Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper: Charting a Course for Multipolar Balance

Fiji Foreign Policy White Paper; AUKUS Meeting; US-Korea Dialogue

Oct 01, 2024

Hub Story: Fiji Releases Foreign Policy White Paper
Spoke Story: AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting
Spoke Story: Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue
Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week

Hub Story: Fiji Releases Foreign Policy White Paper

On September 23rd, the Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its first foreign policy white paper. The government recognizes that the developing US-China rivalry is making the Pacific a perilous region, and Fiji plans to stake out and pursue its own national interests.

The white paper defines its national interests as sovereignty, security, and identity. These aren’t quite national interests, but the white paper delineates Fiji’s guiding principles, which better illuminate the island nation’s foreign policy trajectory and priorities.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

In advancing its national interests Fiji will be guided by the following principles:
First, a recognition that domestic and foreign policy must be aligned. What we do at home should be consistent with what we wish to achieve abroad.
Second, multilateral cooperation is essential to giving Fiji the leverage it simply cannot apply as a small state working on its own. This applies at the global, regional and subregional levels.
Third, Pacific regionalism lies at the heart of our approach to foreign policy. Regionalism defines our maritime environment. It is the foundation of the Pacific Islands Forum and the other institutions that serve our interests from fisheries to economic integration.
Fourth, the strength of domestic institutions is essential to our national strength. Strong institutions buttress our stability. They are the engines of policy making. They underpin our social cohesion, and they guarantee the rule of law. They take time to grow, can quickly weaken and must be carefully nurtured.
Fifth, Fiji must engage in global issues that directly affect its interests. This includes the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the international financial institutions and negotiations on vital issues for Fiji such as climate change, trade liberalisation and access to markets and to finance for development.

Similar to the approach of many smaller nations, Fiji puts a big emphasis on working through multilateral institutions to influence the region. Smaller states often insist that larger great powers and middle powers work with multilateral organizations like ASEAN or the Pacific Islands Forum. As the white power notes, Fiji itself is too small to shape the Pacific region individually. However, pooling resources and influence with other small nations allows the Pacific Islands to punch above its weight.

The white paper, along with many Asian strategists from New Delhi to Tokyo, shares the conclusion that the Pacific is shifting toward a multipolar system. This consensus among experts in the region is a significant viewpoint, even if it is not widely adopted in Washington. It underscores the importance of understanding the diverse perspectives on the power dynamics in the Pacific region.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

In the medium term the power distribution of the Indo-Pacific will run mainly along bipolar rails. There will be a significant power gap between the US and China on the one hand and a clutch of major powers such as India, Indonesia and Japan on the other.
In the long term however the distribution of power may be more dispersed, and more states will want the flexibility to navigate this more complex strategic environment without being exclusively tied to one power or another. This is the nature of a multipolar system.

Interestingly, Fiji views a multipolar system as an end state rather than a context in which it must operate. The strategic logic is sound. Fiji seeks a multipolar Pacific with several countries balancing against each other and giving smaller nations like Fiji options to hedge against.

Fiji’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2024:

The Indo-Pacific is a region where the interests of superpowers, major powers and smaller states intersect. Its diversity demands arrangements which do not shoehorn nations into a single strategic structure such as a bipolar system.
A multipolar region will require adaptable structures where interests are carefully balanced and where strategic space is shared. For now, we are some distance from achieving this.

Fiji sees multilateral partnerships and institutions as critical tools for preserving its security and more adeptly moving the Pacific region from a bipolar rivalry to a multipolar balance.

The United States has a healthy security and military relationship with Fiji but lacks a robust economic and development partnership.

For instance, in August, the United States and Fiji jointly hosted the 48th annual Indo-Pacific Armies Management Seminar. This significant event, which brought together senior army leaders from 21 Indo-Pacific countries, provided a platform for strategic discussions on collective action in wartime operations. However, the economic aspect of the US-Fiji relationship is less vigorous.

As the white paper notes, Fiji’s development partners lack a prominent American presence. In fact, the United States ranks 13th in development partnerships, contributing only 1 percent of Fiji’s development assistance.

The lack of more serious American aid and economic engagement in the Pacific is really destructive to US interests. Narau is an excellent example of how China used financial incentives to get the Pacific island nation to derecognize Taiwan and only recognize the People’s Republic of China. An analysis piece by the United States Institute of Peace demonstrates how smaller countries can exploit great power rivalry for economic and financial gain.

United States Institute of Peace: Financially Weak Pacific Island States Are Vulnerable to China

For years, Nauru has financed as much as two-thirds of its state budget with fees paid by Australia for Nauru’s hosting of an Australian government processing center for people seeking asylum in Australia. In June, Australia evacuated those refugees (while continuing to maintain the offshore processing center) and the reduction in fees created a budget shortfall that Taiwan could not help Nauru to fill. That paved the way for the switch in recognition. Kiribati and Solomon Islands also switched amid financial issues: Kiribati because Taiwan wouldn’t buy it commercial aircraft and Solomon Islands reportedly in exchange for $8.5 million in development funds.

Ultimately, China plays this game well, and the United States is largely absent, hoping friendly countries like Australia, Japan, and New Zealand can pick up the slack. The United States might have a strong security relationship with Fiji, but policymakers need to hear what leaders in this region are saying they need. They rarely ask for more military exercises. This strategy is hardly sustainable and will take leadership to reverse.

Spoke Story: AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting

Defense ministers from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in London to coordinate on AUKUS initiatives. This meeting was important not just for the progress announced but also as a strong signal from the new Labour government in the United Kingdom that they are committed to resourcing this initiative.

There was a big focus on workforce updates. If AUKUS is to succeed, it will require a lot of skilled labor to build and operate the nuclear-powered submarines. A month ago, Australia announced that three Australian submarine officers graduated from the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Reactor Course. Additionally, earlier in the summer, 12 Australian submariners started training with the American Navy on nuclear submarines. The joint statement announced more developments.

US Department of Defense: AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting Communique:

More than 60 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel are currently in various stages of the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine SSN training pipeline to equip a cadre of Australian officers and sailors with experience aboard the U.S. Virginia class SSNs that the RAN will own and operate from the early 2030s. These numbers will increase further in 2025, with more than 100 personnel commencing training. Six officers have completed all training and have been assigned to U.S. Virginia class submarines. RAN enlisted sailors will join U.S. submarine crews before the end of this year.

The joint statement also demonstrated how each nation is investing in its submarine industrial base, another critical aspect of the initiative. If these three countries cannot substantially overhaul their submarine industrial base and properly invest in the workforce needed to develop, produce, and sustain these nuclear-powered submarines, the whole program is at risk of failure.

US Department of Defense: AUKUS Defence Ministers' Meeting Communique:

The U.S. Government decided to invest USD 17.5 billion into its submarine industrial base to support initiatives related to supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements, and strategic sourcing.
Australia has also committed to invest over AUD 30 billion in the Australian defence industrial base to develop Australia's supply chains and facilitate industry participation in U.S. and UK supply chains.
His Majesty's Government announced an initial allocation of £4 billion from the United Kingdom to continue the detailed design work of SSN-AUKUS and order long-lead items, as well as the United Kingdom's investment of £3 billion across its Defence Nuclear Enterprise, including the construction of submarine industrial infrastructure that will help to deliver the SSN-AUKUS programme.

Additionally, this is the first time that the AUKUS nations have stated that they are officially exploring Japan’s inclusion in Pilar II of AUKUS, especially with maritime autonomous systems. AUKUS countries are also holding consultations with Canada, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

Spoke Story: Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue

Last week in Seoul, the United States and Korea held the 25th Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue. Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang Lae, led the ROK delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Anka Lee, led the US delegation. Key senior ROK and US defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue. Washington and Seoul have grown closer as tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula. Key to President Yoon’s foreign policy strategy is a deep US-ROK security relationship, but also a broader partnership network.

US Department of Defense: Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue:

Both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three pillars of the "Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance": enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They acknowledged the importance of faithfully implementing the Defense Vision to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and reviewed implementation of specific tasks. In addition, the two sides noted progress to align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms under the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to effectively and efficiently support strengthening the Alliance through the implementation of the Defense Vision, and pledged to continue assessing them.

As a signal that South Korea is willing to cooperate with the United States on broader security challenges, Seoul is broadening cooperation that can be critical in a US-China fight. This new dialogue demonstrated that the two countries are deepening industrial base collaboration.

US Department of Defense: Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue:

The two sides also pledged to continue expanding cooperative measures to enhance the defense industrial base and interoperability of both the United States and the ROK. The delegations agreed that cooperative efforts for a Regional Sustainment Framework being developed by the Defense Department would strengthen posture and capabilities of the Alliance. As such, they highly appreciated a ROK's participation in the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project, in an area of Air Force's aviation maintenance, and pledged to continue discussions for expanding cooperation into the Army aviation and naval vessels. The two sides also welcomed the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards for the conduct of MRO for U.S. vessels. In addition, both sides recognized the need to provide reciprocal market access to deepen defense cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and pledged to advance progress on a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP-A).

A Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement would be an vital step to bolster US force posture in the region, especially for the US Air Force and Navy. This initiative is a pillar of the Defense Department’s new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience. Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante says the new alliance program will “work through common acquisition and sustainment issues, whether it’s co-development, co-production [or] co-sustainment.” A RDP-A would lower trade barriers so that the two countries can more easily sell weapons systems to each other. Negotiations have it speedbumps as Congress and other interest groups claim it harms American workers and industries. It is not clear if the Pentagon is going to be able to finalize negotiations this year due to political sensitivities.