Seoul’s New Shield: The Rise of South Korea's Strategic Command
ROK STRATCOM; India and the Maldives; AUSMIN; US-Philippines
Hub Story: South Korea to Establish Strategic Command
Spoke Story: India’s Rough Waters in the Maldives
Spoke Story: US-Australia Ministerial 2+2
Spoke Story: US-Philippines Ministerial 2+2
Hub Story: South Korea To Establish Strategic Command This Year
South Korea’s Cabinet approved a presidential decree to create a new military command focused on strategic operations to counter North Korean nuclear and WMD threats, set to launch around October in southern Seoul. This command will integrate critical military assets, including missiles, cyber, drone, and special operations units, and work closely with US Strategic Command to enhance deterrence and develop operational plans.
Obviously, South Korea has no nuclear arsenal. There is growing demand by the South Korean public for Seoul to start building its own domestic nuclear arsenal. However, in a recent interview with Reuters, South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik dismissed calls for South Korea to build nuclear weapons, stating it would fracture Seoul’s alliance with the United States as well as other consequences of breaking with the non-proliferation regime.
South Korea’s new strategic command (ROK STRATCOM) was mentioned in the 2023 Washington Declaration but only recently made headlines. ROK STRATCOM will have two main tasks: integrating ROK forces with US nuclear capabilities and operationalizing South Korea’s “Three-Axis” system. The Three-Axis system was announced in 2016 after North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test. This security approach is how Seoul plans to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack.
South Korea’s Three-Axis System:
The first axis is a “Kill Chain,” a preemptive strike against the adversary’s ballistic missiles or WMDs.
The second axis is “Korea Air and Missile Defense,” known as KAMD, which intercepts launched missiles using a multi-layered missile defense system.
The third axis, “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” (KMPR), involves striking Pyongyang and targeting leadership in retaliation for North Korea’s nuclear or conventional first strike on South Korea.
When ROK STRATCOM is officially established, it will likely lead the operationalization of the Nuclear Consultative Group guidelines signed by the United States and South Korea. During the NATO Summit this summer, President Biden and President Yoon praised the Nuclear Consultative Group's progress and the finalization of the extended deterrence guidelines.
President Biden and President Yoon commend and endorse the tremendous progress that the U.S.-ROK Alliance has achieved in the first year of the NCG, as evidenced by the signing of the U.S.-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula (“Guidelines document”) by the U.S. Department of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense. The Presidents underscored that the Guidelines document provides a solid foundation for enhancing U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner. The Guidelines document provides guidance to Alliance policy and military authorities in maintaining and strengthening a credible and effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture. The Presidents reiterated the need to continue to make swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration; strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices.
If at some point the United States and South Korea do decide to place US-controlled tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, ROK STRATCOM would be necessary for that successful transition. However, for the time being, ROK STRATCOM will be focused on creating smooth interoperability between not only US and ROK forces, but also incorporating US nuclear capabilities into any response from a North Korean attack.
Spoke Story: India’s Rough Waters in the Maldives
India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met with Maldives’ President Mohamed Muizzu to attempt to reset bilateral relations following Muizzu’s pro-China stance and his election campaign promising to reduce Indian influence in the Maldives. This visit marks India’s return to diplomatic engagement with the Maldives after a period of strained relations. The meeting focused on enhancing cooperation, particularly in areas of mutual interest, such as development projects and regional security, despite past tensions.
Ever since Muizzu ascended to the presidency in November 2023, India has struggled to maintain good relations with the critical island nation. Muizzu ran on an “India Out” campaign, which has resulted in a closer relationship with China and the explosion of India’s military personnel. Muizzu even visited Beijing before traveling to India, indicating that his priorities are with a closer relationship with China at the expense of India. The Maldives has borrowed around $1.4 billion from China since joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2014.
The setback in relations has broader geopolitical consequences.
Council on Foreign Relations: The Maldives Is Moving Toward China. Here’s What to Know:
The upgraded relationship also offers potential benefits to China. The Maldives sits along one of the busiest maritime trade passages in the Indian Ocean, through which nearly 80 percent of Chinese oil imports flow. Analysts say Beijing wants Malé to remain a friendly regional military presence to help safeguard its access to oil from the Persian Gulf.
Of course, India has not been neglectful of the Maldives. New Delhi has been pursuing its own development projects.
AP News: India Urges Pro-China Maldives to Ease Tensions and Improve Their Strained Relationship:
Last year, New Delhi started construction of the Indian-funded Greater Male connectivity project, billed as the largest infrastructure initiative in the island nation, a 6.7-kilometer (4.2-mile) -long bridge and causeway connecting the capital city, Male, with the islands of Villingli, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi.
India also is helping Maldives to build 4,000 homes and has extended a $100 million line of credit to finance other infrastructure projects. The two countries have signed agreements for cooperation in cybersecurity, disaster management and fishing zone forecast capacity.
Jaishankar’s visit this week indicates that the Maldives is recalibrating how much it shifts to China. Indian tourism has gone down since the two countries have faced tensions. The Maldives is looking to boost more development assistance and tourism numbers while still maintaining independence and agency.
While there will always be tensions between big states like India and smaller neighborhood nations like the Maldives (tensions rose earlier in 2014 too), the new emergence of great power rivalry makes these tensions more pronounced and more consequential. The Maldives follows other smaller island nations like the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru. These countries smartly play the US and China off each other (or, in this case, India and China) in order to extract the most benefits they can. It’s not the same as the hedging we see from countries like Vietnam or Thailand, but more of a ploy for increased development aid or military assistance. Regardless, New Delhi and Washington must compete for influence with these nations because unilaterally giving up would have significant consequences.
Spoke Story: US-Australia Ministerial 2+2
The United States and Australia commenced high-level talks during the 2024 Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) in Annapolis, Maryland, focusing on China’s “coercive behavior,” the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, and tensions in the Middle East. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasized their collaboration on shared security challenges, including issues in the South China Sea and the Middle East. Australian officials highlighted the expanding US military presence in Australia and defense industry cooperation, reinforcing bipartisan support for the AUKUS program.
The initiatives and projects announced in the joint statement can be categorized into the following topics: innovation cooperation, governance and development, economic resiliency, broad security and defense collaboration, AUKUS, and new co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment initiatives.
One of the key outcomes of the 2024 Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) is the progress made by the two countries in co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment. Australia is just one of the many Indo-Pacific countries that the United States is actively engaging with to advance defense-industrial cooperation. Notably, the US and Japan have established a new high-level forum to accelerate these initiatives. It is likely that Washington is seeking similar arrangements with the Philippines and India.
To further facilitate this growing cooperation, Congress made significant amendments to Title III of the Defense Production Act. These amendments now include Australia and the United Kingdom, designating businesses operating under a US contract in these countries as domestic sources. This not only makes them eligible for grants and loans but also helps them navigate bureaucratic red tape. Additionally, Congress included several provisions in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that prioritize Australia and the United Kingdom for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and provide export exemptions. This year, executive agencies have also made strides in streamlining export control exemptions, further enhancing defense cooperation.
The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule significantly reducing licensing requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) to foster defense trade and technological innovation. BIS anticipates these changes will reduce licensing burdens for trade with Australia and the UK by over 1,800 total licenses valued at over $7.5 billion per year.
BIS is removing Commerce Control List (CCL) license requirements to allow Commerce-controlled military items, missile technology-related items, and hot section engine-related items to be exported or reexported to Australia and the UK without a license. As a result, many Commerce-controlled items, including certain satellite-related items, will now be eligible for export or reexport to Australia and the UK without a license.
US Department of State: AUKUS Partners Rule Changes for Secure License-Free Defense Trade:
The proposed changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations – or ITAR – would create a license exemption supporting billions of dollars in license-free defense trade between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and allow for deeper security cooperation and innovation among AUKUS partners. All three nations are committed to working with our private sectors and our research communities – those who will use these exemptions – to ensure the exemptions, taken together, support the goals of the AUKUS enhanced security partnership.
Most of the attention around AUKUS has focused on Pillar I and the co-development of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines. These changes in rules, regulations, and legislation are meant to help facilitate that. However, they are also meant to assist Pillar II.
Pillar II of AUKUS has eight focus areas:
Undersea capabilities
Quantum technologies
Artificial intelligence and autonomy
Advanced cyber
Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities
Electronic warfare
Innovation
Information sharing
These focus areas are to be jointly developed but think of them more as a set of tools that the three countries can use to address a shared mission. For example, the three countries might decide to leverage AUKUS Pillar II to address boosting regional surveillance. Therefore, the three nations will enhance undersea capabilities, advanced cyber, and information sharing to collaborate on that mission.
Pillar II isn’t meant to advance these eight capabilities independently; instead, they are paired with about ten different missions the three countries are pursuing. This AUSMIN conference centered less on Pillar I and more on Pillar II and co-development for Australian missile defense and munitions production under its Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise.
Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2024:
The United States and Australia committed to streamline cooperation on missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle technologies, particularly for Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise and AUKUS Pillar 2 Advanced Capabilities, and reiterated their respective commitments to upholding the standards of multilateral nonproliferation regimes…
The principals welcomed progress towards our 2023 commitment to collaborate on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, with an initial focus on the co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025. They acknowledged Australia's intent to produce viable volumes of GMLRS for global consumption and welcomed efforts to finalize, by December 2024, the MOU to enable the co-assembly of GMLRS, with follow on mechanisms for co-production in the future. The principals supported the establishment of a sovereign Australian solid rocket motor capability and manufacture of tactical training rounds.
The principals welcomed progress on our 2023 commitment to share technical data on 155mm M795 munitions and highlighted Australia's investment in manufacturing 155mm M795 munitions in Australia. They reaffirmed the support to fast tracked future productions. These efforts are intended to enable U.S. certification of Australian-manufactured munitions and Australia's deeper integration into the U.S. defense enterprise and global energetics supply chain.
The principals acknowledged the supply chain complementarities between GMLRS and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). They committed to finalizing a PrSM MOU on cooperative Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development (PSFD) by December 2024 and announced the establishment of a Joint Program Office to advance cooperative activities on this critical munition in 2025.
The joint statement continues…
The principals welcomed the signing in July 2024 of the Statement of Intent on Integrated Air and Missile Defense between the Australian Department of Defence and U.S. Department of Defense, and committed to deliver a strategic roadmap that will identify strategic joint priorities and lines of effort to pursue near-, mid-, and long-term opportunities for co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities. They welcomed the success of the U.S. Command Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC) demonstration in Australia and continual work toward a networked regional IAMD architecture alignment.
The principals welcomed continuing collaborative efforts to develop and demonstrate an air-launched hypersonic weapon under the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE). Australia and the United States continue to make significant progress in design and ground testing, supporting the bilateral flight test program of Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM). Looking forward, the United States and Australia are working towards expanding this deep collaboration and transitioning the partnership on SCIFiRE and HACM to a fielded combat capability. Australia will consider HACM as a potential pathway to field its first air-launched hypersonic weapon.
The principals reaffirmed their commitment to establishing robust, resilient, and diversified industrial bases that support our cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. They discussed opportunities to expand cooperation on Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul, and Upgrade (MRO&U) of our shared critical capabilities, and noted the successful maintenance activity of a U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk. The United States and Australia are committed to supporting the implementation of the Regional Sustainment Framework and committed to identify opportunities for MRO&U collaboration in Australia.
Washington is slowly trying to boost defense industrial cooperation with allies. AUKUS Pillar II is an important component of that. Pillar II isn’t necessarily about building these advanced capabilities for their own sake but rather as part of a toolkit to address specific problems and missions. The three co’s will become more common in these joint statements.
Spoke Story: US-Philippines Ministerial 2+2
During the 2+2 meeting between the US and the Philippines, the US announced a $500 million investment to enhance the Philippines' defense capabilities, focusing on countering China's maritime aggression in the South China Sea. Additionally, both nations aim to finalize a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement by the end of 2024 to strengthen cybersecurity cooperation.
The main thrust of the ministerial dialogue was to bolster Filipino maritime capabilities and enhance the alliance. This is in line with the shared commitment of both nations to address the continuing tensions in the South China Sea.
Fact Sheet: US-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue:
MODERNIZING ALLIANCE COOPERATION
The United States and the Philippines have made significant strides to address security challenges in the Indo-Pacific by modernizing alliance cooperation, including by:
Establishing the Roles, Missions, and Capabilities Working Group to strengthen bilateral planning and interoperability by providing policy guidance for joint operations, activities, and investments consistent with the Philippines-United States Bilateral Defense Guidelines signed in May 2023.
Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) Agreed Locations to enable increasingly complex combined training, exercises, and interoperability between U.S. and Philippine armed forces, including through a proposed investment of $128 million in the Fiscal Year 2025 President’s Budget Request, as well as Philippine civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities.
Expanding information-sharing on key challenges confronting the U.S.-Philippine alliance through concluding two key bilateral information sharing agreements: the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), extended in June 2024, and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which both countries have agreed to finalize before the end of the year.
The $500 million in funds is meant to help the Philippines modernize its capabilities and to really accelerate a generational investment in the Philippines armed forces.
Defense One: The US is Helping the Philippines Modernize its Military:
The Philippines military is in the process of transforming to more effectively confront China, officials say. The military was “primarily focused on internal security challenges, and they have faced major internal security challenges, particularly related to terrorism,” the defense official said. The shift is to “now be more focused on external defense, and in particular maritime security issues. And that is certainly, in part, driven by the coercion and assertiveness that they're confronting from the PRC.”
The investments will help the Philippines work more closely and effectively with the United States by facilitating more intelligence and information sharing between the two countries, as part of what the Pentagon calls the General Security of Information Agreement.
The new increased US investment will give US forces more access to Filipino bases and allow the United States to expand its own capabilities in the region. For example, under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the Pentagon recently announced that it awarded a $32 million contract to upgrade an airfield in the Philippines.
USNI News: US Funding $32M Upgrade to Air Base in the Philippines:
Basa Air Base is set to receive a 625,000-square-foot parking apron capable of hosting up to 20 aircraft. The contract stated that the project aimed to strengthen the infrastructure at the base, which was deemed to be insufficient for training activities between the U.S. and Philippine forces.
To further demonstrate that the Philippines is looking to shift its armed forces toward the China threat is Manila’s growing collaboration with regional partners.
Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue:
Bolster maritime cooperative activities to promote security cooperation and expand operational coordination with other likeminded partners, including Australia and Japan. These joint efforts demonstrate resolve, strengthen bilateral security ties, and expand multilateral cooperation and training. The Secretaries agreed that cooperation and interoperability, including with both countries' respective Coast Guards, are essential tenets in maintaining stability and supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Secretaries welcomed the signing of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement and looked forward to greater trilateral and multilateral cooperation. They commended the conduct of the April 2024 Philippines-United States-Japan-Australia maritime cooperative activity in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone to strengthen interoperability and uphold international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Recently, Manila and Tokyo inked an unprecedented Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which is already producing results. On August 2nd, Japan and the Philippines conducted their first joint military exercise in the South China Sea. For a great breakdown of what the new RAA facilitates and what is doesn’t do, see this brief by Ryan Ashley and John Bradford. Additionally, this past week, the Philippines and Vietnam conducted their first joint coast guard exercise with the same mission of pushing back on excessive Chinese maritime claims. The new US investment and the actions of Manila with regional partners demonstrate how transformative China’s aggression around the Second Thomas Shoal has been for Filipino defense policy.
Worth Your Time:
Australia:
Australian Defence Ministry: Australian Defence Force Launches Fresh Recruitment Campaign
Breaking Defense: Navy Taps Acquisition Official for New Role Managing Maritime Industrial Base
Japan:
The Diplomat: Japan Further Accelerates Military Integration With the US
The Diplomat: JGSDF Plans to Build a Missile Firing Range on Japan’s Easternmost Island
Nikkei Asia: US Wants Japan to Co-Produce 100-plus Patriot Missiles
South Korea: