Japan's Trouble with Classified Information
NATO and the Pacific, Japan-Philippines 2+2, RAA
Hub Story: Japan’s Mishandling of Classified Materiel
Spoke Story: NATO in the Pacific?
Spoke Story: Japan-Philippines 2+2
Hub Story: Japan’s Mishandling of Classified Materiel
Japan’s Self Defense Force was shaken this week with the revelation of mishandling of classified materiel.
Japan's defense ministry has dismissed navy chief Admiral Ryo Sakai and imposed disciplinary actions on over 200 military officials for mishandling classified materials and other misconduct. This sweeping investigation revealed violations of the sensitive information protection law, abuse of power, and fraudulent claims, leading to numerous senior officials' resignations, demotions, pay cuts, and suspensions. Defense Minister Minoru Kihara acknowledged the significant damage to public trust and pledged comprehensive reforms to restore confidence in the ministry and Self Defense Forces.
Japan's counter-espionage structure and cyber defense capabilities have been a concern for Washington and other allies for a while. Earlier this year, the Japanese foreign minister called for the Japanese government to strengthen cybersecurity after US officials warned Tokyo that China was easily hacking into Japanese cables and systems and taking sensitive information.
The lack of action in Tokyo has not only affected its relationship with Five Eyes but also played a role in Australia's argument to keep Japan out of AUKUS. Even Kurt Campbell expressed hesitation about Japanese progress on cybersecurity reform, stating, "I think it's fair to say Japan has taken some of those steps, but not all of them." This underscores the broader implications of the defense ministry's actions on Japan's international relations.
Ryosuke Hanada's piece in ASPI's The Strategist highlights the deficiencies in Japan's anti-espionage law and the urgent need for improvement. To join AUKUS, Japan must match the cybersecurity capabilities of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Here is one particularly important point:
The Strategist: No, Japan is Not Ready for AUKUS:
[One] problem is the limited coverage of espionage. The Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA) only criminalizes actions for ‘the purpose of obtaining an unjust profit or causing damage to the secret holder’ (Article 21). There is no articulation of foreign principals or foreign states. Article 24 of the PSDS criminalizes obtaining, or attempting to obtain, secrets for foreign states (it says ‘gaikoku’ without definition). The Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (PSDS) criminalizes disclosure of secrets, obtaining such secrets and conspiring, abetting, or inciting others to commit such acts. Other forms of espionage, such as possession and concealment, making a record or copy, or communicating and publishing secrets are out of its purview.
Ultimately, this week's news should be taken as good news, even if hard news. It validates concerns about Japan’s rules and procedures around classified materiel but also indicates that Tokyo is willing to take tough actions to address critical weaknesses. This week is probably just the beginning. It's hard to imagine that this fixes a much more systematic problem.
Spoke Story: NATO in the Indo-Pacific?
Everyone knows by now that the NATO Summit was held this week in Washington. Leaders and senior officials from Europe gathered in DC to give speeches, sit on panels, and hold meetings. However, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand also came to Washington this week (notably absent with the Australian prime minister). The question is, what role should NATO have in the Indo-Pacific?
In a recent Foreign Affairs piece, Mathieu Droin, Kelly Grieco, and Happymon Jacob articulate the case against NATO engaging in the Indo-Pacific.
Foreign Affairs: Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia:
That NATO and its Asian partners are deepening their cooperation is clear. What is less clear is that this cooperation is in either’s best strategic interests… NATO, however, is not the correct forum for fostering transregional cooperation to counter China. Pulling the alliance into Asia fuels Beijing’s narrative of a U.S.-led confrontation between global blocs and risks alienating Asian countries without ultimately helping to shore up regional security or deterrence…
Many regional leaders—and some European ones—have expressed concern that NATO’s deepening involvement could not only force them to pick sides but also divide Asia into rival blocs… Policymakers throughout the Indo-Pacific are wary that NATO’s foray into Asia could constitute another step in Washington’s efforts to build a U.S.-led regional security bloc to counter China…
NATO has attempted to allay these fears, offering repeated assurances that it will neither move into the South China Sea nor admit Asian members. But skeptics and opponents of NATO in Asia remain unconvinced of the alliance’s intentions, especially as NATO now routinely invites top officials from Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries to its summits and ministerial meetings… If NATO continues to insert itself into the Indo-Pacific, it is possible that some will see the alliance, rather than China, as a risk to regional security dynamics—alienating the very countries the United States and Europe need to balance Chinese power in the first place.
This is the core of their first argument against NATO participation in the Indo-Pacific. There are really two components to it: (1) NATO participation in the Indo-Pacific will antagonize China, and (2) it will push non-aligned countries away from the United States.
