Navigating Extended Deterrence: The US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group in Focus
US-ROK Nukes Talks; Quad Meeting; Rubio Takes Charge; Fortifying Guam
Hub Story: US-ROK Hold Fourth Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting
Spoke Story: Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting at Trump Inauguration
Spoke Story: Fortifying Guam
Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week
Hub Story: US-ROK Hold Fourth Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting
On January 10, the United States and South Korea held its fourth Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). The convening is a product of the April 2023 Washington Declaration between President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-Yeol. The Washington Declaration stipulates five key provisions:
South Korea will recommit to the nuclear non-proliferation regime
Washington will commit to making every effort to consult with Seoul before using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula
The two countries will establish a senior-level nuclear consultative group
The United States will carry out visible deployments of strategic assets
The two nations will deepen military training and exercises while integrating South Korean capabilities into US strategic planning
The NCG is co-chaired at the assistant secretary level by senior policy leaders in the US Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense and includes US and ROK interagency participants such as national security, defense, military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. It meets twice per year at the principal level and is supported by frequent working-level meetings. According to a factsheet released this week, the NCG focuses on several workstreams.
Nuclear and strategic planning
Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI)
Exercises, simulations, and trainings
Nuclear consultation and communication processes during crises and contingencies
Establishment of dedicated secure communications systems
Risk reduction practices
Strategic messaging
Security and Information sharing protocols
It’s hard to measure the “success” of the Washington Declaration and its corresponding initiatives. On one hand, the Biden Administration has pursued the provisions robustly. The NCG itself successfully drafted and signed the “United States and Republic of Korea Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula” in July 2024. While not publicly delineated, the guidelines outline principles and procedures to enhance US-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner. Some of the progress in this cooperation and integration is observable. For example, the United States has increased its use of strategic bombers in bilateral exercises and has expanded visitation of other strategic assets, like a port call by a nuclear-capable submarine. However, the Washington Declaration has largely failed to ameliorate South Korean concern about the credibility of American nuclear deterrence, and domestic support for an independent nuclear arsenal has risen.
The Asan Institute: South Koreans and Their Neighbors Survey:
Nuclear deterrence and assurance: Public confidence that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea remained unchanged at 53% (2022: 52.9%, 2023: 54.4%). Public confidence further decreased when respondents were asked whether the United States would fulfill its pledge to use nuclear weapons even at the risk of potential nuclear attacks against itself, with less than half of South Koreans (2024: 46.8%) expressing confidence.
South Korean support for acquiring an independent nuclear weapons capability reached the highest point at 70.9% (Oppose: 27.4%). This is the highest figure since the Asan Institute first began surveying this question in 2010 (min: 54.8%, max: 70.9%). In addition, a majority of respondents (63.8%) also supported reintroducing US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula (Oppose: 33.5%).
Robert E. Kelly and Min-hyung Kim wrote a recent piece in Foreign Affairs Magazine arguing why South Korea should develop its own independent nuclear arsenal. The authors articulate many of the sentiments felt by the South Korean public, asserting that “Washington needs to stop getting in its ally’s way.” Their argument for why South Korea should develop its own domestic deterrent is supported by the following points:
Growing North Korean capabilities increasingly put South Korea in danger
Washington will not risk a nuclear strike on the US homeland for South Korea
A new Donald Trump administration raises doubts about the overall credibility of American commitments to the alliance
The authors make a convincing case for why it's in South Korea's best interest to develop a nuclear capability. However, for policymakers in Washington, this outcome has to be avoided, and Washington should be prepared to absorb reasonable costs to prevent this. Recent political instability in South Korea should worry policymakers in the United States about how a domestic nuclear arsenal will impact South Korean policy and politics. The logical extension of the Nuclear Consultative Group is for it to explore avenues to redeploy American-controlled tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Redeploying nuclear weapons will do a much more effective job of enhancing deterrence, reassuring the South Korean public of American commitments, and limiting the consequences of a US troop drawdown. There are many complications and costs that come with redeployment, but it's a pathway that American policymakers need to start considering.
Spoke Story: Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting at Trump Inauguration
Trump team is picking up where they left off four years ago. The Quad nations—Japan, the US, Australia, and India—plan to hold a foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington following President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, with key ministers from each nation and US Secretary of State nominee Sen. Marco Rubio expected to attend. The meeting aims to reaffirm the importance of the Quad’s regional security framework under the new administration and discuss plans for a Quad summit later in the year. Rubio is the right pick to represent the United States; his alliance credentials are considerable.
While in the Senate, Rubio has pushed for a stronger and deeper partnership with India. This past summer, he introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act to expand bilateral cooperation with India, and was pretty generous. The legislation would have provided a limited exemption for India from sanctions for purchases of Russian equipment used by the Indian military. The bill also endeavored to raise the profile of the Indian partnership to be on the same level as other American allies like Japan, Israel, Korea, and NATO when it came to technology transfers and providing excess defense articles.
On the Australia front, Rubio has consistently advocated for US-Australia defense cooperation and backed Biden’s AUKUS initiative. In August, Rubio supported the Biden administration’s commitment to giving nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia despite domestic shipbuilding delays. In response to delays in shipbuilding Rubio stated, “I don’t think that in any way undermines the commitment that we have, particularly given our shared concerns about the threats in the Indo-Pacific from an increasingly aggressive China.” The new administration will probably want to rethink some aspects of AUKUS, but Rubio’s past support will strengthen partners in Canberra.
Finally, Rubio will be a natural partner for policymakers in Tokyo. The US-Japan alliance has generally deepened and broadened over the past ten years. South Korea is narrowly focused on the North Korean threat, the US’s lack of an official relationship with Taiwan limits cooperation, and the Philippines does not have the economy to support large defense programs. That leaves Japan as the ideal security partner in Northeast Asia. Rubio has long advocated for the alliance, going back to a 2014 trip he made to Japan. Rubio has also supported the Biden administration’s efforts to enhance trilateral ties between the US, Japan, and South Korea.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo have a friend in Marco Rubio. Rubio's hosting of a Quad foreign ministers meeting on inauguration day indicates where his priorities are, and it's a heartening sign that Trump has allowed this to go forward.
Spoke Story: Fortifying Guam
Randall Schriver, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and a recognized leader in Indo-Pacific security argued in a recent op-ed in Breaking Defense that the United States must prioritize the defense of Guam to maintain its strategic position in the Pacific. As the “away team” in a potential Pacific conflict, Guam provides a critical foothold due to its ideal location, robust military infrastructure, and status as a US territory, which ensures operational flexibility. Schriver emphasizes that strengthening Guam’s defenses—especially against missile threats—is essential for deterring adversaries like China, Russia, and North Korea and reducing the risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Schriver articulates why Guam is so critical to American force posture.
Breaking Defense: To Project Power in the Pacific, Invest in Guam’s Protection:
Guam enjoys a “Goldilocks” placement in the Pacific — not too far, and not too close. The island is far enough from the potential fight to have some natural protections against many classes of weapon systems potentially employed by our adversaries. And yet Guam is closer to Beijing than it is to Hawaii — close enough to the fight to be a place for combat force generation. The same proximity also allows Guam to serve as a place for maintenance, repair and sustainment.
Guam topped the list of US Indo-Pacific Command’s unfunded priorities, totaling $11 billion in 44 programs. Guam is home to some of the United States’ premier platforms, including F-35s, B-2 Bombers, and Virginia-class attack submarines. Hardening and fortifying Guam will take years to finish, but pursuing it is critical. The US Missile Defense Agency has been prioritizing the mission, and this past December, they successfully tested an SM-3 interceptor against a ballistic missile. Ultimately, Congress and the administration have failed to prioritize and fund the endeavor. Schriver’s endorsement of the initiative will carry considerable weight with this new administration.
Alliance Insights: Key Articles This Week
Japan:
Nikkei Asia: Japan to test hypersonic missile tracking with space sensors
Nikkei Asia: Indonesia, Japan boost security ties amid China's rise, Trump's return
South Korea:
Yonhap News Agency: Military chiefs of S. Korea, Australia discuss cooperation in phone talks
The Chosun Daily: Beijing resumes disputed installations in West Sea amid S. Korea's turmoil
Philippines:
Nikkei Asia: Philippines deploys air and sea assets to track Chinese 'monster'
Naval News: U.S. Army Validates Maritime Transport of Typhon Missile System
Taiwan:
Naval News: China Suddenly Building Fleet Of Special Barges Suitable For Taiwan Landings
Taiwan News: Taiwan signs NT$10.31 billion surface-to-air missile system contract with US
US State Department: U.S.-Taiwan Working Group Meeting on International Organizations
Australia:
Australia Defence Ministry: HMAS Brisbane returns home after milestone deployment
Breaking Defense: Aussies buying 40 more Bushmasters for long-range fire C2
The Economist: AUKUS enters its fifth year. How is the pact faring?
India: