importance of this relationship is so important that when New Zealand created its foreign policy white paper, its Pacific focus area almost exclusively talked about New Zealand-Australia cooperation.

New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry: Strategic Intentions 2024-2028

Partnering for the Pacific:

The Pacific is increasingly contested and complex. Alongside Australia, we have a non-discretionary interest in supporting the resilience of Pacific countries to address short and long-term challenges, including those related to climate change, security, human development, and economic prosperity.

Australia is our indispensable partner in this work. Working together, we can contribute at scale and speed, and in ways that directly address the needs and priorities of our Pacific partners…

The Ministry will focus extra effort into achieving these objectives:

• Objective One: Enhanced coordination and knowledge management within the Ministry and New Zealand Government to give transparency, visibility, and coherence to how we interact with Australia on Pacific issues.

• Objective Two: More structured engagement with Australia on Pacific issues, drawing on our respective strengths.

• Objective Three: Increased opportunities to work with Australia, in the region and in multilateral settings, in support of Pacific priorities.

For New Zealand, the Kiribati case is familiar. Australia has struggled to make inroads with the Pacific island nation as Kiribati balances China and the United States. The Cook Islands story is much more concerning. The Cook Islands is in a constitutional free association with New Zealand. Under the free association arrangement, the Cook Islands and New Zealand are expected to consult each other on external affairs and defense.

Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964

External affairs and defence

Nothing in this Act or in the Constitution shall affect the responsibilities of Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand for the external affairs and defence of the Cook Islands, those responsibilities to be discharged after consultation by the Prime Minister of New Zealand with the Premier of the Cook Islands.

If Cook Islands does move forward to sign a new comprehensive strategic partnership with China, New Zealand will probably demand details about the arrangement. The recent diplomatic challenges New Zealand faces with Kiribati and the Cook Islands highlight critical implications for US policy in the Pacific. As New Zealand grapples with increasing Chinese influence in these nations, especially in the context of strategic partnerships and climate change security, the US must reassess its reliance on regional allies to maintain influence. Given New Zealand’s key role in supporting Pacific resilience and security, the US risks losing ground if its partners, like New Zealand, struggle to engage effectively with Pacific Island nations that are increasingly drawn to Beijing’s influence.

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Spoke Story: United Kingdom-Australia Defense and Security Cooperation Agreement

The recently released UK-Australia Defence and Security Cooperation Agreement outlines key areas of collaboration aimed at strengthening mutual defense and security. Although signed in 2024, the agreement still requires approval from both countries' respective parliaments. While AUKUS serves as the catalyst for enhanced defense cooperation, the agreement's language reflects a much broader and more comprehensive security agenda between the two nations.

This agreement outlines various areas of cooperation between the parties, focusing on defense and security. These efforts aim to strengthen their partnership and capacity for joint operations, while also addressing evolving global challenges. Key areas of cooperation include:

• Peacekeeping and Military Operations: The parties will work together to sustain their capacity for peacekeeping and military operations, particularly those conducted under international frameworks like the United Nations, NATO, or other coalitions. "The Parties shall cooperate to build a long-term mutually beneficial partnership in defence and security."

• Multilateral Security Mechanisms: Cooperation will extend to multilateral security mechanisms such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and the Air and Space Interoperability Council. Regular reviews of these mechanisms will ensure their ongoing relevance to current security needs.

• Advanced Defence Capabilities and Technology: The agreement emphasizes cooperation in cutting-edge defense technologies, including participation in the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. This will cover areas like nuclear-powered submarines, cyber defense, AI, electronic warfare, and emerging technologies like hypersonic and quantum technologies.

• Information Sharing and Strategic Dialogue: The parties will exchange defense information, particularly regarding capabilities and operations, in line with their national security laws. They will also engage in strategic discussions on mutual interests, including sharing documents and conducting candid dialogues.

• Cybersecurity, Space, and Climate Security: The agreement recognizes the importance of cybersecurity, space domain awareness, and climate security. It calls for continued collaboration in these areas, including working together in multilateral forums to address shared challenges.

• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Both parties will cooperate in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, responding to natural disasters or other crises where their capabilities can support affected regions.

• Military Personnel Exchanges and Training: To enhance interoperability, there will be ongoing exchanges of military and civilian personnel. These exchanges will support training, education, and personnel development, fostering integration between the parties’ forces.

• Logistics and Industrial Cooperation: Practical cooperation will be strengthened through joint and multilateral exercises, logistical activities, and the sharing of defense procurement information. The agreement also highlights collaboration in defense science and technology, as well as testing and evaluating defense capabilities.

• Maritime and Emerging Security Issues: Maritime security is a key area of cooperation, along with exploring new defense fields that may emerge. The parties are committed to working together in these areas, including sharing information and participating in relevant multilateral forums.

This agreement encapsulates a comprehensive and evolving partnership aimed at enhancing defense capabilities, responding to global challenges, and ensuring mutual security interests are met. It underscores a commitment to long-term collaboration across various sectors of defense, technology, and international cooperation.

The agreement also includes a Status of Forces Agreement and outlines the responsibilities and procedures related to the presence of a Visiting Force in a host state, focusing on legal, operational, and logistical aspects. Key points include:

1. Respect for Local Laws: Members of a Visiting Force, its Civilian Component, and Dependants must respect the laws and regulations of the Receiving State, with provisions for disciplinary actions by the Sending State and cooperation on criminal jurisdiction.

2. Jurisdiction and Disciplinary Matters: The agreement establishes a framework for jurisdictional authority over members of a Visiting Force, covering both criminal and disciplinary actions, with details on how concurrent jurisdiction cases are handled between the Sending and Receiving States.

3. Logistics and Cooperation: The agreement includes provisions on the entry and exit of personnel, the importation of goods and equipment, security, communications, and medical treatment, ensuring smooth cooperation and compliance with local laws. It also covers environmental protection, accident investigations, and the handling of deceased members of the Visiting Force.

This framework ensures clarity in the legal status, operational protocols, and mutual responsibilities between the Sending and Receiving States. The agreement is a great advancement for AUKUS, but also demonstrates how initiatives like AUKUS can engender deeper cooperation.

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Spoke Story: India Increases Defense Spending

India has proposed a 9.5 percent increase in its defense budget for the 2025-26 fiscal year, reaching approximately $78.7 billion, with a significant portion directed toward wages and pensions rather than new military acquisitions. While about $54.2 billion is allocated to manpower costs, the capital outlay for modernization and procurement is set at $20.8 billion, a 4.6% increase from the previous year, but still insufficient to counter China’s military advancements. Analysts are concerned that the slow pace of defense deals and procurement could hinder India’s military modernization efforts, despite the higher budget allocation.

Breaking Defense: Indian defense budget boosted 9.5%, but analysts say pensions hindering weapons spending

According to analyst Neelanjana Banerjee, the budget breaks down like this:

India Defense Budget:

• Total: 681,210 crore (USD $78.8 billion), a 9.53% increase

• Defense pensions: 160,795 crore ($18.6 billion), a 14% increase.

• Capital expenditure: 180,000 crore ($20.8 billion), a 5% increase

• Revenue expenditure: INR 311,732 crore ($36 billion), a 10% increase.

Key Weapons Spending:

• Aircraft & aircraft engines: 48,614 crore rupees ($5.6 billion)

• Other Equipment: 63,099 crore rupees ($7.3 billion)

• Navy: 24,391 crore rupees ($2.8 billion)

To both Trump and Biden, India has played a core component to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Trump officials have done early indications that they plan on maintaining close US-India ties. On Trump’s inauguration day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a Quad Ministerial Meeting. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s phone call with Indian defense minister showed early hints at more cooperation, with an expected comprehensive defense framework in progress. Trump’s recent tariffs will hit India hard. Modi’s visit to Washington soon could help alleviate some of the hurt if they give enough concessions to ameliorate the White House.

Reuters: India's Modi to Meet Trump with Planned Tariff Concessions

As well as discussing tariffs with Trump, India is open to discussing a possible mini trade deal, two government officials said.

Modi's early visit aims to avoid a "trade war-like situation that is happening between the United States and China," a third official said…

India's budget this month cut average import tariff rates to 11% from 13% on several items, besides reducing taxes on high-end bikes and luxury cars. India is also reviewing surcharges on more than 30 items, including luxury cars and solar cells.

Nearly a fifth of India's exports of engineering goods — comprising steel and aluminum and worth about $25 billion — are at risk if Trump adopts the proposed 25% tariff, an official of an industry body said.

A recent War on the Rocks article by Sameer Lalwani and Vikram J. Singh highlighted some key areas for advancing US-India security cooperation.

War on the Rocks: How to Get the Most Out of the U.S.-Indian Defense Partnership

Defense Technology

The White House can also encourage India to reform its procurement process, fix its inverted tariff structure, and support Indian private sector partnerships with the U.S. defense industry for rapid scaling of capabilities. India could also reprioritize its defense dollars — of its latest $78 billion defense budget, we estimate only 20 percent will go to capital acquisitions. In its first few months, the new administration should also demonstrate its intention to accelerate approvals and licensing for U.S. exports to trusted allies and partners, and reform the export control community. India, for its part, should propose ways to harmonize its own technology security and export control mechanisms with those of the United States, which will continue to have concerns about cybersecurity and intelligence collection efforts by Russia…

Military Operational Cooperation

Beyond increasing the number of military exercises, the United States and India can also enhance the quality of military exercises by conducting them with more advanced and/or diverse assets, under more complex conditions, and moving up the conflict spectrum from disaster relief to combat exercises. Exercises should also expand in advanced domains like undersea and space domain awareness. India should send a large, high-level participant delegation to Space Command’s Global Sentinel Exercise, and get on a path to join the Schriever Wargame which brings partners together to plan for space operations…

Institutional Architecture: U.S.-Indian Bilateral Defense Framework

The first challenge is to modernize the framework to account for contemporary problem sets, efforts, and priorities. The fact that the last defense framework, signed in 2015, does not mention the words “China,” “Indo-Pacific,” “deterrence,” “competition,” “interoperability,” or even “threat,” serves as a reminder that this document was written in a completely different era…

A second reform requires integrating foreign affairs and national security council representatives into the Defense Policy Group framework to offer a wider strategic perspective, geopolitical depth, and coordination to the two defense agencies.

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Spoke Story: Australia and Japan Visit Washington

This past week, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles met to discuss shared defense priorities and the progress of the AUKUS security agreement, which includes Australia acquiring US Virginia-class submarines and investing in the US submarine industrial base. The agreement strengthens joint capabilities and enhances defense collaboration between the US and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, with Australia contributing $500 million toward a $3 billion investment in the US defense sector.

Additionally, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba made a trip to Washington to meet with President Donald Trump, aiming to build a personal connection and reinforce the US-Japan alliance. The two leaders discussed shared concerns, including China's growing influence in the Pacific and North Korea's nuclear threat, with Ishiba emphasizing Japan’s commitment to defense spending and its investment in US manufacturing. Ishiba also prepped for potential discussions on Nippon Steel's $14.1 billion acquisition of US Steel and the future of US-Japan cooperation on AI and defense technologies.

Hegseth’s comments proved very favorable for AUKUS.

Australian Defence Ministry: Opening Remarks, Meeting with US Secretary of Defense

SECRETARY HEGSETH: The President is very aware, supportive of AUKUS, recognises the importance of the defence industrial base, which the Deputy Prime Minister pointed out the investment Australia is willing to make. It enhances our ability in the subterranean space, but also our allies and partners. This is not a mission, in the Indo-Pacific, that America can undertake by itself. It has to be robust allies and partners. Technology sharing and subs are a huge part of it. So he’s aware and appreciative for his support and leadership on that topic.

JOURNALIST: Secretary, will you deliver Australia’s first nuclear submarine on time?

SECRETARY HEGSETH: We sure hope so. Part of what President Trump is committed to doing is cutting red tape, investing in the defence industrial base, ensuring that we stand by our allies and partners. I think that’s something that was missing in the last four years, that President Trump demonstrated – you’re going to have no worse enemy, and no better ally. And that’s what he’s charged me with at the Defense Department, is when we make these strategic partnerships and we invest in them, and there’s skin in the game, as the Deputy Prime Minister pointed out, we’re going to do everything possible we can to help deliver on that.

Ishiba’s meeting with Trump went well and demonstrated that the relationship will be core to US defense strategy. The joint statement is summarize below:

US-Japan Cooperation for Peace and Security
The meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Ishiba focused on strengthening US-Japan cooperation for peace and security, with both leaders reaffirming their commitment to the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. They discussed enhancing bilateral defense capabilities, including improving command and control frameworks, increasing presence in Japan's Southwest Islands, and deepening collaboration on defense equipment, technology, and cybersecurity. The leaders also emphasized the importance of US defense commitments to Japan, including the application of nuclear capabilities, and expressed strong opposition to any efforts to undermine Japan's peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands.

US-Japan Cooperation for Growth and Prosperity
On the economic front, the leaders committed to expanding bilateral cooperation, focusing on cutting-edge technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors, while also addressing economic coercion and strengthening supply chains. They also aimed to enhance energy security through increased US natural gas exports to Japan and to collaborate on nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors. Their discussions emphasized creating high-quality jobs and elevating economic ties, with both countries aiming to foster investment and cooperation in critical areas.

US-Japan Coordination in the Indo-Pacific
In terms of regional cooperation, both leaders affirmed their shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, bolstering multilateral partnerships like the Quad and trilateral relations with countries such as South Korea and Australia. They reiterated their opposition to China’s aggressive territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, expressed support for Taiwan’s peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, and addressed concerns over North Korea’s nuclear program and military ties with Russia.

A key measure of the relationship’s strength will be Ishiba’s ability to increase Japanese defense spending and navigate the trade pressures from Trump. These dynamics were analyzed in a recent article by Hudson Institute experts William Chou and Masashi Murano.

Hudson Institute: A Good First Step: Analyzing the Trump-Ishiba Summit

Tokyo will need to increase its defense spending to support these avenues of cooperation. The joint statement referenced Japan’s efforts “to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities beyond [fiscal year] 2027.” This was a politically sophisticated way to affirm Japan’s defense expansion without specifying a percentage target. The mention of 2027 was a recognition of Japan’s 2022 Defense Building Program, which set a goal of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2027. The statement’s more ambiguous phrasing seems to acknowledge that the yen’s weakness has limited Japan’s purchasing power. Costs of both domestic and American equipment have increased by 20 to 60 percent compared to previous estimates. Therefore, even if Japan reaches the 2 percent target by 2027, it will fall short of the projected defense capabilities it set out in 2022. The statement’s language allows the Japanese government to make the case to voters that higher defense spending—perhaps 3 percent of GDP—may be necessary…

Given his consistent emphasis on addressing American trade imbalances, it was unsurprising that Trump remained committed to resolving Japan’s $68.5 billion trade surplus with the United States. It is worth noting that the Japanese surplus has decreased from 65.5 percent of US-Japan trade in 1991 to just 6.7 percent in 2023. That figure, along with Ishiba’s promises to expand Japanese investments in the US and purchases of American energy, likely figured in the president’s confidence that the bilateral trade issue could be handled without resorting to flat tariffs—the prime minister’s primary economic objective of this trip.

Ultimately, these meetings should be taken as a good sign. These meetings reflect a strong commitment from the US, Australia, and Japan to enhance defense collaboration, economic ties, and regional stability. As the Indo-Pacific becomes an increasingly complex security environment, these partnerships are crucial for countering growing threats from China and North Korea. Moving forward, the success of these initiatives will depend on how well the nations address trade imbalances, strengthen defense capabilities, and foster technological innovation.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• Breaking Defense: Japan picks Textron T-6 for JASDF training fleet

• USSF: Space Systems Command, Japan launch first bilateral space effort

• The Japan News: Japan, U.S., South Korea Foreign Ministers Expected to Meet in Munich; Mid-Feb. Trilateral Summit Will Be First Since Trump Inauguration

Taiwan:

• Focus Taiwan: Economics officials to meet with Trump's team to avoid 100% tariff on chips

• The Economist: China is infiltrating Taiwan’s armed forces

South Korea:

• The Korea Times: How Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law unfolded

• USSF: Space Forces Korea holds first POLARIS HAMMER - KOREA

• Yonhap News Agency: U.S. nuclear-powered submarine arrives in S. Korea to replenish supplies

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, U.S. hold live-fire drills near border with N. Korea

• Yonhap News Agency: Top generals of S. Korea, Thailand discuss military cooperation

India:

• WION: Russia offers joint production of SU 57E fighter jet to India

• US Embassy: Enhanced U.S.-India Defense Ties and Indo-Pacific Security on Display at Aero India 2025

• Nikkei Asia: India sends navigation satellite into orbit in landmark launch

The Philippines:

• Nikkei Asia: Australia, Japan, Philippines and U.S. to conduct joint drills off Philippines

• Nikkei Asia: Philippines would return Typhon missile if China stops 'harassing': Marcos

Europe:

• Britain’s World: Carrier strike groups: The European commitment to the Indo-Pacific

United States:

• Breaking Defense: Twin political paths President Trump can take to ensure nuclear deterrence

US Indo-Pacific Command:

• USINDOPACOM Commander addresses Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense

• Mongolian Minister of Defense visits U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

• USAF and USMC Work With Allies and Partners to Enhance Capabilities for CN25

• North Wind 25 Reaffirms U.S.-Japan Alliance

• USFJ Alliance Evolves: Multilateral Partnerships, training at core of C2 Modernization efforts

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Hub Story: DoD Announces Acquisition Reform Plan

The US Department of Defense released its 2025 report on overhauling its acquisition process to improve agility, flexibility, and alignment with national strategies. Reforms focus on modernizing data sharing, enhancing decision-making tools, and strengthening workforce capabilities, guided by recommendations from the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform. These updates aim to ensure the process is effective, efficient, and adaptable to evolving threats by 2028. DoD’s acquisition process comes under constant fire for being slow and inflexible. Despite DoD leadership saying acquisition reform is a top priority, a recent study by the Government Accountability Office found that since 2020 “the average amount of time for major defense acquisition programs to deliver capability increased from 8 to 11 years.”

While DoD’s 2025 implementation report adopts 26 of the Commission’s 28 recommendations, it is much less ambitious in scope. The Commission outlined a pathway to fundamentally restructure defense acquisition, completely replacing the current PPBE system with a new Defense Resourcing System (DRS). This is how the current PPBE system is broadly organized:

1. Planning: This phase involves setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing threats and opportunities, and determining resource requirements for defense programs and acquisitions.

2. Programming: During programming, specific programs and projects are identified and prioritized based on the strategic goals established in the planning phase. This includes outlining timelines, budget estimates, and resource allocations.

3. Budgeting: In this phase, detailed budget proposals are developed based on the programs and projects identified in the programming phase. It involves allocating funds to support acquisitions and other defense-related activities.

4. Execution: Execution involves implementing the programs and projects as funded through the budgeting phase. This includes contract awards, project management, and overseeing the delivery of goods and services.

The Commission recommends replacing PPBE with DRS, which is organized into three phases: strategy, resource allocation, and execution.

The Commission argues that this new process offers several advantages. It improves the connection between strategic goals and resource allocation by providing clearer guidance, particularly in terms of risk-taking and force structure. By consolidating programming and budgeting phases, it reduces duplication and conflicting outcomes, streamlining the process. Senior leaders will have better visibility into programs and initiatives, ensuring consistent decisions throughout the process. The consolidation of IT systems will create efficiencies and reduce organizational complexity. Ultimately, the DRS aims to simplify the budget process, improve strategic decision-making, and save time in preparing budget materials.

The new 2025 PPBE implementation report completely scraps the main thrust of the Commission’s recommendation for a new acquisition process, but adopts the rest of the recommendations to reform PPBE. DoD’s report structures the recommendations into four buckets:

• Objective 1: Strengthen and simplify strategy to budget to capability to successfully deliver on our strategic priorities in a complex, ever-changing, geopolitical environment.

• Objective 2: Modernize and simplify information sharing between DoD and Congress to effectively present and defend the equities of the Department.

• Objective 3: Modernize and simplify financial management, defense business systems, and end-to-end environment to empower data-driven, fiscally informed, strategic decision-making.

• Objective 4: Invest in today's and tomorrow's workforce to develop and recruit an agile and adaptable civilian service.

The US government has been attempting to reform acquisition for years with little success. The Biden administration was never likely to make the tough decisions required for radical reform. While the DRS may create more problems than it solves, given the growing threats, evolving enemy capabilities, and an atrophied American defense industrial base, leadership must take action to address these challenges.

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Spoke Story: Indonesia's Hedging Strategy with India and Japan

Indonesia is strengthening its strategic partnerships with middle powers like India and Japan to enhance defense and economic cooperation while navigating the growing influence of China. In talks with Indian Prime Minister Modi, Indonesian President Prabowo emphasized defense manufacturing, maritime security, and regional stability, while also pursuing greater economic collaboration. Similarly, in discussions with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba, Indonesia seeks to balance relations with major powers by fostering closer ties with Japan in defense, energy, and technology, aiming to avoid over-reliance on any single country.

Like many other nations, Indonesia seeks to balance its relations between China and the United States. Prabowo’s embrace of India and Japan reflects how countries will increasingly turn to middle powers to hedge against great powers. While Washington should deepen ties with countries like Indonesia, policymakers should recognize that Indonesia is seeking to strengthen ties with American partners such as India, Japan, and Australia. In 2024, Kurt Campbell was criticized for ‘deputizing’ Australia by allowing it to take the lead in relations with the Pacific islands, but this strategic approach is largely correct. The United States should rely on close allies and partners to build relationships in regions where Washington faces challenges.

India will be a critical partner to support. India's defense exports have increased by over 30 times in the last decade, with the US now accounting for nearly 50% of these exports, demonstrating the deepening defense ties between the two nations. This surge, bolstered by American companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin collaborating with Indian manufacturers, highlights India's growing role as a defense supplier. As India continues to expand its defense capabilities, the US should further embrace this partnership to enhance regional security and technological collaboration, particularly in the face of growing geopolitical tensions.

Indonesia and Japan have strengthened their partnership through concrete actions, such as Japan providing significant security assistance, including patrol boats, radar systems, and drones, to enhance Indonesia’s maritime security. In 2023, Japan also granted Indonesia two monitoring ships to help secure its waters, particularly the North Natuna Sea, where both nations have a shared interest in upholding international maritime law. Despite some differences in their approaches to China, these defense collaborations reflect a growing and durable relationship, exemplified by Japan’s plans to invest in Indonesia’s maritime capabilities over the next decade.

As the United States continues to struggle with its relationships with countries like Indonesia, assisting partner nations such as India and Japan in making inroads will be critical.

Spoke Story: France Leads Indo-Pacific Exercise

This past week the United States participated in the 2025 La Perouse exercise. Led by the French Carrier Strike Group, the exercise brings together a range of allied and partner nations, including the US, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, to enhance maritime security and interoperability in Southeast Asia's critical straits. The exercise aims to improve cooperation in maritime surveillance, interdiction, and air operations, with the French Navy focusing on regional security and information-sharing through the Indo-Pacific Information Sharing platform. Despite participating in separate national phases, Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore continue to engage with international partners to bolster regional security in the face of rising maritime threats.

USNI News: French Carrier Charles de Gaulle Kicks Off La Perouse Exercise in South East Asia:

“La Perouse 25 is divided into three locations – the Malacca Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait. The objective of the exercise is to provide maritime safety in the three critical straits through the French Navy operating with regional and international partners and sharing information and coordinating actions against multiple threats by using the Indo-Pacific Information Sharing platform (IORIS).

The La Pérouse 2025 exercise and France's broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific carry significant geopolitical implications. By leading this multinational maritime security exercise with nations like the US, India, Australia, and Japan, France reaffirms its commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, demonstrating the importance of multilateral cooperation in securing critical maritime chokepoints. The exercise enhances interoperability among regional powers, fostering stronger defense relationships that improve collective crisis response capabilities in one of the world’s most strategically important regions. Furthermore, France’s ability to project military power with its nuclear-capable Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier serves as a powerful symbol of European influence in a region increasingly dominated by the US-China rivalry. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a European nuclear power, France's actions signal its intention to balance the influence of other major powers in the region, positioning itself as a stabilizing force in an era of rising tensions over maritime sovereignty and international law.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• IISS: Japan set to enhance its anti-ship missile inventory

• AP News: Japan’s leader says he’s preparing for tough negotiations with Trump on maintaining US presence

• Nikkei Asia: Japan's top diplomat to lay out Tokyo's red lines to Trump administration

• Breaking Defense: Japan inks deal with Shield AI for sea-based V-BAT drones

• Nikkei Asia: Japan to handle stealth tech for fighter developed with U.K. and Italy

India:

• Nikkei Asia: India seeks 'complementary' partnership in chip industry with Japan

• Breaking Defense: India joins Eurodrone effort as observer nation

South Korea:

• Brookings: How will South Korea navigate US-China competition in 2025?

• Breaking Defense: Will S. Korea’s drama cause problems, or savings, for Poland’s large weapon buys?

The Philippines:

• Breaking Defense: Philippines to increase FA-50 fighter fleet, among moves analysts say complicate planning in Beijing

• Nikkei Asia: Philippines and U.S. hold joint maritime drills in South China Sea

Australia:

• Breaking Defense: Aussies announce $163M more for AUKUS initiatives, experts skeptical of ‘substance’

• Australian Government: Statement on Australia’s one-China policy

INDOPACOM:

• BH 25-1: Kadena Airmen demonstrate readiness capabilities

• Comm, Clear and Connected: The 8th Communication Squadron keeps Beverly Pack 25-1 connected

• Multi-Domain Effects Cell Enhances I Corps Combat Power

• Australian Secretary of the Department of Defence visits U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Other:

• War on the Rocks: Why Britain Should Scupper the Chagos Islands Deal

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Hub Story: US-ROK Hold Fourth Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting

On January 10, the United States and South Korea held its fourth Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). The convening is a product of the April 2023 Washington Declaration between President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-Yeol. The Washington Declaration stipulates five key provisions:

1. South Korea will recommit to the nuclear non-proliferation regime

2. Washington will commit to making every effort to consult with Seoul before using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula

3. The two countries will establish a senior-level nuclear consultative group

4. The United States will carry out visible deployments of strategic assets

5. The two nations will deepen military training and exercises while integrating South Korean capabilities into US strategic planning

The NCG is co-chaired at the assistant secretary level by senior policy leaders in the US Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense and includes US and ROK interagency participants such as national security, defense, military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. It meets twice per year at the principal level and is supported by frequent working-level meetings. According to a factsheet released this week, the NCG focuses on several workstreams.

• Nuclear and strategic planning

• Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)

• Exercises, simulations, and trainings

• Nuclear consultation and communication processes during crises and contingencies

• Establishment of dedicated secure communications systems

• Risk reduction practices

• Strategic messaging

• Security and Information sharing protocols

It’s hard to measure the “success” of the Washington Declaration and its corresponding initiatives. On one hand, the Biden Administration has pursued the provisions robustly. The NCG itself successfully drafted and signed the “United States and Republic of Korea Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula” in July 2024. While not publicly delineated, the guidelines outline principles and procedures to enhance US-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner. Some of the progress in this cooperation and integration is observable. For example, the United States has increased its use of strategic bombers in bilateral exercises and has expanded visitation of other strategic assets, like a port call by a nuclear-capable submarine. However, the Washington Declaration has largely failed to ameliorate South Korean concern about the credibility of American nuclear deterrence, and domestic support for an independent nuclear arsenal has risen.

The Asan Institute: South Koreans and Their Neighbors Survey:

Nuclear deterrence and assurance: Public confidence that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea remained unchanged at 53% (2022: 52.9%, 2023: 54.4%). Public confidence further decreased when respondents were asked whether the United States would fulfill its pledge to use nuclear weapons even at the risk of potential nuclear attacks against itself, with less than half of South Koreans (2024: 46.8%) expressing confidence.

South Korean support for acquiring an independent nuclear weapons capability reached the highest point at 70.9% (Oppose: 27.4%). This is the highest figure since the Asan Institute first began surveying this question in 2010 (min: 54.8%, max: 70.9%). In addition, a majority of respondents (63.8%) also supported reintroducing US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula (Oppose: 33.5%).

Robert E. Kelly and Min-hyung Kim wrote a recent piece in Foreign Affairs Magazine arguing why South Korea should develop its own independent nuclear arsenal. The authors articulate many of the sentiments felt by the South Korean public, asserting that “Washington needs to stop getting in its ally’s way.” Their argument for why South Korea should develop its own domestic deterrent is supported by the following points:

• Growing North Korean capabilities increasingly put South Korea in danger

• Washington will not risk a nuclear strike on the US homeland for South Korea

• A new Donald Trump administration raises doubts about the overall credibility of American commitments to the alliance

The authors make a convincing case for why it's in South Korea's best interest to develop a nuclear capability. However, for policymakers in Washington, this outcome has to be avoided, and Washington should be prepared to absorb reasonable costs to prevent this. Recent political instability in South Korea should worry policymakers in the United States about how a domestic nuclear arsenal will impact South Korean policy and politics. The logical extension of the Nuclear Consultative Group is for it to explore avenues to redeploy American-controlled tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Redeploying nuclear weapons will do a much more effective job of enhancing deterrence, reassuring the South Korean public of American commitments, and limiting the consequences of a US troop drawdown. There are many complications and costs that come with redeployment, but it's a pathway that American policymakers need to start considering.

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Spoke Story: Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting at Trump Inauguration

Trump team is picking up where they left off four years ago. The Quad nations—Japan, the US, Australia, and India—plan to hold a foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington following President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, with key ministers from each nation and US Secretary of State nominee Sen. Marco Rubio expected to attend. The meeting aims to reaffirm the importance of the Quad’s regional security framework under the new administration and discuss plans for a Quad summit later in the year. Rubio is the right pick to represent the United States; his alliance credentials are considerable.

While in the Senate, Rubio has pushed for a stronger and deeper partnership with India. This past summer, he introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act to expand bilateral cooperation with India, and was pretty generous. The legislation would have provided a limited exemption for India from sanctions for purchases of Russian equipment used by the Indian military. The bill also endeavored to raise the profile of the Indian partnership to be on the same level as other American allies like Japan, Israel, Korea, and NATO when it came to technology transfers and providing excess defense articles.

On the Australia front, Rubio has consistently advocated for US-Australia defense cooperation and backed Biden’s AUKUS initiative. In August, Rubio supported the Biden administration’s commitment to giving nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia despite domestic shipbuilding delays. In response to delays in shipbuilding Rubio stated, “I don’t think that in any way undermines the commitment that we have, particularly given our shared concerns about the threats in the Indo-Pacific from an increasingly aggressive China.” The new administration will probably want to rethink some aspects of AUKUS, but Rubio’s past support will strengthen partners in Canberra.

Finally, Rubio will be a natural partner for policymakers in Tokyo. The US-Japan alliance has generally deepened and broadened over the past ten years. South Korea is narrowly focused on the North Korean threat, the US’s lack of an official relationship with Taiwan limits cooperation, and the Philippines does not have the economy to support large defense programs. That leaves Japan as the ideal security partner in Northeast Asia. Rubio has long advocated for the alliance, going back to a 2014 trip he made to Japan. Rubio has also supported the Biden administration’s efforts to enhance trilateral ties between the US, Japan, and South Korea.

New Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo have a friend in Marco Rubio. Rubio's hosting of a Quad foreign ministers meeting on inauguration day indicates where his priorities are, and it's a heartening sign that Trump has allowed this to go forward.

Spoke Story: Fortifying Guam

Randall Schriver, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and a recognized leader in Indo-Pacific security argued in a recent op-ed in Breaking Defense that the United States must prioritize the defense of Guam to maintain its strategic position in the Pacific. As the “away team” in a potential Pacific conflict, Guam provides a critical foothold due to its ideal location, robust military infrastructure, and status as a US territory, which ensures operational flexibility. Schriver emphasizes that strengthening Guam’s defenses—especially against missile threats—is essential for deterring adversaries like China, Russia, and North Korea and reducing the risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Schriver articulates why Guam is so critical to American force posture.

Breaking Defense: To Project Power in the Pacific, Invest in Guam’s Protection:

Guam enjoys a “Goldilocks” placement in the Pacific — not too far, and not too close. The island is far enough from the potential fight to have some natural protections against many classes of weapon systems potentially employed by our adversaries. And yet Guam is closer to Beijing than it is to Hawaii — close enough to the fight to be a place for combat force generation. The same proximity also allows Guam to serve as a place for maintenance, repair and sustainment.

Guam topped the list of US Indo-Pacific Command’s unfunded priorities, totaling $11 billion in 44 programs. Guam is home to some of the United States’ premier platforms, including F-35s, B-2 Bombers, and Virginia-class attack submarines. Hardening and fortifying Guam will take years to finish, but pursuing it is critical. The US Missile Defense Agency has been prioritizing the mission, and this past December, they successfully tested an SM-3 interceptor against a ballistic missile. Ultimately, Congress and the administration have failed to prioritize and fund the endeavor. Schriver’s endorsement of the initiative will carry considerable weight with this new administration.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• Nikkei Asia: Japan to test hypersonic missile tracking with space sensors

• Nikkei Asia: Indonesia, Japan boost security ties amid China's rise, Trump's return

South Korea:

• Yonhap News Agency: Military chiefs of S. Korea, Australia discuss cooperation in phone talks

• Yonhap News Agency: USFK commander stresses need to maintain trilateral cooperation among S. Korea, U.S., Japan

• The Chosun Daily: Beijing resumes disputed installations in West Sea amid S. Korea's turmoil

Philippines:

• Nikkei Asia: Philippines deploys air and sea assets to track Chinese 'monster'

• Naval News: U.S. Army Validates Maritime Transport of Typhon Missile System

Taiwan:

• Naval News: China Suddenly Building Fleet Of Special Barges Suitable For Taiwan Landings

• Taiwan News: Taiwan signs NT$10.31 billion surface-to-air missile system contract with US

• US State Department: U.S.-Taiwan Working Group Meeting on International Organizations

Australia:

• Australia Defence Ministry: HMAS Brisbane returns home after milestone deployment

• Breaking Defense: Aussies buying 40 more Bushmasters for long-range fire C2

• The Economist: AUKUS enters its fifth year. How is the pact faring?

India:

• The Economic Times: India to sign four major defence deals worth over ₹1.5 lakh crore

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Hub Story: DoD’s Office of Strategic Capital Releases 2025 Investment Strategy

The Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is one of DoD’s newer shops. Announced by Secretary Lloyd Austin in December, 2022, OSC is tasked with investing in private sector businesses working on technologies critical to national security. This week OSC released its Fiscal Year 2025 Investment Strategy.

Congress authorized OSC in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 and defined OSC’s core duties as:

1. To develop, integrate, and implement capital investment strategies proven in the commercial sector

2. To identify and prioritize promising critical technologies and assets that require capital assistance and have the potential to benefit the Department of Defense

3. To make investments in such technologies and assets

The real strength of OSC investment lies in its ability to signal demand. While OSC has nearly $1 billion to invest in 2025, this is still relatively small in the rapidly growing technology investment sector. For comparison, the CHIPS and Science Act provides a much larger $53 billion for semiconductor manufacturing. However, like the CHIPS and Science Act, OSC investments are designed to catalyze private investment. For example, a $100 million public loan could generate $500 million in private loans. If properly aligned with executive branch stakeholders and Congress, OSC can send demand signals to private investors about the technologies the Department of Defense will prioritize in the coming years.

In 2024, OSC focused on its first initiative, the Small Business Investment Company Critical Technology Initiative (SBICCT Initiative), a partnership with the Small Business Administration (SBA) to provide credit to funds investing in the Department’s fourteen Critical Technology Areas. Under the SBICCTI, OSC and SBA (using SBA authorities and funding) extend loan guarantees to licensed investment funds for early-stage investments, supporting the commercialization of critical component technologies.

The FY2025 Investment Strategy introduces a new credit program to extend loans or loan guarantees (using NDAA authorities and funding) to companies or financial institutions for the scaled production of critical component technologies. While FY2024 focused on early-stage R&D, FY2025 will center on production. As defined by its mission, all investments must support national security objectives. OSC defines national security impact as "those that provide the United States and/or its allies and partners with a robust competitive advantage over its strategic competitors."

OSC’s investment focus is centered on the following industry segments:

OSC’s investment time horizon is more nuanced:

1. Near-term control over chokepoints in economic networks

2. Medium-term leadership within key industries

3. Long-term development of critical technologies

Near-Term (0-3 years): Capturing Chokepoints in Economic Networks:

Globalization has created strong economic ties across borders, impacting national security. Competitors can exploit these connections to disrupt access to key resources like financing, materials, and technology, weakening a nation's capabilities. To protect US national security, it’s crucial to address these vulnerabilities. OSC’s financial products can help by diversifying sources of supply, capital, technology, and expertise, reducing dependencies and preventing chokepoints.

Medium-Term (2-7 years): Dominating Key Industries:

When a competitor controls an industry critical to national security—beyond just controlling an economic chokepoint—they gain a significant competitive advantage. Some competitors try to dominate these industries using illegal or secretive tactics that are unfamiliar to the US and the international rules-based system. OSC’s financial products can help by supporting domestic and allied production through investment programs that reduce the cost of capital for companies.

Long-Term (5-15+ years): Winning Critical Tech Races:

In the long run, developing next-generation critical technologies is key to maintaining a lasting competitive advantage. Success in this area requires not just creating new technologies, but also turning them into successful, sustainable businesses. Falling behind in this race could leave the US technologically outdated, with competitors surpassing the Department of Defense's capabilities. OSC’s financial products can help by accelerating the growth of emerging industries through targeted investment programs, like the SBICCT Initiative, which reduce the cost of capital for investing in technology sectors that need long-term funding.

Ultimately, the success of OSC will depend on its ability to attract private investment for national security needs. However, OSC’s success also hinges on factors beyond its control, with Congress and the new administration playing a much more significant role in determining its outcome.

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Spoke Story: US Announces $3.6 Billion Sale of Air-to-Air Missiles to Japan

The US State Department has approved a potential $3.64 billion sale of up to 1,200 Advanced Medium-Range Air-To-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) made by RTX to Japan. This sale aims to enhance Japan’s defense capabilities, supporting both US foreign policy and national security objectives by strengthening a key ally in the Indo-Pacific. The deal is expected to help Japan defend its homeland and US personnel stationed there, with no difficulties anticipated in integrating the missiles into Japan’s armed forces. However, the final details are subject to change.

AMRAAMs are in high demand. In addition to Japan, the United States plans to provide AMRAAMs to Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the UK. Last year, the Pentagon placed its largest-ever order for AMRAAMs from RTX. However, the current production rate of 1,200 missiles per year is at full capacity, and the Arizona factory lacks the ability to expand.

To support production goals, the US and Japan began a feasibility study in October to assess whether Japan can co-produce AMRAAMs domestically. Japan currently co-produces Patriot missiles but has only produced around 10, with plans to scale up to 100. The announcement of the AMRAAM sale suggests that the feasibility study is progressing well and that Japan will likely be able to co-produce some of the missiles it is purchasing.

Spoke Story: NSA Jake Sullivan’s Final Trip to India

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan is concluding his final trip abroad, with India as his destination. The National Security Council has led US efforts to strengthen relations with India, with Kurt Campbell bringing particular energy to the relationship during his time at the NSC. Sullivan has continued to prioritize this partnership, with the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) being a key program resulting from these efforts. Since iCET is managed by the White House, it is unclear whether a potential Trump Administration would continue or abandon this Biden-era initiative. Nevertheless, Sullivan's trip to New Delhi sends a strong message that India is a critical partner for the United States.

To mark the trip, the US is reforming regulations to enable greater civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries, a goal first pursued during President George W. Bush's administration in the early 2000s. As part of this cooperation, the US has taken steps to delist Indian nuclear companies.

Space cooperation remains another major area of US-India collaboration.

The White House: FACT SHEET: The United States and India Committed to Strengthening Strategic Technology Partnership:

• Announcing the first-ever joint effort between American and Indian astronauts at the International Space Station with the launch of Axiom-4 scheduled to take place this spring, which will mark a significant milestone in the U.S.-India human spaceflight partnership and space exploration;

• Reducing barriers to collaboration around commercial space technology following the U.S. government’s recent conclusion of updates to Missile Technology Control Regime export policy, which will open the door to additional technology licensing and co-development opportunities in support of the U.S.-India space partnership;

• Working toward the launch of a new bilateral space accelerator to promote commercial space cooperation, including around lunar exploration, human spaceflight, geospatial data and services, and the co-development of technology;

• Celebrating the conclusion of a Strategic Framework for Human Spaceflight Cooperation to deepen interoperability in space and working toward the imminent completion of additional agreements to commence advanced training for ISRO astronauts and ground personnel at the NASA Johnson Space Center and for joint experiments at the International Space Station;

• Preparing for the launch of the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar, a jointly developed satellite that will map the entirety of the Earth’s surface twice every 12 days as the United States and India work together to combat climate change and other global challenges, this spring;

• Deciding to hold the first bilateral experts’ exchange on space situational awareness and space traffic coordination in the first half of this year. This exchange builds upon the two nations’ shared commitment to pursue opportunities for deeper collaboration to ensure safe and sustainable space operations;

• Exploring additional avenues for cooperation in space exploration technologies, including docking and interoperability demonstration missions, as well as India’s participation in the United States Traffic Coordination System for Space program.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Japan:

• Nikkei Asia: Japan and U.S. to start joint AI cyberattack research

• USNI: Japanese Cabinet Approves Record Defense Budget; China Launches New Amphibious Warship

• Nikkei Asia: Japan to move key defense command centers underground

• Nikkei Asia: Japan to launch new maritime transport Self-Defense Forces unit

South Korea:

• Korea Times: Why is Yoon’s approval rating rebounding?

• Yonhap News Agency: National security office convenes meeting over N. Korea's missile launch

• Yonhap News Agency: Navy conducts first maritime drills this year

• Yonhap News Agency: Acting defense minister meets U.S. ambassador, reaffirms alliance

Taiwan:

• Nikkei Asia: Trump 'right' on Taiwan military spending, ruling DPP heavyweight says

• Nikkei Asia: Taiwan 'tabletop' war game sets stage for population-wide preparedness

India:

• WION: India's security is our security: Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Khaleel

• The Hindu: India protests China’s ‘new counties’ in Ladakh

Other:

• USNI: Carrier USS Carl Vinson Back in the South China Sea, French Carrier in Indian Ocean

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Hub Story: Japanese Politicians Calls for Revision to US Forces Agreement

As Japan’s Lower House election results trickle in, revising the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is attracting public attention due to ongoing issues like disruptive night flights and environmental concerns related to US military operations in Okinawa. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has committed to pursuing changes, supported by opposition parties, while officials from the Foreign and Defense Ministries express caution about potential strains on Japan-US relations. LDP’s main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), has long supported SOFA revision in Okinawa. Critics argue the current SOFA, finalized in 1960 and revised in 1990, is inequitable and fails to adequately protect residents’ rights and safety.

SOFAs are multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally establish the framework under which US military personnel operate in a foreign country and how domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply toward US personnel in that country. Japan’s Okinawa prefecture hosts a significant portion of American troops stationed in Japan, which has often caused friction with the local inhabitants.

SPICE: Understanding Okinawa's Role in the US-Japan Security Arrangement:

Problems resulting from US military on the island manifest themselves in several key areas. First, given the trend toward urbanization in central Okinawa since the end of World War II, many US military installations now sit in highly populated areas, where they once did not. For areas hosting installations with ground units, this poses an irritant; for areas in which aircraft constantly take-off, land, and train, it poses a potential danger. Second, US military concentrations give rise to a sizeable number of complaints from local governments and citizens, such as the negative impact on the tourist industry and economy, environmental issues, training accidents, and crimes committed by US servicemen and their family members against local citizens. Finally, because of the Government of Japan's dual responsibilities to Okinawa as an administrative prefecture and its obligations to the US under the Mutual Security Treaty, it is often placed in the role of "middleman," trying to accommodate US military operational needs and local concerns, with varying degrees of success.

US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been the primary source of friction between the local Okinawa inhabitants and US Forces Japan. The relocation of Futenma has been a long conversation. In 1999, US Forces Japan and the Japanese central government agreed to relocate Futenma from the residential, urban location to the more isolated Henoko on the island’s coast. Okinawan officials have demanded that the base be relocated outside of the prefecture altogether, while US Forces Japan and Tokyo have advocated for the relocation to remain on Okinawa at the Henoko location.

Earlier this year, the Japanese central government made a decision that the base relocation will remain on Okinawa. While some initial construction and landfill work has been completed, the relocation process is far from over and is expected to take at least nine years to complete.

Even as opposition parties like the CDP win the election this month and potentially form a coalition government, they seem unlikely to fully reverse course on Futenma’s base location. However, to appeal to Okinawa residents, both a CDP and LDP government may push for a revision to SOFA. If Japanese leadership insists on revision, the two countries will have to balance local demands while remaining supportive of alliance goals.

The Asahi Shimbun: Renewed Focus on Revising Japan-US SOFA Ahead of Election:

A 1996 Japan-US agreement restricts flights at the Futenma air station between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. to only those deemed operationally essential. However, observations by the Okinawa Defense Bureau show that takeoffs and landings during those hours have remained between 300 and 400 per year. From January to August this year alone, there have already been 392 flights―an average of 1.6 per day.

The environmental and health impacts are another concern to residents.

Eight years ago, an Okinawa prefectural survey detected high levels of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)―cancer-causing organic fluorine compounds―in rivers and the groundwater near a US military base. Since then, Nakasone has told her children not to drink from the tap. Even when residents complained, the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement serves as a barrier, preventing Japan from limiting U.S. military flights. Okinawa Prefecture’s efforts to investigate the sources of PFAS contamination have also been stalled, as access to the bases requires US consent, which has yet to be granted.

Whether the new government will prioritize revising or reforming the US-Japan SOFA will have to be seen.

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Spoke Story: Australia Buys American SM-2 and SM-6 Missiles

Australia has announced a $4.7 billion purchase of advanced American-made SM-2 and SM-6 air defense missiles to enhance its military capabilities amid rising competition with China. The deal, finalized in spring, aligns with Australia’s 2024 defense strategy to expand its naval fleet and strengthen its defense industry. This acquisition highlights ongoing US-Australia collaboration, particularly regarding the AUKUS agreement.

The 2024 Australian National Defense Strategy prioritizes acquiring long-range strike capabilities.

Australian Ministry of Defence: 2024 National Defense Strategy:

Across the coming decade, investment in the integrated, focused force will be extended to deliver increases in combat and enabling abilities in the following capability priorities…

• targeting and long-range strike to provide a greater capacity, at longer ranges, to deter any attempts to project power against Australia

Acquiring and producing a large and sophisticated missile arsenal is a crucial defense priority for Canberra. Earlier this year, Australia announced they would co-produce the Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile with Norway’s Kongsberg Defense company.

These acquisitions support Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. GWEO invests A$4.1 billion to acquire more long-range strike systems and manufacture longer-range munitions in Australia. However, with this new announcement, it looks like Australia is investing even more funds. The enterprise already boasts some achievements:

Australian Ministry of Defence: Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise:

• Accelerated the acquisition of guided weapons including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) long-range strike missiles, naval strike missiles and sea mines. Sea mines will be maintained in Australia with a view to technical transfer to enable local electronics servicing and load, assembly and pack of sea mines.

• Agreed with the US to deepen cooperation on Australia's GWEO enterprise by collaborating on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, scoping co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025.

• Commenced domestic manufacture of BLU-111 aircraft bombs.

The acquisition of the SM-2 and SM-6 is a significant development for the United States, which traditionally is cautious about sharing missile technology even with close allies. This August, Australia became the first country besides the United States to launch an SM-6 missile from a warship. The SM-2 is critical for missile defense, while the SM-6 can provide air and missile defense, it also has exceptional offensive anti-ship capabilities.

Australian Ministry of Defence: Safeguarding Australians with Boost to Air and Missile Defence:

The acquisition of the Standard Missile 2 Block IIIC (SM-2 IIIC) and Standard Missile‑6 (SM-6) is a significant milestone in the Government’s rapid progress in boosting the long-range capability of Navy’s surface combatant fleet. 

The SM-2 IIIC and SM-6 are the most advanced air and missile defence weapons in the world and will be progressively deployed across Navy’s Hobart class destroyers and in the future, the Hunter class frigates. This follows the recent successful test firing of a SM-6 from HMAS Sydney.

The SM-2 IIIC and SM6 contain advanced technologies that will greatly enhance the lethality and effectiveness of our Navy ships in line with the National Defence Strategy and the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet. 

The SM-2 IIIC brings active seeker technology and significantly enhanced defensive capabilities against missile threats. 

The SM-6 missile will provide Australia with extended range air defence capability against air and missile threats, an offensive anti-ship capability and for the first time, a terminal ballistic missile defence capability.

The SM-2 IIIC and SM-6 complement existing capabilities such as ESSM Block 2 and Naval Strike Missile as part of a layered strike and missile defence capability for Navy’s surface combatant fleet.

Australia’s renaissances in long-range strike capability is a great development for American security. As Washington strategizes and plans for a Taiwan contingency, Australia is becoming more critical as a staging ground and maintenance hub for US forces. It is vital to US defense policy that Australia has a robust arsenal to defend the Australian homeland and develops credible deterrence through long-range strike capability.

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Spoke Story: AUKUS Pillar II’s “Maritime Big Play”

This month, Australia, the UK, and the US conducted "Maritime Big Play," a series of integrated exercises aimed at enhancing interoperability and capability development within the AUKUS partnership. The exercises focused on operating uncrewed maritime systems, sharing naval data, and improving real-time maritime awareness to support decision-making. Notably, the event involved the evaluation of new technologies from private sector companies, highlighting the involvement of various stakeholders in refining operational practices, enhancing joint capabilities, and strengthening the resilience of supply chains among partner nations.

One of the major exercises conducted under the umbrella of Maritime Big Play was Exercise Autonomous Warrior, hosted by Australia. Exercise Autonomous Warrior showcased advanced Australian-developed military technologies, enhancing strike capabilities and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Key systems included the OWL-B loitering strike glider, the Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessel, the Ghost Shark underwater vehicle, and the Speartooth, highlighting the government's commitment to advancing the defense industry and innovation in Australia.

Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter: AUKUS Pillar II in Action at Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2024:

Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon Richard Marles said: “Exercise Autonomous Warrior is an exciting and tangible demonstration of progress being made under AUKUS Pillar II. Pillar II is a generational opportunity for our three nations to harness and uplift our collective innovation enterprises and industrial bases, strengthen cooperation, and together deliver advanced capabilities across our defence forces.”

This is the first exercise structured around AUKUS Pillar II. AUKUS leaders have organized Pillar II as a mission-focused initiative. AUKUS defense leaders create specific missions they want to collaborate on and prioritize. Pillar II was created to help support those combined missions by utilizing advanced technologies in each country. AUKUS leaders have become more open to collaborating with other allied countries on Pillar II. Japan seems like the obvious first partner. However, New Zealand, South Korea, Canada, and other countries have been speculated as future contributors. It will be interesting to see if these Pillar II exercises will expand as more nations participate in Pillar II.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Australia:

• Breaking Defense: Australia to Award 155 Shell Production Contract in Coming ‘Weeks,’ Minister Says

• The Strategist: Australia’s Defence is Lost in a Fog of Strategic Failure and a Lack of Imagination

• Naval News: Australia Invests Heavily to Expand Shipbuilding Precinct in the West

Taiwan:

• US State Department: The 2024 Fifth U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue

India:

• Hindustan Times: India Launches 4th Nuclear-Missile Submarine

Japan:

• War on the Rocks: Russian Pacific Fleet Redux: Japan’s North as a New Center of Gravity

• Nikkei Asia: Japan and U.S. Hold Evacuation Drills for Islands Near Taiwan

• Defense News: US Navy Ousts Top Commanders of Ship Repair Facility in Japan

• Kyodo News: Japan, Britain, Italy to Speed Up Work on Next-Gen Fighter Jet Plan

• Australian Defence Magazine: Japan Approved to Buy RIM-116E Missiles, Build Maintenance Facility

Philippines:

• US State Department: US Advances Cooperation with Japan and the Philippines to Build Economic Resilience 

South Korea:

• War on the Rocks: How Australia and South Korea Are Recrafting Their Relationship and Fortifying the Indo-Pacific

• USNI: New Philly Shipyard Owners Promise ‘Big Time’ Investment

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea to Launch 3rd Military Spy Satellite in December

• Yonhap News Agency: Yoon, British FM Agree to Cooperate Against N.K.-Russia Military Cooperation

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, Indonesia agree to expand cooperation in defense, EV

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Hub Story: DoD’s New Indo-Pacific Defense Industrial Base Program

On October 7-8, 2024, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante chaired the inaugural plenary meeting of the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) in Honolulu, gathering National Armament Directors from member nations. The forum aims to enhance defense industrial resilience by reducing production barriers and addressing supply chain issues, with participants adopting a Core Vision Statement to guide their collaboration.

PIPIR began in May of this year after the Shangri-La Security Dialogue. Thirteen nations agreed to a broad set of principles to guide the new defense industrial initiative.

US Department of Defense: Endorsing a Statement of Principles for Indo-Pacific Defense Industrial Base Collaboration:

The following principles will guide these collaborative actions among likeminded participants:

• Ensuring shared defense industrial resilience is vital to the continued regional security, economic security, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.

• Strengthening defense industrial resilience requires collaborative action to expand industrial base capability, capacity, and workforce; increase supply chain resilience; promote defense innovation; improve information sharing; encourage standardization; reduce barriers to cooperation; and otherwise mitigate potential vulnerabilities and facilitate collaboration.

• Optimizing collaboration requires accounting for the needs, capabilities, and comparative advantages of participants' industrial bases consistent with free and fair market competition and protection of intellectual property.

• Conducting collaborative action will not be limited to governments, but also include industry, capital providers, academia, and other forms of partnership.

• Fostering further dialogue is needed to promote collaboration and increase shared defense industrial resilience.

PIPIR is based on its European cousin, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), which includes more than 40 countries and is convened to accelerate “capability deliveries to Ukraine by synchronizing international procurement, production, and sustainment efforts.” However, UDCG operates more as a crisis response group, while PIPIR has the opportunity to be a more structured and sustainable defense industrial collaboration forum. A notable distinction between the two is that UDCG’s raison d’etre is capability delivery to Ukraine; this is notably absent in PIPIR, which does not mention or seem to strive for capability delivery to Taiwan. Instead, PIPIR is more about boosting American capacity through allies and partners.

The member nations of PIPIR identified four workstreams on which the countries would collaborate. Those four workstreams are Sustainment, Production, Supply Chain Resilience, and Policy and Optimization. Indo-Pacific nations already have several projects contributing to each workstream. Here are just a few of the most recent announcements:

Sustainment:

• US-India Master Ship Repair Agreement

• US-ROK First Shipyard Repair Contract

• US-Australia Aircraft Maintenance

Production:

• US-Japan Missile Co-Production

• US-Australia Co-Production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

• US-Australia Co-Production of Precision Strike Missile

• Australia-ROK K-9 Co-Production of Self-Propelled Howitzers and Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles

Supply Chain Resilience:

• US-India Enter Into Security of Supply Arrangement

• AUKUS Supply Chain MOU

• US-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement

Policy and Optimization:

• US and Japan Establish Joint Forces Headquarters

• US-Australia Combined Intelligence Center

• New Zealand Added to US National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB)

• AUKUS Partners Rule Changes for Secure License-Free Defense Trade

• US-Japan Open Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell

PIPIR is guided by DoD’s Regional Sustainment Framework, which puts the priority on Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) agreements.

US Department of Defense: Regional Sustainment Framework:

The Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) outlines the Department’s strategic initiative designed to optimize regional Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) capabilities. These capabilities may be owned by partner nations, industrial partners, or through cooperative partnerships. Currently, we return assets to the Continental United States for major repairs, missing an opportunity to use existing ally or partner nation MRO capabilities for shared weapons systems. By integrating these resources, we foster an effective regional MRO strategy that supports both our regional partners and the U.S. Joint Force in competition and conflict.

Out of the four workstreams listed above, sustainment seems to be the initiative with the least amount of progress. In January, there were reports that the US and Japan would announce an agreement on Japan conducting repairs for major warships, but negotiations are still ongoing. Perhaps PIPIR can streamline collaboration.

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Spoke Story: US-Papua New Guinea Strategic Partnership Dialogue

On October 10, 2024, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Minister John Rosso held the inaugural US-Papua New Guinea Strategic Partnership Dialogue in Washington, DC, significantly strengthening bilateral relations. The dialogue aims to enhance cooperation in various areas, including security, climate change, economic development, and cultural exchange while committing to modernizing their security relationship to support a free and open Indo-Pacific. Both nations expressed their dedication to annual consultations, with the next meeting scheduled for 2025 in Port Moresby to coincide with Papua New Guinea’s 50th anniversary of independence.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been a target nation for US defense policy in the region. In the past year, US-PNG ties have broaden and deepened. For decades, PNG has been struggling to modernize and professionalize its armed forces. While PNG ushered new security agreements with Indonesia and Australia, PNG still lacked the adequate partner. Last year, the United States and Papua New Guinea signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) designed to overhaul the relationship.

PNG is a strategically located partner for the United States.

The Strategist: The Rising Value of Papua New Guinea’s Strategic Geography:

The island of New Guinea, of which PNG forms the eastern half, is often depicted as sitting at the foot of the ‘second island chain’. Alternatively conceived, it constitutes the biggest link in Australia’s own first island chain. Either way, its importance is clear: it’s not just the closest country to the Australian mainland but, with an 820-kilometre land border with Indonesia, also the hinge between Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. The Torres Strait, between PNG and Australia, controls access between the Indonesian archipelago and the Coral Sea. Cape York, the northernmost part of the Australian continent, points directly to Guam, in the Marianas, America’s bulwark base in the second island chain. PNG is the only country in between.

The DCA bolsters American access and includes provisions for tighter US-PNG training and collaboration, specifically on countering illegal fishing. Under the agreement, the United States will have access to six sites for 15 years, including Lombrum Naval Base and Momote Airport in northern Papua New Guinea. The bases can be used for contingency operations, which during peacetime means response to natural disasters and providing humanitarian aid, but potentially could be used for future conflicts.

Spoke Story: ASEAN-India Summit

At the recent India-ASEAN Summit in Laos, leaders underscored the importance of deepening partnerships to counterbalance regional challenges and enhance cooperation across various sectors. The discussions highlighted shared commitments to upholding international law and promoting stability while exploring opportunities for economic and educational collaboration. This summit represents a continued effort to strengthen ties as both sides navigate evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region.

India is emerging as the strategic partner of choice for Southeast Asian countries, a significant development as the US-China rivalry continues to impact the region. ASEAN, in particular, is wary of aligning with either superpower in this new cold war. While other Indo-Pacific nations like Japan and Australia have strong ties to the region, Southeast Asian nations may be seeking a partner that is not bound by legal obligations to the United States. India boasts a robust streak of independence that allows it to engage with Russia, the United States, and China, which could be the ideal strategic partner.

Prime Minister Modi announced a 10 point plan to support India-ASEAN partnership:

• Celebrating 2025 as ASEAN-India Year of Tourism for which India will make available USD 5 million towards joint activities

• Celebrate a decade of Act East Policy through several people centric activities including Youth Summit, Start-up Festival, Hackathon, Music Festival, ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks and Delhi Dialogue

• Doubling the number of scholarships at Nalanda University and provision of new scholarships for ASEAN students at Agriculture Universities in India

• A women scientist conclave under the India-ASEAN S&T Fund

• Expeditious review and conclusion of ASEAN-India Trade in Good Agreement by 2025

• Allocation of $5mn for disaster resilience from India-ASEAN Fund

• Institutionalization of health ministers’ meetings for ensuring health security

• Digital and cyber policy dialogue

• Green future through regular workshops and exchange of information and expertise

• Supporting climate resilience through " Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam” (Plant for Mother)

Washington should do what it can to encourage closer alignment between ASEAN and India. Even if ASEAN-India cooperation is not a direct positive for the United States, it is an indirect gain because it results in a stronger India and isn’t a win for China. Letting allies and partners play a leadership role in the regions the United States cannot prioritize is something Washington should encourage. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell got heat for an off-the-cuff remark about the United States deputizing Australia in the Pacific Islands. Poor language, good policy.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

United States:

• Defense News: US Army Pacific to Absorb New Units Under ‘Transformation’ Mantra

• UPI: Lt. Gen. Stephen Jost Takes Command of US Forces in Japan

Australia:

• Breaking Defense: Eyeing Australia’s Missile Money Pot, Anduril Aims to Join Solid Rocket Motor Market Down Under

India:

• Nikkei Asia: India to Buy 31 Armed Drones From The US

Japan:

• Nikkei Asia: Japan and US Move Closer to Co-Production of Air-to-Air Missile

• Yonhap News: Defense Chiefs of S. Korea, Japan Underscore Trilateral Cooperation with US

Taiwan:

• Nikkei Asia: Taiwan Submarine Program Faces Mounting Questions Over Tactical Merits

South Korea:

• Yonhap News: S. Korea, Vietnam Agree to Expand Security, Economic Ties

• Yonhap News: Defense Chief Urges Stronger Joint Exercises with US During Meeting with Admiral Samuel Paparo

• Nikkei Asia: South Korea's Hanwha 'Not Done' With US Shipyard Acquisitions

• Yonhap News: S. Korean Expert Calls for Stronger Defense Industrial Cooperation with US, Voices Concern Over Export Controls

Other:

• USNI: German Navy Asserts Freedom of Navigation During Pacific Deployment, Says Admiral

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Hub Story: South Korea and US Announce Cost-Sharing Agreement

South Korea and the United States have reached a significant defense cost-sharing agreement, known as the 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), which will see Korea's direct financial contributions increase by 8.3 percent in 2026. This deal marks a shift back to a consumer price index (CPI)-based system for determining annual contributions instead of being tied to South Korean defense budget growth. The agreement, finalized after extensive negotiations, is poised to address previous concerns about the financial burden on Seoul.

This new announcement comes after many rounds of cost-sharing negotiations this year. Seoul and Washington pushed to reach a settlement early to try to prevent negotiations from taking place under a second Trump Administration. The graph below shows South Korean payments since the 1st SMA in 1991.

Do these numbers actually reflect South Korean cost share? Not quite. Washington has pushed South Korea to pay 50 percent of the total US cost and obligation to the Asian ally. However, as recent reports have indicated, these payments only reflect the direct costs that South Korea pays and do not reflect the indirect costs that South Korea contributes to US Forces Korea.

Additionally, the figures accrued under the various SMA’s do not account for other projects negotiated outside SMA deals. For example, a 2021 Government Accountability Office report tracked South Korea’s direct cast payments under the SMA but also some of the costs Seoul incurred for the Yongsan Garrison relocation to Camp Humphreys, which were quite significant and projected to cost $7.4 billion in total.

Under President Trump, the alliance was strained, particularly regarding cost-sharing. Trump demanded $1.5 billion from Seoul, but in 2019, the two countries agreed on a roughly $1 billion figure. In 2021, under the 11th SMA, the cost the ROK would pay was linked to annual increases in ROK’s defense budget growth. While this was acceptable to the more dovish Moon Jae-in administration, it resulted in dramatic cost-sharing increases under the new Yoon Suk Yeol administration, mainly due to his more hawkish posture and efforts to increase South Korean defense spending.

Seoul wants to insulate direct costs from another Trump Administration by getting a settlement very early and with a more friendly Biden Administration. Trump has already criticized the amount that South Korea pays earlier this year. It is doubtful that Trump would keep to a Biden-era deal, especially since the current SMA isn’t set to lapse until 2026. Additionally, Trump foreign policy advisors like Bridge Colby have called for a re-evaluation of the American position on the peninsula. Colby does not call for the abandonment of South Korea but rather that the US force posture there be reimagined to face China rather than solely focused on the North Korean threat. Even if Trump does not decide to renegotiate the SMA, the US-South Korea alliance will come under strain as the new administration looks to determine US interests in the region. It seems unlikely that a President Kamala Harris would throw out the new SMA for her own.

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Spoke Story: Sweden Releases Indo-Pacific Strategy

Last week, the Swedish government released its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Within, Sweden acknowledges the growing link between security in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, as threats from authoritarian states challenge international norms. To address these challenges, Sweden aims to strengthen defense cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners to maintain stability and protect trade. This policy outlines the government's commitment to enhancing engagement in three key areas: defense relations, military presence, and collaboration on defense technology, ultimately improving Sweden's national defense capabilities.

There is a burgeoning convergence between the European and Indo-Pacific allies, a trend that underscores the strengthening of allied relations. The Swedish government is committed to upholding international law and extends this commitment to the Indo-Pacific. This declared connection is part of a larger trend in thinking by European and Indo-Pacific governments. This is evidenced by NATO's gradual embrace of the Indo-Pacific, as seen with the inclusion of Indo-Pacific leaders at this year's NATO Summit in Washington. South Korea's recent expansion of military assistance to NATO countries and the new Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's statement that "today's Ukraine could be tomorrow's East Asia" all point to a deepening of security ties in the region.

Unfortunately, Eurasia's authoritarian countries have come to similar conclusions. Russia and North Korea have grown worryingly close, and China has expanded wartime assistance to Moscow.

Sweden intensities three thrust areas that it plans to focus on for its Indo-Pacific posture: defense relations, military presence, and cooperation on defense materiel. The white paper identifies several measures Sweden plans to take:

• Expanding bilateral defense and security dialogues

• Participating in regional forums

• Increasing the presence of defense attachés in prioritized Indo-Pacific countries

• Strengthening both the Government Offices’ and public authorities’ analytical skills in the defense and security sectors

• Continue to monitor the maritime security situation and evaluate contributions for future efforts and regional initiatives for maritime security in the region

• Assigning liaison officers to staff in the region

• Taking part in regional defense exercises and operations for maritime security

• Enhancing bilateral collaboration to develop specific military operational concepts may be valuable to Sweden’s national defense capacity development

• Increasing cooperation on defense technology and innovation with high-tech countries to increase Swedish capacity development in the short or long term

Sweden concludes its strategy with a strong note.

Swedish Ministry of Defence: Defence Policy Direction for Cooperation with Countries in the Indo-Pacific Region:

Since the Government is now launching, and prioritising, enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the conditions for collaborating internationally and strengthening the transatlantic link are good. EU and NATO activities are an important part of developing and promoting Sweden’s defence relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, a number of measures can be implemented nationally and by individual actors in Sweden to develop and promote the ambitions outlined in this document.

Spoke Story: South Korean President Visits the Philippines

For nearly a year, the Philippines and China have been in heightened tensions over China's excessive claims and actions in the South China Sea. Chinese aggression has resulted in notably closer collaboration between the Philippines and the United States, as well as other Indo-Pacific countries like Japan and Australia. Last week marked the first state visit of a South Korean president to the Philippines since 2011.

President Yoon Suk Yeol's visit to Manila was not just a visit but a strategic move that upgraded Korean and Filipino relations to a "strategic partnership." This shift in status, along with Yoon's announcement of $1.9 billion of low-interest loans for two infrastructure projects in the Philippines, signifies the importance of this development.

On the security front, the two leaders announced deeper cooperation on maritime security between their coast guards, a clear signal to China. A more significant takeaway is that the joint statement emphasized defense-industrial cooperation.

Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea:

Closer cooperation between defense industries and logistical acquisition symbolizes mutual trust between the two countries. The ROK’s support in this area is essential to the Modernization Program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Building on the progress made thus far, the two countries will continue to deepen their special partnership in this area.

Yoon’s trip to Manila is just the first leg of a broader Southeast Asian tour, which includes Singapore and Laos. Yoon has set a path for South Korea to become one of the world’s leading defense exporters. In 2023, South Korea was in the top 10 for arms exports, and the government is striving to reach fourth place by 2027. Yoon and the ROK Defense Ministry have done an impressive job engaging with Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in defense sales. South East Asia is another great opportunity for Seoul to increase its domestic industrial capacity through arms exports. Yoon’s push falls within his vision of South Korea as a Global Pivotal State. The Philippines is a good target as Manila is desperate to rapidly modernize its armed forces.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Australia:

• Defense News: New Zealand, Australia Swap Senior Military Commanders

• Defense News: House Leaders Urge White House to Share More Tech with Australia, UK

India:

• The Diplomat: AI and Indian Defense: Enhancing National Security Through Innovation

• US State Department: Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar

Japan:

• Naval News: Japan MoD Signs Contracts to Build Two ASEVs with MHI and JMU

• Japan Times: Ishiba Looks to 'Defense Tribe' to Fill Key Cabinet Positions

• Nikkei Asia: Japan's Chip Revival is on Track. The Real Challenge Begins Now

South Korea:

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korean, U.S. Navies Hold Joint Drill in East Sea

• Nikkei Asia: South Korea Unveils Most Powerful Ballistic Missile

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea to attend NATO defense ministers' meeting for 1st time

• Yonhap News Agency: Int'l Defense Exhibition Opens at Gyeryongdae Military Headquarters

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Hub Story: Fiji Releases Foreign Policy White Paper

On September 23rd, the Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its first foreign policy white paper. The government recognizes that the developing US-China rivalry is making the Pacific a perilous region, and Fiji plans to stake out and pursue its own national interests.

The white paper defines its national interests as sovereignty, security, and identity. These aren’t quite national interests, but the white paper delineates Fiji’s guiding principles, which better illuminate the island nation’s foreign policy trajectory and priorities.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

In advancing its national interests Fiji will be guided by the following principles:

First, a recognition that domestic and foreign policy must be aligned. What we do at home should be consistent with what we wish to achieve abroad.

Second, multilateral cooperation is essential to giving Fiji the leverage it simply cannot apply as a small state working on its own. This applies at the global, regional and subregional levels.

Third, Pacific regionalism lies at the heart of our approach to foreign policy. Regionalism defines our maritime environment. It is the foundation of the Pacific Islands Forum and the other institutions that serve our interests from fisheries to economic integration.

Fourth, the strength of domestic institutions is essential to our national strength. Strong institutions buttress our stability. They are the engines of policy making. They underpin our social cohesion, and they guarantee the rule of law. They take time to grow, can quickly weaken and must be carefully nurtured.

Fifth, Fiji must engage in global issues that directly affect its interests. This includes the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the international financial institutions and negotiations on vital issues for Fiji such as climate change, trade liberalisation and access to markets and to finance for development.

Similar to the approach of many smaller nations, Fiji puts a big emphasis on working through multilateral institutions to influence the region. Smaller states often insist that larger great powers and middle powers work with multilateral organizations like ASEAN or the Pacific Islands Forum. As the white power notes, Fiji itself is too small to shape the Pacific region individually. However, pooling resources and influence with other small nations allows the Pacific Islands to punch above its weight.

The white paper, along with many Asian strategists from New Delhi to Tokyo, shares the conclusion that the Pacific is shifting toward a multipolar system. This consensus among experts in the region is a significant viewpoint, even if it is not widely adopted in Washington. It underscores the importance of understanding the diverse perspectives on the power dynamics in the Pacific region.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

In the medium term the power distribution of the Indo-Pacific will run mainly along bipolar rails. There will be a significant power gap between the US and China on the one hand and a clutch of major powers such as India, Indonesia and Japan on the other.

In the long term however the distribution of power may be more dispersed, and more states will want the flexibility to navigate this more complex strategic environment without being exclusively tied to one power or another. This is the nature of a multipolar system.

Interestingly, Fiji views a multipolar system as an end state rather than a context in which it must operate. The strategic logic is sound. Fiji seeks a multipolar Pacific with several countries balancing against each other and giving smaller nations like Fiji options to hedge against.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

The Indo-Pacific is a region where the interests of superpowers, major powers and smaller states intersect. Its diversity demands arrangements which do not shoehorn nations into a single strategic structure such as a bipolar system.

A multipolar region will require adaptable structures where interests are carefully balanced and where strategic space is shared. For now, we are some distance from achieving this.

Fiji sees multilateral partnerships and institutions as critical tools for preserving its security and more adeptly moving the Pacific region from a bipolar rivalry to a multipolar balance.

The United States has a healthy security and military relationship with Fiji but lacks a robust economic and development partnership.

For instance, in August, the United States and Fiji jointly hosted the 48th annual Indo-Pacific Armies Management Seminar. This significant event, which brought together senior army leaders from 21 Indo-Pacific countries, provided a platform for strategic discussions on collective action in wartime operations. However, the economic aspect of the US-Fiji relationship is less vigorous.

As the white paper notes, Fiji’s development partners lack a prominent American presence. In fact, the United States ranks 13th in development partnerships, contributing only 1 percent of Fiji’s development assistance.

The lack of more serious American aid and economic engagement in the Pacific is really destructive to US interests. Narau is an excellent example of how China used financial incentives to get the Pacific island nation to derecognize Taiwan and only recognize the People’s Republic of China. An analysis piece by the United States Institute of Peace demonstrates how smaller countries can exploit great power rivalry for economic and financial gain.

United States Institute of Peace: Financially Weak Pacific Island States Are Vulnerable to China

For years, Nauru has financed as much as two-thirds of its state budget with fees paid by Australia for Nauru’s hosting of an Australian government processing center for people seeking asylum in Australia. In June, Australia evacuated those refugees (while continuing to maintain the offshore processing center) and the reduction in fees created a budget shortfall that Taiwan could not help Nauru to fill. That paved the way for the switch in recognition. Kiribati and Solomon Islands also switched amid financial issues: Kiribati because Taiwan wouldn’t buy it commercial aircraft and Solomon Islands reportedly in exchange for $8.5 million in development funds.

Ultimately, China plays this game well, and the United States is largely absent, hoping friendly countries like Australia, Japan, and New Zealand can pick up the slack. The United States might have a strong security relationship with Fiji, but policymakers need to hear what leaders in this region are saying they need. They rarely ask for more military exercises. This strategy is hardly sustainable and will take leadership to reverse.

Spoke Story: AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting

Defense ministers from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in London to coordinate on AUKUS initiatives. This meeting was important not just for the progress announced but also as a strong signal from the new Labour government in the United Kingdom that they are committed to resourcing this initiative.

There was a big focus on workforce updates. If AUKUS is to succeed, it will require a lot of skilled labor to build and operate the nuclear-powered submarines. A month ago, Australia announced that three Australian submarine officers graduated from the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Reactor Course. Additionally, earlier in the summer, 12 Australian submariners started training with the American Navy on nuclear submarines. The joint statement announced more developments.

US Department of Defense: AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting Communique:

More than 60 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel are currently in various stages of the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine SSN training pipeline to equip a cadre of Australian officers and sailors with experience aboard the U.S. Virginia class SSNs that the RAN will own and operate from the early 2030s. These numbers will increase further in 2025, with more than 100 personnel commencing training. Six officers have completed all training and have been assigned to U.S. Virginia class submarines. RAN enlisted sailors will join U.S. submarine crews before the end of this year.

The joint statement also demonstrated how each nation is investing in its submarine industrial base, another critical aspect of the initiative. If these three countries cannot substantially overhaul their submarine industrial base and properly invest in the workforce needed to develop, produce, and sustain these nuclear-powered submarines, the whole program is at risk of failure.

US Department of Defense: AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting Communique:

• The U.S. Government decided to invest USD 17.5 billion into its submarine industrial base to support initiatives related to supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements, and strategic sourcing.

• Australia has also committed to invest over AUD 30 billion in the Australian defence industrial base to develop Australia's supply chains and facilitate industry participation in U.S. and UK supply chains.

• His Majesty's Government announced an initial allocation of £4 billion from the United Kingdom to continue the detailed design work of SSN-AUKUS and order long-lead items, as well as the United Kingdom's investment of £3 billion across its Defence Nuclear Enterprise, including the construction of submarine industrial infrastructure that will help to deliver the SSN-AUKUS programme.

Additionally, this is the first time that the AUKUS nations have stated that they are officially exploring Japan’s inclusion in Pilar II of AUKUS, especially with maritime autonomous systems. AUKUS countries are also holding consultations with Canada, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

Spoke Story: Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue

Last week in Seoul, the United States and Korea held the 25th Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue. Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang Lae, led the ROK delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Anka Lee, led the US delegation. Key senior ROK and US defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue. Washington and Seoul have grown closer as tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula. Key to President Yoon’s foreign policy strategy is a deep US-ROK security relationship, but also a broader partnership network.

US Department of Defense: Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue:

Both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three pillars of the "Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance": enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They acknowledged the importance of faithfully implementing the Defense Vision to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and reviewed implementation of specific tasks. In addition, the two sides noted progress to align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms under the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to effectively and efficiently support strengthening the Alliance through the implementation of the Defense Vision, and pledged to continue assessing them.

As a signal that South Korea is willing to cooperate with the United States on broader security challenges, Seoul is broadening cooperation that can be critical in a US-China fight. This new dialogue demonstrated that the two countries are deepening industrial base collaboration.

US Department of Defense: Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue:

The two sides also pledged to continue expanding cooperative measures to enhance the defense industrial base and interoperability of both the United States and the ROK. The delegations agreed that cooperative efforts for a Regional Sustainment Framework being developed by the Defense Department would strengthen posture and capabilities of the Alliance. As such, they highly appreciated a ROK's participation in the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project, in an area of Air Force's aviation maintenance, and pledged to continue discussions for expanding cooperation into the Army aviation and naval vessels. The two sides also welcomed the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards for the conduct of MRO for U.S. vessels. In addition, both sides recognized the need to provide reciprocal market access to deepen defense cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and pledged to advance progress on a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP-A).

A Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement would be an vital step to bolster US force posture in the region, especially for the US Air Force and Navy. This initiative is a pillar of the Defense Department’s new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience. Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante says the new alliance program will “work through common acquisition and sustainment issues, whether it’s co-development, co-production [or] co-sustainment.” A RDP-A would lower trade barriers so that the two countries can more easily sell weapons systems to each other. Negotiations have it speedbumps as Congress and other interest groups claim it harms American workers and industries. It is not clear if the Pentagon is going to be able to finalize negotiations this year due to political sensitivities.

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Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Australia:

• Defense News: Australia Primes Local Production of Solid Rocket Motors for its Ammo

• Defense News: Australian Army Seeks Light Vehicles for its Littoral Ambitions

The Philippines:

• Defense News: US Missile System Will Remain in Philippines Despite China’s Alarm

• Naval News: ‘Philippines Will Need More Vessels’ – Military Chief

• Naval News: Philippines and Allies hold joint sail in West Philippine Sea

• Japan Times: US Coast Guard Advising Manila as it Seeks Bigger Indo-Pacific Footprint

Japan:

• US Department of State: US and Japan Advance Economic and Technology Policy Alignment through Fourth Economic Policy Consultative Committee Vice-Ministerial Meeting

India:

• Breaking Defense: Boeing Subsidiary, Indian Firm Ink New Agreement to Produce Unmanned Vehicles: White House

South Korea:

• Naval News: Hanwha Shows New Frigate Design With Australian Radar At ADAS 2024

• Yonhap News: S. Korea, Japan to Hold 1st Talks on Continental Shelf Development since 1985

• Yonhap News: S. Korea to Launch Strategic Command this Week Amid N. Korean Threats

New Zealand:

• The Diplomat: New Zealand’s Trade Deal With the UAE Could Be the Start of Something Much Bigger

Other:

• Breaking Defense: Singapore, US Defense Innovation Unit Collab to Tackle ‘Unauthorized Drones’ in Indo-Pacific

• US Department of State: Solidifying Cybersecurity Cooperation in the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

• Japan Times: Singapore Commissions New Submarines as Asia's Undersea Rivalry Grows

• PINA: US President met with leaders from Freely Associated States in the Pacific

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Hub Story: CNO Navigation Plan 2024

US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti released her 2024 Navigation Plan, which lays out her strategic priorities for the US Navy and announces the US Navy’s Project 33 approach.

CNO Navigation Plan 2024:

Executing the Navigation Plan:

This Navigation Plan drives toward two strategic ends: readiness for the possibility of war with the People’s Republic of China by 2027 and enhancing the Navy’s long-term advantage. We will work towards these ends through two mutually reinforcing ways: implementing Project 33 and expanding the Navy’s contribution to the Joint warfighting ecosystem…

The seven Project 33 targets are:

• Ready the force by eliminating ship, submarine, and aircraft maintenance delays

• Scale robotic and autonomous systems to integrate more platforms at speed

• Create the command centers our fleets need to win on a distributed battlefield

• Recruit and retain the force we need to get more players on the field

• Deliver a quality of service commensurate with the sacrifices of our Sailors

• Train for combat as we plan to fight, in the real world and virtually

• Restore the critical infrastructure that sustains and projects the fight from shore

Project 33 sets new targets but we do not need new levers to reach them. This is core to my guidance. We will deliver results using the tools and resources we have to gain ground without losing speed.

The strategy is realistic and puts emphasis on the real barriers to a stronger navy:

We must recognize that the Navy faces real financial and industrial constraints, including the once-in-a-generation cost of recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent. Right sizing the fleet will be a generational project for the Navy, Congress, and industry. Even as we increase the role of robotic and autonomous systems in the fleet, we will continue to need a deep bench of Sailor and civilian talent to meet our mission.

I wish there were more of a call to action. Branch strategies must work with the available resources and cannot get too political. Still, there is also a responsibility to provide guidance on what resources they need to accomplish political goals, like fighting and winning a war with China. I understand the desire of uniformed leaders to display confidence, but sometimes, this leads to complacency in political leadership. For example, during a recent panel event at the American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Kori Schake praised the Biden Administration's advancements in force posture in the Indo-Pacific but questioned if we lacked actual progress on force structure. To defend the administration, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner noted that INDOPACOM Commander Paparo often says he has everything he needs to fight and beat China. We're in an awkward pendulum between displaying confidence and sounding the alarm for robust rearmament. The majority of responsibility falls to the political civilians to make this case about resourcing, but I fear that uniformed leaders often exacerbate the issue.

Spoke Story: US Army Pacific Theater Strategy

On September 15th, US Army Pacific (USARPAC) released its theater strategy guided by the motto “Get in a Position to Compete, Fight and Win.” Led by General Charles Flynn, USARPAC has constantly tried to emphasize the role of the Army in the Indo-Pacific. Flynn himself is continuously on the think tank events circuit, and this theater strategy is in part written to convince the reader that the US Army is important (critical?) to a US-China contingency.

USARPAC Theater Strategy:

This Strategy Reflects a Central Idea: As part of the Combined/Joint Force, Army forces achieve positional advantage with decisive landpower to win the long-term strategic competition, and, if called upon, to prevail in war through four strategic methods:

• We ORGANIZE the most battle-winning mix of capabilities to transform in contact and execute the Theater Army’s required missions, roles, and functions across the competition continuum.

• We GENERATE the combined and joint warfighting capacity to prosecute multidomain operations against our opponents, namely the PLA.

• We APPLY landpower on key terrain creating unity of effort, imposing adversary dilemmas, and empowering our partners to defend their sovereignty and assert their rights.

• We BUILD Joint Interior Lines for warfighting that create enduring advantages, allow Army forces to control decisive points, and provide staying power to the Joint Force.

Central to USARPAC’s strategy is this idea of achieving and holding positional advantage.

Foremost to our success is achieving positional advantage, a favorable condition that provides us freedom of action or, at a minimum, windows to maneuver. We achieve positional advantage with forces undergoing “Continuous Transformation” who occupy key terrain in competition and seize, hold, and defend land areas in combat. Key terrain is physical in the sense of geographical locations that are decisive to maneuver, but it is also non-physical, such as a leader’s mental calculations of warfare or how information connects humans to the physical world.

USARPAC has boosted capabilities in the region this year:

• Deployed Mid-Range Capability to the Philippines

• Launched Precision Strike Missiles from Palau to sink a moving ship during Valiant Shield exercise

• Launched High-Altitude Balloons with sensing and communications capabilities from Guam

• Supported Malaysia Maritime Domain Awareness with a Combined Information and Effects Fusion Cell

• Deployed a battalion from 1/1 Armor from Texas to South Korea, drew equipment, and conducted a live fire exercise within six days

One of the issues with the strategy is that it is almost entirely focused on the China threat and its planning for that contingency. Obviously, this is critically important, and planning is needed. However, the Korean Peninsula is only referenced briefly a few times in passing. Yet, the Korean Peninsula is USARPAC's primary operation in the region, with around 22,000 US Army soldiers stationed in South Korea. The Korean Peninsula is becoming increasingly less stable, especially as the North Korean and Russian relationship gets deeper. USARPAC will undoubtedly have a role to play in the China fight. Still, if it pivots to focus primarily on the China operation, it may hinder regional stability by failing to prep and resource the Korean Peninsula adequately.

Spoke Story: Military AI Summit in Seoul

South Korea co-hosted the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit in Seoul along with the Netherlands, Singapore, Kenya, and the United Kingdom. Government and military officials, as well as business leaders from more than 90 countries, discussed responsible development and use of AI in the military sector and how to establish international norms for the matter. The result was the Blueprint for Action, signed by around 60 countries, including the United States but not China.

The 2024 Blueprint for Action is meant to complement REAIM’s 2023 Call to Action. The 2024 statement is much more explanatory on how militaries should build and incorporate AI. Some of the key themes emphasized are that military AI should abide by international law and ethics, be protected from bad actors, ensure that humans are held accountable for all AI actions, and adhere to a structure of rules and regulations.

Most of the actions from the non-legally binding blueprint are fairly generic. It’s concerning that Beijing would decide against signing onto it. There may be some language in the blueprint that Beijing is worried might be used against them down the road, for example:

REAIM Blueprint for Action:

Emphasize that such a discussion should take place in an open and inclusive manner to fully reflect wide- ranging views, bearing in mind that different states and regions are at varying stages of integrating AI capabilities in the military domain, come from different security environments and have varying security concerns.

Regardless of the precise reason for China’s withdrawal, it looks like a good step forward on American leadership with China protesting on the sidelines.

Spoke Story: Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index

The Lowy Institute has released its 2024 edition of its Asia Power Index, assessing the geopolitical dynamics across the Indo-Pacific. Lowy measures 131 indicators captured in eight categories of power.

The new report offers many insights, and it’s worth exploring the data in full. One significant development is that India has surpassed Japan as the third-most powerful country in the region.

Lowy Institute: Asia Power Index:

India performs best in the future resources measure, placing 3rd behind only the United States and China. By contrast, India’s lowest-ranked measure is economic relationships, a result of the country sitting outside the regional economic integration agenda.

India’s score improved across the resources measures in 2024, although it did not gain a ranking in any measure. It dropped one place for both economic relationships and defence networks to 10th and 9th, respectively, repeating its performance in 2023 when its rankings also declined for each of these measures.

When looking at the annual changes to India’s power, there is a boost across the economic dimensions of India’s power, with limited and diminishing gains in India’s military power.

Most of India’s influence is found in its near abroad, with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Myanmar being the countries most influenced by New Delhi. Some of these gains might be the product of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Act East Policy, which has resulted in closer economic, technological, and strategic collaboration, especially with ASEAN.

The other side of this story, is Japan’s relative decline. The notable distinction between India and Japan is their future resources category. Diplomatically and economically, Japan remains strong, but India has a much better hand to play when forecasting a decade from now.

Lowy Institute: Asia Power Index:

Japan scores best in diplomatic influence, where it ranked 2nd in 2024, pushing the United States to 3rd place.

Japan’s lowest scores are for resilience and future resources, for which it ranks 7th. While its score for resilience increased by four rankings, its score for future resources declined by two places.

Japan’s biggest improvement in a measure score in 2024 was for defence networks, where its increased activity with the United States and other regional partners saw its score rise by 13.1 points.

However, as the Indo-Pacific approaches the 2030s, Japan’s demographic challenges will sap its comprehensive power. Overall, India ranks third on future resources, while Japan is at a modest seventh place. Even more telling is the comparative demographics between the middle powers. India leads the Indo-Pacific nations on future demographics, while Japan lags even further behind. For the next few years, India and Japan are bound to bounce back and forth between third and fourth place, but India is the safe bet for the coming decades.

Spoke Story: US-India Defense Dialogues

The US-India INDUS-X initiative held its third summit in Silicon Valley on September 9th, with a strong focus on strengthening defense industrial cooperation and innovation. This was achieved through the active participation and contributions of defense technology innovators, investors, and researchers. Key topics included co-producing advanced military capabilities, improving supply chains, and enhancing US-India military interoperability for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The summit featured the signing of an updated Memorandum of Understanding between the US Defense Innovation Unit and India's Defense Innovation Organization to expand cooperation on defense innovation, and the launch of a new INDUS-X webpage for investors and startups.

The growing INDUS-X initiative has many defense outcomes. One interesting development on the security front is the growing defense industrial collaboration.

Defense Innovation Unit: INDUS-X Impact Report:

US-India industrial partnerships provide advanced defence capabilities and reinforce defence supply chains. Skydio, a U.S.-based manufacturer of A.I.-enabled unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), announced a new partnership with Aeroarc, an Indian-based UAS manufacturer. Through this partnership, Skydio and Aeroarc will strengthen defence capabilities, expand artificial intelligence (AI) collaboration between the US and India, and support demand from global customers. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., a US- based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturer, announced two partnerships to support US-India industrial collaboration on India’s future MQ-9B UAV program. General Atomics will leverage expertise from 114ai, an Indian technology company, to jointly develop software and artificial intelligence models to process ISR data more effectively. General Atomics is also partnering with Bharat Forge and an Indian engineering company, to manufacture MQ-9 components and assemblies in India for use on all MQ-9B aircraft worldwide. Liquid Robotics, a Boeing Company, highlighted their collaboration with Indian partners to develop capabilities of the Wave Glider Uncrewed Surface.

Additionally, President Biden and Prime Minister Modi met on the sidelines of the UN and Quad gatherings. The two nations agreed that India would be more proactive in helping secure maritime trade, “The Leaders reaffirmed their support for the freedom of navigation and the protection of commerce, including critical maritime routes in the Middle East where India will assume co-lead in 2025 of the Combined Task Force 150 to work with Combined Maritime Forces to secure sea lanes in the Arabian Sea.”

During his testimony before Congress, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell confirmed that the US and India would also hold dialogues about coordinating on security issues in the Indian Ocean. As Campbell admits, the Indian Ocean falls between the cracks of the Indo-Pacific Command and Central Command, leaving a gap in US security attention. It seems that INDOPACOM Commander Paparo will lead the Indian Ocean engagement.

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Alliance Insights:

Australia:

• USSC: Expanding the National Security Innovation Base: How Australia and the United States can Collaborate to Harness their Commercial Technology Ecosystems

• Defense News: Australian Army to Grow, Diversify its Drone Fleet

• Breaking Defense: Lockheed Nearing Test of Sea-Launched JAGM, Pitches for US and Australia

Japan:

• Naval News: JMSDF Set to Establish a New “Fleet Information Warfare” Command

• State Department: Approved Sale of Japan of KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft

India:

• Brookings Institute: The US-India Partnership and the 2024 Elections

• The Indian Express: Maldives, India Resolved ‘Misunderstandings’ After Rough Patches in Ties

• Times of India: Ammunition from India Enters Ukraine, Raising Russian Ire

South Korea:

• War on the Rocks: South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma

• Yonhap News: Army Chief Discusses Arms, Defense Cooperation in Poland, Romania

Pacific Islands:

• The Strategist: PIF Hack Highlights the Need for Cyber Capacity Building

Hub Story: US-New Zealand Strategic Dialogue

On August 30, 2024, officials gathered in Auckland to participate in the New Zealand–United States Strategic Dialogue. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs Bede Corry reaffirmed their commitment to deepening security, defense, and economic ties amidst global challenges.

Much of the press statements were along the lines of standard joint ally statements. Both countries voiced concerns over destabilizing actions in the South China Sea and reaffirmed their support for regional stability and the Pacific Islands Forum. They also highlighted their commitment to working with like-minded partners to uphold a stable Indo-Pacific region and looked forward to future high-level meetings.

The more significant takeaway is the launch of the New Zealand-United States Dialogue on Critical and Emerging Technologies.

US Department of State: New Zealand–United States Strategic Dialogue:

This will facilitate links between New Zealand and United States technology sectors, explore new avenues for research cooperation, and focus on opportunities to address regulatory and legal issues pertaining to the technology partnership between the two countries.  The launch of this new strand of the relationship will enhance economic connections and build prosperity, including through technology and innovation, and is a fitting means to celebrate the 150th anniversary of when American scientists visited New Zealand for the first time to observe the transit of Venus.

The United States and New Zealand committed to pursue focused collaboration on the need to advance safe, secure, trustworthy, and responsible AI innovation; safe and secure biotechnologies; and quantum computing. They reaffirmed that the digital economy and information and communication technologies act as an essential enabler of these critical and emerging technologies.

The new forum on critical and emerging technologies joins the list of growing dialogues that the US and New Zealand are convening. In April, the two countries held a United States-New Zealand Space Dialogue.

These dialogues are relatively standard amongst close allies and partners. Still, this growing engagement may be part of New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s new “reset” in New Zealand security policy. Luxon is eager to engage with the United States and be more forward-leaning on security policy. Earlier this year, Luxon announced that he would send NZ troops to the Gulf of Aden to join the multinational coalition defending shipping from the Houthis.

Fact Sheet: NZDF Deployment To Protect Red Sea Shipping:

The decision to deploy a team of six NZDF personnel to uphold maritime security in the Red Sea has been made with these same goals in mind: defending lives, de-escalating tensions, and restoring stability to the Red Sea.

Cooperating on critical and emerging technologies makes sense for the relationship. Given Luxon’s new security policy and its historically close ties with Australia, it begs whether this dialogue will eventually help facilitate NZ participation in Pillar 2 of AUKUS. This is pretty unlikely, at least in the near term. Australia is very stand-offish about the idea, despite Kurt Campbell’s many hints that other countries will join Pillar 2. Eventually, AUKUS might open up Pillar 2 on a case-by-case basis, but there is already so much to fix with export controls that it is unlikely NZ will be meaningfully incorporated soon.

While a smaller nation, New Zealand is a hub for education and technology. According to a recent study, the New Zealand tech sector will comprise 23,433 firms in 2022, an 8.1 percent increase from the previous year, creating 1,752 new tech firms. The largest growth was in digital technology, with 1,302 new firms in 2022, a 9.8 percent year-on-year growth rate. New Zealand’s most prosperous technology sector is information and communication technology (ICT). The technology sector in New Zealand is only bound to grow. Further cooperation should be pursued.

Spoke Story: US-South Korea Extended Deterrence Talks

On September 4, 2024, the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) convened the fifth meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in Washington. This is a necessary meeting for the alliance as North Korea becomes increasingly provocative and as it deepens its new military partnership with Russia, which includes military transfers. While the main thrust of the US-ROK alliance remains to be the North Korean threat, the alliance has broadened its cooperation to include larger interests in the Indo-Pacific and including small pivots to counter China, particularly because of President Yoon’s more ambitious foreign policy outlook.

Department of State: United States of America-Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG):

The ROK and the United States recognized the deepening interconnectedness between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic and discussed the implications for deterrence and U.S. nuclear posture. The two sides considered the impact of non-nuclear threats to the Alliance, including emerging technologies, and committed to leverage Alliance technology advantages to enhance the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture… To that end, both sides committed to cooperating with likeminded partners to counter foreign misinformation on extended deterrence… In the context of a deteriorating security environment, the principals conducted a scenario-based discussion, for the first time at the EDSCG, to strengthen policy planning and coordination.

Acknowledging mounting regional threats, the ROK and the United States committed to continue close cooperation to ensure that ROK and U.S. strategies and postures enhance peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.  The United States reiterated its ironclad commitment to draw on the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to support extended deterrence for the ROK.  Both sides reaffirmed that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response, and the United States reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its allies is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.

The EDSCG meetings were initiated under the 2023 Washington Declaration and are meant to bolster and deepen strategic coordination between Seoul and Washington. Under the Washington Declaration, the United States has increased the frequency of visitation of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, like nuclear-armed submarines, aircraft carriers, and nuclear-armed bombers. In response, Seoul is establishing its own indigenous strategic command that will help deepen interoperability with American-controlled nuclear weapons. This week, US and ROK officials conducted their first table-top simulation to understand how each country will react and work together to respond to a North Korean attack. Whether the Washington Declaration is working on deterring North Korean aggression and reassuring alliance partners in South Korea remains debatable.

Furthermore, the United States and the Republic of Korea, in a display of unity and determination, convened the seventh US-Republic of Korea (ROK) Working Group on September 5-6. This meeting, with its focus on countering cyber threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), holds the potential to significantly enhance our collective security.

Department of State: Seventh United States-Republic of Korea Working Group to Counter Cyber Threats Posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:

The meeting underscored the continued close collaboration between the U.S. and ROK governments to disrupt the DPRK’s ability to generate revenue through malicious cyber activity, which it uses to fund its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs. The working group included participants from 15 U.S. and ROK government departments, ministries, and agencies.

The United States and the ROK are pursuing a wide range of actions to prevent and disrupt DPRK cryptocurrency heists, address DPRK cyber espionage against the defense sector, stop third party facilitators from enabling DPRK illicit revenue generation, and dismantle DPRK IT worker infrastructure and networks. The Working Group meeting also focused on coordinated diplomatic outreach, information sharing, and capacity building for nations vulnerable to the DPRK cyber threat.

Ultimately, the Washington Declaration enhances and deepens US-ROK cooperation, but more importantly, it improves strategic coordination and planning. Coordination NOW is critical for rapid response LATER. Whether the Washington Declaration will deter North Korea is unknown, but it is successful in enriching US-ROK coordination.

Spoke Story: New Indian Attack Submarine

India's recent addition of the INS Arighaat, its second of four planned nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, is a significant milestone. This development further bolsters India's nuclear deterrence capabilities, particularly in the context of regional tensions with China and Pakistan. The new submarine, along with a third one set to join the fleet next year, underscores India's strategic focus on strengthening its maritime security and nuclear triad. Notably, India is one of only six countries, including the US, UK, Russia, France, China, and India, that can boast of having nuclear-powered submarines.

As far as capabilities, these nuclear subs have a 6,000 tons displacement and are equipped with 12 Sagarika (K-15) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of around 700 km, as well as versions of the nuclear-capable Nirbhay cruise missiles. India's growing submarine fleet contributes to India's decades-long effort to round out the maritime component of its nuclear triad. This is the current breakdown of India's submarine fleet:

• Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBNs): 2

• Nuclear-Powered attack submarines (SSNs): 0

• Diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs): 17

• Air-independent propulsion (AIP) enabled: 0

India launched its Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) submarine program in the 1980s. To train its submarine crew, India frequently leases Russian nuclear Akula-class vessels (showcasing another point of close security partnership between India and Russia). India will be leasing another Akula-class nuclear submarine for ten years starting in 2025.

India still faces challenges when operating its emerging nuclear submarine fleet. In 2017, its first indigenousness nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, was left inoperable for a year when human error resulted in water entering its proposal chamber. It looks like the submarine crew has become notably better due to the lack of similar accidents.

The recent developments in India's nuclear submarine program should be viewed as a welcomed development by Washington, at least for now. The US-India relationship has been robust in recent years, as evidenced by the India Defense Minister's recent visit to Washington. The mutual support between Washington and New Delhi is crucial. However, the long-term implications of this development on the US-India relationship, especially in the next forty to fifty years, remain to be seen. Is India a reliable partner in this context? This is a question that will need to be addressed in the future.

Spoke Story: Japan Releases 2024 Defense White Paper

This week, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released its full 572 page White Paper. The White Paper highlights three major objectives:

Japanese Ministry of Defense: 2024 Defense of Japan:

The first one is to steadily actualize a fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan. Building future core defense capabilities such as stand-off and IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defense) must be prioritized. Therefore, Japan is going to acquire various types of stand-off missiles earlier than originally planned, including Tomahawk missiles and the ground-launched version of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles. Japan will expedite the start of the construction of Aegis System Equipped Vessels to defend herself from increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and other threats. Enhancing sustainability and resiliency is another important task. Japan will thus proceed to improve the operational availability of equipment, secure sufficient ammunition and guided missiles, and promote focused investments to improve the resiliency of defense facilities…

The second major objective is to cooperate with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners. No country can now protect her own security alone. As challenges to the existing international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries, and other partners with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests…

The third major objective is to reinforce our human resource base, which is an urgent one. As Japan is in a midst of serious labor shortages, there is an increasingly fierce competition to secure human resources. SDF personnel constitutes the core element of defense capabilities of Japan. To procure excellent human resources in the competitive recruiting environment, we will take all necessary measures to reinforce our human resource base without ruling out any options. These consist of the enhancement of SDF recruitment capabilities, the effective use of human resources, the improvement of living and working environments, and the reformation of remuneration systems

Additionally, the White Paper specifically focuses on the China Threat. The White Paper mentions China 1,265 times, North Korea 538 times, and Russia 804 times. There is too much inside to breakdown the whole thing, but it is worth exploring in full.

Spoke Story: Vietnam and Philippines Sign New Defense Agreement

On August 30, the Philippines and Vietnam inked a new agreement to expand defense cooperation. As China pushes territorial claims in the South China Sea, the two Southeast Asian countries have slowly moved toward each other. More interestingly, though, is that Vietnam-China territorial disputes have taken a backseat to those happening to the Philippines. Zack Cooper and Greg Poling described the conundrum well in a War on the Rocks piece.

War on the Rocks: The South China Sea Dog that Hasn’t Barked … Yet:

Vietnam has been busy. In recent months, it has exponentially expanded the size of several features it controls in the Spratly Islands, including Barque Canada Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, and Discovery Great Reef. China appears to have allowed these expansion efforts to occur largely unmolested. And yet, elsewhere in the Spratlys at Second Thomas Shoal, Beijing is preventing the Philippines from supplying food, water, and limited building supplies to the handful of Filipino personnel on the Sierra Madre, a Philippine Navy ship grounded at the shoal in 1999. Why have Chinese leaders chosen to take such a hard line against resupply efforts by the Philippines while permitting Vietnam’s large-scale island building at multiple nearby features?

While only Letters of Intent have been signed, the joint statement emphasizes the tensions in the South China Sea. Despite their own territorial disputes in the sea, Vietnam and the Philippines have determined that closer relations are the right way to bolster protection in the South China Sea. In fact, the two countries pledged to continue to try to resolve their disputes through negotiation while indirectly calling on China to stop their provocations.

Outcome of the Bilateral Meeting between Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Viet Nam Minister of National Defence General Phan Van Giang:

Both Ministers shared views on the need to maintain peace, stability, ensuring security, safety, freedom of navigation and aviation in the East Sea/West Philippine Sea/South China Sea. They also agreed to resolve all disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982); effectively and fully implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea/West Philippine Sea/South China Sea (DOC), building a substantive, effective Code of Conduct in the East Sea/West Philippine Sea/South China Sea (COC) in accordance with international law.

While the agreement details will be negotiated, it will revolve around enhanced military cooperation in humanitarian and disaster relief. This announcement comes after the two nations conducted joint coast guard training for search and rescue operations earlier this month. Ultimately, the growing relationship between Vietnam and the Philippines is one to watch. Nothing indicates that China is going to temper its assaults against the Philippines. Chinese behavior could very well push a once quiet and cautious Vietnam into tighter cooperation and maybe eventual coordination with the Philippines.

Spoke Story: Japan Australia 2+2 Meeting

This week, Japan and Australia hosted their 2+2 Ministerial Meeting in Queenscliff, Australia.

Notably, the ministers expressed their “concern about the increase of China’s military activities around Japan, especially the recent intrusion into Japan’s territorial airspace.” ASPI’s Justin Bassi and Alex Bristow noted that Australia’s support for Japan is critical for pushing back on Chinese behavior.

The Strategist: Wong and Marles Must Speak Up About Chinese Incursions Into Japan:

These latest incursions follow two violations of Japanese airspace by Russian helicopters since 2022—seemingly warnings over Tokyo’s support for Ukraine. An ineffective response, including from Japan’s partners, might embolden Beijing and Moscow to push their ‘no limits’ partnership even further, such as taking greater risks in the joint military exercises that they already conduct around Japan.

The two nations also stressed interest in continuing "to promote cooperation between counterstrike capabilities that leverage Japanese stand-off defense capabilities and Australia's long-range strike capabilities."

The cornerstone of the security relationship goes back to the 2022 Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The new reaffirmation of their Special Strategic Partnership pledged to expand senior-level exchanges, military exercises, and broader defense cooperation and interoperability.

Additionally, the ministers announced their intention to:

• launch Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Consultations,

• enhance cybersecurity cooperation through the Cyber Policy Dialogue,

• collaborate on initiatives for security and stability in the Pacific region, including maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and Japan's Official Security Assistance (OSA),

• work together to strengthen the connectivity and digital resilience of the Pacific by establishing an Australia-Japan Pacific Digital Development Initiative (PDDI),

• enhance bilateral operational capabilities and interoperability through operations and joint exercises, leveraging the Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA),

• exchange liaison officers for the future establishment of Japan Joint Operations Command (JJOC),

• consult with AUKUS partners and Japan on opportunities for cooperation on AUKUS Pillar II Projects,

• and welcome Australian defense personnel’s participation in the Japan-United States Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) and affirmed expanding trilateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation.

What is great about allied cooperation—absent American participation— is its federated approach to supporting shared goals in the Indo-Pacific. The press releases note that their shared alliance with the United States will be central to their foreign and security policies. However, it is a net positive for American interests when allies work together to provide developmental assistance to the Pacific Islands or collaborate to enhance each other’s long-range capabilities.

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Worth Your Time

Australia:

• Breaking Defense: US Marines, Australian Army Plan Tests Around Island-Hopping Stern Landing Vessel

• The Strategist: GWEO Rockets Up The US Alliance Agenda, But Australia Isn’t Close to Self-Sufficiency

• Naval News: Rohde & Schwarz Australia secures Hunter class frigate communications contract

Japan:

• Department of Defense: Readout of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Ely Ratner's Meeting With Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyake Shingo

• Department of State: Third United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Diplomatic Working Group Meeting on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Cyber Activities

• Nikkei Asia: US Wants to Deploy Midrange-Missile Launcher to Japan Via Drills

South Korea:

• Naval News: Hanwha Ocean Becomes First South Korean Shipyard to Secure US Navy MRO Contract

• Stimson Center: Will South Korea’s Defense Industry Boom Change US-ROK Military Relations?

India:

• India News Network: India’s ‘Look East’ Policy Gets a Boost: Ties with Singapore Elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

United States:

• Nikkei Asia: US and Indonesia Wrap Up Multinational Indo-Pacific Drills

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Hub Story: India’s Defense Talks with Japan and the US

India has conducted several high-level engagements with Japan and the United States this August. Before heading to Washington, India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh hosted their Japanese counterparts for a 2+2 ministerial dialogue. Both countries view the Japan-India relationship as vital. The two nations sit at the poles of the Indo-Pacific, and coordination with each other can be difficult. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe prioritized deepening the India-Japan relationship, and the two countries are still enjoying the benefits of Abe’s strategic outreach.

Japan views its relationship with India as a cornerstone of its strategy to maintain a stable and balanced power structure in the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo sees India as a critical partner in countering China’s expanding influence, mainly by aligning both countries’ visions for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japan places significant value on deepening ties with India not just in defense and security cooperation but also in economic initiatives like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which aims to promote sustainable infrastructure as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

India sees its relationship with Japan as a critical element of its Act East Policy and a key pillar in enhancing strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi views Tokyo as a trusted and reliable partner in balancing China’s assertiveness, particularly through Japan’s active role in promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and collaborating on regional security initiatives. Beyond defense cooperation, India highly values Japan’s significant investments in infrastructure, technology, and connectivity projects like the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, which not only align with India’s economic growth objectives but also demonstrate the mutual benefits of their strategic relationship.

Since the last 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2022, the two nations have considerably expanded joint military exercises with an eye on expanding more into space and cyber.

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Joint Statement Third Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting:

• The Ministers appreciated the progress in the defence cooperation and exchanges among each component between the two sides since the last meeting in September 2022. They welcomed the first air visit by Japanese fighters and their participation at Tarang Shakti, the first multilateral exercise hosted by the Indian Air Force. They also welcomed the conduct of the inaugural edition of the bilateral fighter exercise 'Veer Guardian 2023' between the Japan Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) and Indian Air Force (IAF) and conduct of the bilateral exercises of all the three services in one calendar year for the first time in 2023. The Ministers further concurred on deepening bilateral cooperation in field of space and cyber. They reaffirmed the importance of multilateral defence cooperation and exchanges in the Indo-Pacific region. The Ministers expressed their commitment to continuing bilateral and multilateral exercises including “Dharma Guardian”, JIMEX and “Malabar.”

Expansion into space and cyber will probably be slow and limited. The technology sharing needed for robust cooperation will face bureaucratic hurdles as most nations are eager to protect technological advantages. Japan announced that it would export naval antennas that can rapidly detect missiles and drones to India. While the joint statement does share that there has been completion of joint collaboration on Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)/Robotics, it remains unclear what the extent of this project is.

The Strategist: India and Japan Take Small Steps Towards Stronger Ties:

India and Japan collaborated in a joint research project on unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) robotics—though it seems possible this did not lead to the development of any actual vehicles. The collaboration was revealed by the first 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2019 and mentioned again in 2020 by the Japanese Ministry of Defense as an example of defence equipment and technology co-operation with partner countries. The initiative was quite forward-looking, considering the development of such UGVs in the context of the Ukraine war.

The latest joint statement says the project is complete, but what this means is unclear. Japan has contracted for three THeMIS UGVs from Estonian firm Milrem Robotics, which suggests that the India-Japan research project has not produced any UGVs. The two countries did announce transfer of the unified complex radio antenna (UNICORN) and related technologies, communication gear that are deployed on Japanese stealth warships.

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during a four-day trip to the United States. The trip focused on advancing US-India industrial base cooperation. Last June, the US-India released a roadmap for US-India defense industrial cooperation. The US-India roadmap is DoD’s sister initiative to the White House’s initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which I discuss more here.

The roadmap highlights several goals:

• Dialogue between government and industry will be facilitated to address issues like licensing, export controls, defense trade barriers, and technology transfer, with a focus on regulatory improvements.

• The US and India will identify cooperative defense projects to address shared military challenges, focusing on advanced technologies, co-development, and co-production opportunities.

• The US aims to support India in developing logistics, repair, and maintenance hubs for aircraft and ships.

• The US plans to integrate Indian defense industries into global supply chains of American defense and aerospace companies.

• India will work to implement the Industrial Security Annex to enable deeper classified cooperation between both nations’ defense sectors.

• Both countries will strive to finalize the Security of Supplies Arrangement (SOSA) and Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreement as soon as possible.

During Singh’s trip, the two countries were able to cross one agenda item off the list. India and the US have signed a Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) as well as a Memorandum of Agreement on the assignment of liaison officers.

The SOSA, a DoD initiative from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, is a non-binding agreement that aims to strengthen supply chain resilience and address disruptions by ensuring both countries provide reciprocal priority support for critical national defense resources.

Department of Defense: Security of Supply:

Bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSA) allow the DoD to request priority delivery for DoD contracts, subcontracts, or orders from companies in these countries. SOSA also allow the signatory nations to request priority delivery for their contracts and orders with U.S. firms.

Security of Supply Arrangements (or SOSA) are conducted under overarching Declarations of Principles for Enhanced Cooperation in Matters of Defense Equipment and Industry that have been signed with select nations. Security of Supply Arrangements (or SOSA) implement the “Meeting National Defense Requirements” section of these documents, which recognizes the potential for a certain degree of mutual interdependence of supplies needed for national security, and calls for the parties to explore solutions for achieving assurance of supply.

Currently, 18 nations have signed on to the program at varying levels of commitment. I wish DoD would provide a public report assessing the success of this program. The arrangements that the countries sign are non-binding, and subsequently, the firms that associate with the program are all voluntary and only strive to make reasonable efforts to prioritize American industrial demand. The extent to which this program has been successful is unknown. However, the SOSA might be best understood as the first step toward a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP), which is legally binding and has more actual benefits.

The second agreement announced at the Singh-Austin meeting was the liaison officers agreement. This agreement will not only allow Indian liaison officers to be stationed at US commands but also significantly expand coordination, interoperability planning, and information sharing, keeping all parties well-informed and prepared.

Beyond new agreements, President Biden notified Congress of the approval of a proposed sale to India of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sonobuoys and related equipment worth around $52.8 million for the multi-mission MH-60R Seahawk helicopters being inducted by the Indian Navy.

There is a big push in Washington to make India a logistics and maintenance hub for the US Navy. India is in a strategic location between the Middle East and East Asia. Its ports are safe distance from any combat operations that may take place, but close enough to get ships back in the action relatively quickly. There should be new announcements coming later this year on this initiative.

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Spoke Story: Australia and Indonesia Sign Defense Cooperation Agreement

This week, Australia and Indonesia announced the signing of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement, which upgrades the security relationship to a “treaty level.” While the text of the agreement has not been released, some of the provisions are expected to include joint drills and reciprocal access to each other’s countries. This new agreement with Indonesia is part of Australia’s larger diplomatic push with Southeast Asia. The first paragraph officially announcing this agreement highlights Australia’s importance of ASEAN.

Joint Ministerial Statement on Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation:

Australia and Indonesia have a common commitment to the pursuit of a peaceful, stable, secure and prosperous region where sovereignty is respected. We have a positive vision and constructive outlook for our region with ASEAN at its centre, providing an essential stabilising influence.

Australia has lost a lot of standing recently in the eyes of many Southeast Asian countries. The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey, compiled by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, showcased how far Australia has fallen.

• Ranked ninth (out of nine) in most influential economic power in Southeast Asia.

• Ranked eighth in most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia.

• And placed solidly in the middle when Southeast Asians were asked which third country they would pick to hedge against China and the United States.

To counter its dwindling influence, Australia announced last year, "Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040." All of the key initiatives include pretty standard provisions, including promoting Australian business integration into Southeast Asia's dynamic growth by supporting critical sectors like infrastructure, digital economy, and green energy. The strategy also emphasizes enhancing regulatory frameworks, removing trade barriers, and fostering people-to-people connections through programs like exchange initiatives and investment deal teams. Additionally, Australia aims to build resilient supply chains and strengthen collaboration through bilateral agreements and regional partnerships like the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Indonesia has quietly taken the mantle of first among equals in ASEAN. It's becoming a preferred nation as companies look to invest in the region, and it masterfully plays Beijing and Washington off each other. As Australia continues to make inroads with ASEAN, Indonesia is the natural starting point.

Spoke Story: Africa and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Japan hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) Ministerial Meeting this weekend. The TICAD Ministerial Meeting focused on strengthening Japan-Africa cooperation ahead of the upcoming leaders-level TICAD 9 Summit in 2025. The discussions emphasized collaborative solutions in areas like health, climate resilience, and economic reforms, while promoting entrepreneurship, particularly among women and youth, to support Africa’s economic transformation. The meeting highlighted Japan’s support for private-sector engagement and start-up ecosystems in Africa, aiming to drive innovative partnerships and address global challenges.

TICAD is an important tool that Japan uses to realize its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). The Indo-Pacific geographic paradigm is a Japanese concept adopted by nearly every major country (although China still prefers Asia-Pacific). Starting in the Trump Administration, Washington quickly embraced it and began incorporating the geographic concept into speeches, strategies, and white papers, even renaming US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command. Unfortunately, the American version narrows the region to encompass only the eastern border of India and Hawaii. The original Japanese version starts the Indo-Pacific father west on the eastern coast of Africa; in fact, when Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced the FOIP strategy, he did so in Nairobi, Kenya.

Japan prioritizes Japanese-African relations, often visiting and holding dialogues like TICAD to promote common prosperity. As Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with eastern African nations this weekend in bilateral side meetings, the press releases often mentioned the African nation’s central position in Japan’s FOIP strategy. Whether it’s smaller island nations like Mauritius or larger countries like Madagascar, Japan always highlighted its importance in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.

US-Africa relations remain a sore spot in American foreign policy. It’s a critical region that fails to gain the prominence of Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. Washington should rightly incorporate the eastern coast of Africa into its Indo-Pacific framing. If strategists in Washington were forced to broaden their conception of the Indo-Pacific, then it would help facilitate more momentum for Africa and help secure the region.

Spoke Story: Australia Leverages Partners for its Defense Industrial Base

This week, Australia made two significant advancements in supporting its defense needs by working with partner nations.

Australia has announced a partnership with Norway’s Kongsberg Defence to manufacture Naval Strike Missiles and Joint Strike Missiles in Newcastle, marking the only production site outside of Norway. The Australian government will invest A$850 million to establish the facility, which will begin production in 2027 and enhance the Australian Defence Force’s long-range precision strike capability while also serving export demands, particularly to the US and allies in the Indo-Pacific. This facility will position Australia as a critical player in missile production, addressing global supply chain constraints and supporting US forces in the region.

The Joint Strike Missile is one of the key weapons for the F-35. If production can be scaled, this new plant could help supply American and allied F-35s in the region. Kongsberg joins Lockheed Martin and Raytheon in supporting Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. GWEO invests A$4.1 billion to acquire more long-range strike systems and manufacture longer-range munitions in Australia. The enterprise already boasts some achievements:

Australian Ministry of Defence: Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise:

• Accelerated the acquisition of guided weapons including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) long-range strike missiles, naval strike missiles and sea mines. Sea mines will be maintained in Australia with a view to technical transfer to enable local electronics servicing and load, assembly and pack of sea mines.

• Agreed with the US to deepen cooperation on Australia's GWEO enterprise by collaborating on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, scoping co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025.

• Commenced domestic manufacture of BLU-111 aircraft bombs.

Additionally, South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace has opened its first overseas manufacturing plant in Geelong, Australia, known as the Hanwha Armored Vehicle Centre of Excellence (H-ACE). The facility will produce self-propelled howitzers, armored ammunition resupply vehicles, and Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles for the Australian Army as part of significant defense contracts. This plant, covering 150,000 square meters, marks a key expansion for Hanwha into the AUKUS market, allowing it to serve both Australia and allied nations amid rising defense needs in the Indo-Pacific region.

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Worth Your Time:

Indo-Pacific:

• CSIS: U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Strategic Stability in the Taiwan Strait

• Naval News: US Navy eyes Coalition Affordable Maritime Strike (CAMS) weapon for international partners

Australia:

• Naval News: Ghost Shark XL-AUV Arrives in the United States

• AU News: Australia-NZ Facing Biggest Strategic Challenge ‘Since Second World War’

Japan:

• Naval News: Japan Plans New Missile Range In Southeastern Island

• CSIS: Building a Mutually Complementary Supply Chain between Japan and the United States

• Japan Times: Italy-Japan Ties Enter ‘New Era’ Amid Deepening Alignment, Top Envoy to Tokyo Says

South Korea:

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, US Wrap up 6th Round of Talks on Defense Cost Sharing

• Yonhap News Agency: S. Korea, US to Kick Off Major Amphibious Landing Exercise This Week

• Yonhap News Agency: US Authorizes Potential Aale to S. Korea of Apache Attack Helicopters, Other Items for US$3.5 bln

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Hub Story: South Korea To Establish Strategic Command This Year

South Korea’s Cabinet approved a presidential decree to create a new military command focused on strategic operations to counter North Korean nuclear and WMD threats, set to launch around October in southern Seoul. This command will integrate critical military assets, including missiles, cyber, drone, and special operations units, and work closely with US Strategic Command to enhance deterrence and develop operational plans.

Obviously, South Korea has no nuclear arsenal. There is growing demand by the South Korean public for Seoul to start building its own domestic nuclear arsenal. However, in a recent interview with Reuters, South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik dismissed calls for South Korea to build nuclear weapons, stating it would fracture Seoul’s alliance with the United States as well as other consequences of breaking with the non-proliferation regime.

South Korea’s new strategic command (ROK STRATCOM) was mentioned in the 2023 Washington Declaration but only recently made headlines. ROK STRATCOM will have two main tasks: integrating ROK forces with US nuclear capabilities and operationalizing South Korea’s “Three-Axis” system. The Three-Axis system was announced in 2016 after North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test. This security approach is how Seoul plans to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack.

South Korea’s Three-Axis System:

1. The first axis is a “Kill Chain,” a preemptive strike against the adversary’s ballistic missiles or WMDs.

2. The second axis is “Korea Air and Missile Defense,” known as KAMD, which intercepts launched missiles using a multi-layered missile defense system.

3. The third axis, “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” (KMPR), involves striking Pyongyang and targeting leadership in retaliation for North Korea’s nuclear or conventional first strike on South Korea.

When ROK STRATCOM is officially established, it will likely lead the operationalization of the Nuclear Consultative Group guidelines signed by the United States and South Korea. During the NATO Summit this summer, President Biden and President Yoon praised the Nuclear Consultative Group's progress and the finalization of the extended deterrence guidelines.

Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden of the United States of America and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea on U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula:

President Biden and President Yoon commend and endorse the tremendous progress that the U.S.-ROK Alliance has achieved in the first year of the NCG, as evidenced by the signing of the U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula (“Guidelines document”) by the U.S. Department of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense. The Presidents underscored that the Guidelines document provides a solid foundation for enhancing U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner. The Guidelines document provides guidance to Alliance policy and military authorities in maintaining and strengthening a credible and effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture. The Presidents reiterated the need to continue to make swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration; strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices.

If at some point the United States and South Korea do decide to place US-controlled tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, ROK STRATCOM would be necessary for that successful transition. However, for the time being, ROK STRATCOM will be focused on creating smooth interoperability between not only US and ROK forces, but also incorporating US nuclear capabilities into any response from a North Korean attack.

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Spoke Story: India’s Rough Waters in the Maldives

India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met with Maldives’ President Mohamed Muizzu to attempt to reset bilateral relations following Muizzu’s pro-China stance and his election campaign promising to reduce Indian influence in the Maldives. This visit marks India’s return to diplomatic engagement with the Maldives after a period of strained relations. The meeting focused on enhancing cooperation, particularly in areas of mutual interest, such as development projects and regional security, despite past tensions.

Ever since Muizzu ascended to the presidency in November 2023, India has struggled to maintain good relations with the critical island nation. Muizzu ran on an “India Out” campaign, which has resulted in a closer relationship with China and the explosion of India’s military personnel. Muizzu even visited Beijing before traveling to India, indicating that his priorities are with a closer relationship with China at the expense of India. The Maldives has borrowed around $1.4 billion from China since joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2014.

The setback in relations has broader geopolitical consequences.

Council on Foreign Relations: The Maldives Is Moving Toward China. Here’s What to Know:

The upgraded relationship also offers potential benefits to China. The Maldives sits along one of the busiest maritime trade passages in the Indian Ocean, through which nearly 80 percent of Chinese oil imports flow. Analysts say Beijing wants Malé to remain a friendly regional military presence to help safeguard its access to oil from the Persian Gulf. 

Of course, India has not been neglectful of the Maldives. New Delhi has been pursuing its own development projects.

AP News: India Urges Pro-China Maldives to Ease Tensions and Improve Their Strained Relationship:

Last year, New Delhi started construction of the Indian-funded Greater Male connectivity project, billed as the largest infrastructure initiative in the island nation, a 6.7-kilometer (4.2-mile) -long bridge and causeway connecting the capital city, Male, with the islands of Villingli, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi.

India also is helping Maldives to build 4,000 homes and has extended a $100 million line of credit to finance other infrastructure projects. The two countries have signed agreements for cooperation in cybersecurity, disaster management and fishing zone forecast capacity.

Jaishankar’s visit this week indicates that the Maldives is recalibrating how much it shifts to China. Indian tourism has gone down since the two countries have faced tensions. The Maldives is looking to boost more development assistance and tourism numbers while still maintaining independence and agency.

While there will always be tensions between big states like India and smaller neighborhood nations like the Maldives (tensions rose earlier in 2014 too), the new emergence of great power rivalry makes these tensions more pronounced and more consequential. The Maldives follows other smaller island nations like the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru. These countries smartly play the US and China off each other (or, in this case, India and China) in order to extract the most benefits they can. It’s not the same as the hedging we see from countries like Vietnam or Thailand, but more of a ploy for increased development aid or military assistance. Regardless, New Delhi and Washington must compete for influence with these nations because unilaterally giving up would have significant consequences.

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Spoke Story: US-Australia Ministerial 2+2

The United States and Australia commenced high-level talks during the 2024 Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) in Annapolis, Maryland, focusing on China’s “coercive behavior,” the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, and tensions in the Middle East. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasized their collaboration on shared security challenges, including issues in the South China Sea and the Middle East. Australian officials highlighted the expanding US military presence in Australia and defense industry cooperation, reinforcing bipartisan support for the AUKUS program.

The initiatives and projects announced in the joint statement can be categorized into the following topics: innovation cooperation, governance and development, economic resiliency, broad security and defense collaboration, AUKUS, and new co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment initiatives.

One of the key outcomes of the 2024 Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) is the progress made by the two countries in co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment. Australia is just one of the many Indo-Pacific countries that the United States is actively engaging with to advance defense-industrial cooperation. Notably, the US and Japan have established a new high-level forum to accelerate these initiatives. It is likely that Washington is seeking similar arrangements with the Philippines and India.

To further facilitate this growing cooperation, Congress made significant amendments to Title III of the Defense Production Act. These amendments now include Australia and the United Kingdom, designating businesses operating under a US contract in these countries as domestic sources. This not only makes them eligible for grants and loans but also helps them navigate bureaucratic red tape. Additionally, Congress included several provisions in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that prioritize Australia and the United Kingdom for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and provide export exemptions. This year, executive agencies have also made strides in streamlining export control exemptions, further enhancing defense cooperation.

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security: Commerce Significantly Streamlines Export Controls For Australia And The United Kingdom Advances Goals Of The AUKUS Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership:

The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule significantly reducing licensing requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) to foster defense trade and technological innovation. BIS anticipates these changes will reduce licensing burdens for trade with Australia and the UK by over 1,800 total licenses valued at over $7.5 billion per year. 

BIS is removing Commerce Control List (CCL) license requirements to allow Commerce-controlled military items, missile technology-related items, and hot section engine-related items to be exported or reexported to Australia and the UK without a license.  As a result, many Commerce-controlled items, including certain satellite-related items, will now be eligible for export or reexport to Australia and the UK without a license. 

US Department of State: AUKUS Partners Rule Changes for Secure License-Free Defense Trade:

The proposed changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations – or ITAR – would create a license exemption supporting billions of dollars in license-free defense trade between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and allow for deeper security cooperation and innovation among AUKUS partners. All three nations are committed to working with our private sectors and our research communities – those who will use these exemptions – to ensure the exemptions, taken together, support the goals of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership.

Most of the attention around AUKUS has focused on Pillar I and the co-development of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines. These changes in rules, regulations, and legislation are meant to help facilitate that. However, they are also meant to assist Pillar II.

Pillar II of AUKUS has eight focus areas:

• Undersea capabilities

• Quantum technologies

• Artificial intelligence and autonomy

• Advanced cyber

• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities

• Electronic warfare

• Innovation

• Information sharing

These focus areas are to be jointly developed but think of them more as a set of tools that the three countries can use to address a shared mission. For example, the three countries might decide to leverage AUKUS Pillar II to address boosting regional surveillance. Therefore, the three nations will enhance undersea capabilities, advanced cyber, and information sharing to collaborate on that mission.

Pillar II isn’t meant to advance these eight capabilities independently; instead, they are paired with about ten different missions the three countries are pursuing. This AUSMIN conference centered less on Pillar I and more on Pillar II and co-development for Australian missile defense and munitions production under its Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise.

Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2024:

The United States and Australia committed to streamline cooperation on missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle technologies, particularly for Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise and AUKUS Pillar 2 Advanced Capabilities, and reiterated their respective commitments to upholding the standards of multilateral nonproliferation regimes…

 The principals welcomed progress towards our 2023 commitment to collaborate on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, with an initial focus on the co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025.  They acknowledged Australia's intent to produce viable volumes of GMLRS for global consumption and welcomed efforts to finalize, by December 2024, the MOU to enable the co-assembly of GMLRS, with follow on mechanisms for co-production in the future.  The principals supported the establishment of a sovereign Australian solid rocket motor capability and manufacture of tactical training rounds.  

The principals welcomed progress on our 2023 commitment to share technical data on 155mm M795 munitions and highlighted Australia's investment in manufacturing 155mm M795 munitions in Australia.  They reaffirmed the support to fast tracked future productions. These efforts are intended to enable U.S. certification of Australian-manufactured munitions and Australia's deeper integration into the U.S. defense enterprise and global energetics supply chain.

The principals acknowledged the supply chain complementarities between GMLRS and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).  They committed to finalizing a PrSM MOU on cooperative Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) by December 2024 and announced the establishment of a Joint Program Office to advance cooperative activities on this critical munition in 2025.

The joint statement continues…

The principals welcomed the signing in July 2024 of the Statement of Intent on Integrated Air and Missile Defense between the Australian Department of Defence and U.S. Department of Defense, and committed to deliver a strategic roadmap that will identify strategic joint priorities and lines of effort to pursue near-, mid-, and long-term opportunities for co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities.  They welcomed the success of the U.S. Command Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC) demonstration in Australia and continual work toward a networked regional IAMD architecture alignment.

The principals welcomed continuing collaborative efforts to develop and demonstrate an air-launched hypersonic weapon under the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE).  Australia and the United States continue to make significant progress in design and ground testing, supporting the bilateral flight test program of Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM).  Looking forward, the United States and Australia are working towards expanding this deep collaboration and transitioning the partnership on SCIFiRE and HACM to a fielded combat capability. Australia will consider HACM as a potential pathway to field its first air-launched hypersonic weapon.

The principals reaffirmed their commitment to establishing robust, resilient, and diversified industrial bases that support our cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.  They discussed opportunities to expand cooperation on Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul, and Upgrade (MRO&U) of our shared critical capabilities, and noted the successful maintenance activity of a U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk.  The United States and Australia are committed to supporting the implementation of the Regional Sustainment Framework and committed to identify opportunities for MRO&U collaboration in Australia. 

Washington is slowly trying to boost defense industrial cooperation with allies. AUKUS Pillar II is an important component of that. Pillar II isn’t necessarily about building these advanced capabilities for their own sake but rather as part of a toolkit to address specific problems and missions. The three co’s will become more common in these joint statements.

Spoke Story: US-Philippines Ministerial 2+2

During the 2+2 meeting between the US and the Philippines, the US announced a $500 million investment to enhance the Philippines' defense capabilities, focusing on countering China's maritime aggression in the South China Sea. Additionally, both nations aim to finalize a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement by the end of 2024 to strengthen cybersecurity cooperation.

The main thrust of the ministerial dialogue was to bolster Filipino maritime capabilities and enhance the alliance. This is in line with the shared commitment of both nations to address the continuing tensions in the South China Sea.

Fact Sheet: US-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue:

MODERNIZING ALLIANCE COOPERATION

The United States and the Philippines have made significant strides to address security challenges in the Indo-Pacific by modernizing alliance cooperation, including by:

• Establishing the Roles, Missions, and Capabilities Working Group to strengthen bilateral planning and interoperability by providing policy guidance for joint operations, activities, and investments consistent with the Philippines-United States Bilateral Defense Guidelines signed in May 2023.

• Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) Agreed Locations to enable increasingly complex combined training, exercises, and interoperability between U.S. and Philippine armed forces, including through a proposed investment of $128 million in the Fiscal Year 2025 President’s Budget Request, as well as Philippine civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities.

• Expanding information-sharing on key challenges confronting the U.S.-Philippine alliance through concluding two key bilateral information sharing agreements: the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), extended in June 2024, and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which both countries have agreed to finalize before the end of the year.

The $500 million in funds is meant to help the Philippines modernize its capabilities and to really accelerate a generational investment in the Philippines armed forces.

Defense One: The US is Helping the Philippines Modernize its Military:

The Philippines military is in the process of transforming to more effectively confront China, officials say. The military was “primarily focused on internal security challenges, and they have faced major internal security challenges, particularly related to terrorism,” the defense official said. The shift is to “now be more focused on external defense, and in particular maritime security issues. And that is certainly, in part, driven by the coercion and assertiveness that they're confronting from the PRC.” 

The investments will help the Philippines work more closely and effectively with the United States by facilitating more intelligence and information sharing between the two countries, as part of what the Pentagon calls the General Security of Information Agreement. 

The new increased US investment will give US forces more access to Filipino bases and allow the United States to expand its own capabilities in the region. For example, under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the Pentagon recently announced that it awarded a $32 million contract to upgrade an airfield in the Philippines.

USNI News: US Funding $32M Upgrade to Air Base in the Philippines:

Basa Air Base is set to receive a 625,000-square-foot parking apron capable of hosting up to 20 aircraft. The contract stated that the project aimed to strengthen the infrastructure at the base, which was deemed to be insufficient for training activities between the U.S. and Philippine forces.

To further demonstrate that the Philippines is looking to shift its armed forces toward the China threat is Manila’s growing collaboration with regional partners.

Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue:

• Bolster maritime cooperative activities to promote security cooperation and expand operational coordination with other likeminded partners, including Australia and Japan.  These joint efforts demonstrate resolve, strengthen bilateral security ties, and expand multilateral cooperation and training.  The Secretaries agreed that cooperation and interoperability, including with both countries' respective Coast Guards, are essential tenets in maintaining stability and supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific.  The Secretaries welcomed the signing of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement and looked forward to greater trilateral and multilateral cooperation.  They commended the conduct of the April 2024 Philippines-United States-Japan-Australia maritime cooperative activity in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone to strengthen interoperability and uphold international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Recently, Manila and Tokyo inked an unprecedented Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which is already producing results. On August 2nd, Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint military exercise in the South China Sea. For a great breakdown of what the new RAA facilitates and what is doesn’t do, see this brief by Ryan Ashley and John Bradford. Additionally, this past week, the Philippines and Vietnam conducted their first joint coast guard exercise with the same mission of pushing back on excessive Chinese maritime claims. The new US investment and the actions of Manila with regional partners demonstrate how transformative China’s aggression around the Second Thomas Shoal has been for Filipino defense policy.

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Worth Your Time:

Australia:

• Australian Defence Ministry: Australian Defence Force Launches Fresh Recruitment Campaign

• Breaking Defense: Navy Taps Acquisition Official for New Role Managing Maritime Industrial Base

• Breaking Defense: Australian Admiral Warns AUKUS Effort May be ‘At Risk’ if Dry Dock Issue Not Solved Soon

Japan:

• The Diplomat: Japan Further Accelerates Military Integration With the US

• The Diplomat: JGSDF Plans to Build a Missile Firing Range on Japan’s Easternmost Island

• Nikkei Asia: US Wants Japan to Co-Produce 100-plus Patriot Missiles

South Korea:

• Yonhap News: Military to Launch 'Strategic Command' Around October

• Yonhap News: S. Korea not Ruling Out N.K. Nuke Test Possibility Around U.S. Presidential Election: Report