The second argument is more convincing to me than the first. As the authors point out in more detail in their piece, Southeast Asian countries are not interested in picking between the United States and China. NATO engagement in the region might heighten those concerns, resulting in diminishing returns for the United States and its allies. I think this concern might be a little overstated, but overall, it is directionally correct. However, the first argument has some flaws. Beijing is perpetually paranoid. Washington and allied nations should take steps to communicate with Chinese leaders, especially with Xi Jinping directly. However, taking steps that will unilaterally disadvantage the United States and its allies just to avoid playing into a Chinese narrative is strategically problematic. Reassurance will always have a role in great-power competition, but I think it can become a slippery slope if Washington starts making policy based on how much it plays into a Chinese narrative.
However, the authors also address the deterrence capability of NATO in the Indo-Pacific.
Foreign Affairs: Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia:
Supporters of engagement with Asia, both within the alliance and among NATO’s Asian partners, believe that these partnerships can enhance deterrence in the region… The argument goes, the alliance could offer indirect support such as weapons, logistics, and intelligence sharing to Asian partners as well as to NATO member states choosing to intervene militarily under their national flags in a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea contingency. But it is unclear how this kind of deterrence would work in practice—and a more active NATO role in Indo-Pacific security could well backfire…
There are good reasons to doubt that NATO has the political will or military capabilities to make a meaningful contribution to Indo-Pacific security and deterrence. Many European allies would not be willing to support a NATO mission to check Chinese aggression in a far-off theater, either because they are busy dealing with Russia; because of their extensive economic ties with Beijing; or because Asia is, strictly speaking, not an existential interest for European countries.
Even if every NATO member wanted to intervene in Asia, the alliance has little to no spare capacity for operations thousands of miles away. European defense budgets are on the rise… but those funds will be used primarily to replenish weapons sent to Ukraine... Moreover, the type of military assets that NATO countries in Europe require for deterrence and defense on the continent—such as heavy artillery, antitank weapons, and tactical drones—are quite different from the maritime and air capabilities needed to project power into the Indo-Pacific. NATO is simply not equipped to deal with Asian contingencies.
This section is the authors' strongest point. As a security organization running on consensus, NATO is unlikely to approve of any meaningful military engagement in an Indo-Pacific contingency. While I think it's largely convincing that NATO shouldn't be too focused on the Indo-Pacific, I think policymakers should be more concerned about the reverse. Asia should stay out of Europe.
Asian nations rightly understand the interconnectedness between Europe and Asia. The White House released a long factsheet showcasing how Indo-Pacific nations have supported NATO and Ukraine. While Ukraine's fate is not determinant of the fate of the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine's success in propelling Russia will have positive security impacts for the Indo-Pacific. While Asian nations should provide support to Ukraine, policymakers cannot go too far. Japan has sent Patriot-missiles to the United States to backfill stocks sent to Ukraine. After Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, South Korea announced they are considering sending arms to Ukraine as a response. Meanwhile, US assets have been deployed from the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic to address other conflicts, leaving the Indo-Pacific under-resourced.
Asian leaders are engaging with NATO because they are making a bet that being supportive of Europe now will result in European support for Asia down the road. As the authors above noted, there are just too many barriers to meaningful NATO operations in the Indo-Pacific if a war breaks out. Having Asian leaders at the NATO Summit is a positive development, and high-level interactions should continue. However, Washington and its Asian allies should be extremely cautious not to degrade Indo-Pacific readiness for European priorities, as this could pose significant risks.
Spoke Story: Japan-Philippines Security Cooperation
The Philippines and Japan held their 2+2 ministers dialogue recently. It was their second such convening, but the first one was held over two years ago. While there was mention to Taiwan and North Korea, most of the meeting focused on the South China Sea and the tensions surrounding the Second Thomas Shoal.
Joint Press Release on the Outcome of the 2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2):
The Ministers emphasized the need for the international community to speak out on the importance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law. The Ministers strongly opposed any unilateral attempts to change the peacefully established status quo by force or coercion.
The Ministers underscored their unwavering commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with UNCLOS and expressed serious concern over the dangerous and escalatory actions by China at Second Thomas Shoal, which obstructed freedom of navigation and disrupted supply lines, thus increasing tensions. The Philippines appreciated Japan’s consistent support on the various incidents which constitute destabilizing conduct. The Philippines and Japan decided to continue coordination in promoting the adherence to international law, in particular UNCLOS, and through various related initiatives, and called on China to abide by the final and legally-binding 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea.
The 2+2 meeting comes right as the Philippines and Japan inked their new Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). This new RAA between the two countries is different than the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that the Philippines has with the United States. The RAA is meant to make exercises easier between the two countries. Before this agreement, Japan would have to go through the United States to conduct training in Filipino terrirotiy. Now, Japan has more access to Filipino waters and terrirtory for training. The US-Philippines VFA alters Filipino law more drastically to allow for more extended deployments of US forces on Filipino territroy. While the RAA is mostly centered on ease-of-training, the VFA is more extensive and focused on operations and interoperability.
Worth Your Time:
Australia:
South Korea:
Japan:
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Nikkei Asia: Japan's Tacit NATO Membership Acts as Bridge for Global Security
India: