Will South Korea Make Nukes?

Nukes, Missiles, and the South China Sea

Jun 17, 2024

Hub Story: Will There Be Nuclear Weapons In South Korea?
Spoke Story: U.S.-Japan Increase Military Production
Spoke Story: U.S. and Philippines Look North to China

Hub Story: Will There Be Nuclear Weapons In South Korea?

The third Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) occurred in Seoul on June 10, 2024. The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration in April 2023 to enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. extended deterrence. The question now is whether the Washington Declaration is effective.

The Biden administration has grappled with a considerable dilemma since taking office in 2021: how to address South Korea's increasing desire for nuclear weapons.

Relations between the two Korean states have rapidly deteriorated in the past couple of years, and the South Korean people are getting nervous. As I discussed last week, President Yoon has embraced a new offensive strategy to deter and respond to Pyongyang's aggression. However, this has failed to ameliorate the concerns of the South Korean people.

The Asan Institute, a South Korean-based think tank, has consistently conducted polls on South Korean attitudes toward various pressing security issues. The Asan Institute's 2024 South Korea and Their Neighbors Report shows that South Koreans increasingly desire to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. While support for building an independent nuclear arsenal has always been high, it is getting noticeably more popular. During the Trump administration, South Korean support for developing nuclear weapons averaged around 63 percent. Since Biden took office, this support has increased to 68 percent, reaching an all-time high of 70 percent in 2024.

The Biden Administration's response to this concern was the 2023 Washington Declaration, which announced the following:

South Korea will recommit to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Washington will commit to take every effort to consult with Seoul before using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States and South Korea will establish a nuclear consultative group, frequently meeting at senior levels.
The United States will carry out visible deployments of strategic assets.
The United States and South Korea will deepen training and exercises while integrating South Korean capabilities into U.S. strategic planning.

On paper, the Washington Declaration has predominantly held up. Both parties have fulfilled their obligations, but it appears insufficient. For his part, President Yoon has consistently stated since the Washington Declaration that South Korea will not develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Washington has mostly upheld its end of the deal.

According to a 2023 press statement, the U.S. has been emphasizing visible deterrence through strategic assets:

2023 Joint Press Statement on the 2nd Nuclear Consultative Group Meeting:

NCG Principals reviewed the enhanced visibility of strategic assets to bolster extended deterrence, including the ballistic missile submarine the USS KENTUCKY port visit to Busan in July, B-52 strategic bomber flyover and landing on the Korean Peninsula in October, and joint observation of an ICBM test launch in November, as well as discussing future plans to demonstrate a strengthening of deterrence.

The third Nuclear Consultative Group was held this week, demonstrating that the two countries are aligning on nuclear strategy. The two sides have reviewed a joint guideline document on ways to respond in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea. Additionally, both countries will be holding a nuclear response drill this summer to further bolster cooperation and strategic planning. It is not officially signed off on, but it is an important benchmark for U.S.-ROK response integration.

It's clear that Washington is taking tangible steps to bolster nuclear-extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, but it doesn't seem to be working. North Korea is becoming increasingly aggressive, and the South Korean people lack trust in U.S. extended deterrence. The Asan Institute polling shows South Korean trust in U.S. extended deterrence has flatlined at about 54 percent in the past few years.

I'm not sure if deploying U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons is the right solution, but it's a debate that needs to start happening in Washington. The Washington Declaration, while making strides in its intended purpose, seems to be falling short in some aspects.

Senator Roger Wicker preempted the debate when he released his "Peace Through Strength" report. In it, he says Washington should explore a "nuclear sharing agreement in the Indo-Pacific and re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula."

There are some critical issues with deploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. First, the United States only has about 200 tactical nuclear weapons. One hundred are deployed in Europe, and the other hundred are in strategic reserve in the United States. How many would we need to deploy to South Korea? Is it wise to redeploy them from our strategic reserve or Europe? The other issue is the China component. When the United States deployed the THAAD missile defense system, Beijing hit South Korea with punitive sanctions. Deploying nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula will undoubtedly garner a more aggressive response from China. Is South Korea willing to pay the economic price for American nuclear weapons? Of course, the United States had nuclear weapons deployed to South Korea for decades during the Cold War. However, the security environment in 2024 is very different from that of 1958 or 1991.

At its core, the Washington Declaration was designed to prevent the nuclearization of South Korea while strengthening deterrence. While both countries have pursued the key initiatives with vigor, the Washington Declaration, while not a failure, has not achieved the desired success. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating, and the increasing desire of South Koreans for their own independent nuclear arsenal is a clear indication that more measures need to be considered.

Spoke Story: U.S.-Japan Increase Military Production

Japan and the U.S. have taken a significant step forward in their defense partnership. They have agreed to establish working groups for joint missile production, ship and aircraft repair, and supply chain resiliency during Tokyo's inaugural Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment Forum (DICAS). U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel has rightly underscored the importance of Japan's significant industrial capacity in meeting U.S. defense needs, particularly in the face of ongoing global conflicts. This forum, led by U.S. Undersecretary William LaPlante and Japan's ATLA Commissioner Masaki Fukasawa, is not just a platform for discussion, but a vehicle for achieving concrete outcomes by the upcoming "two-plus-two" meeting in July.

While a significant development, most of this has been reported in the past couple of months. Ship repairs is the outcome to watch. There has been some progress on this initiative, but much more talk than action. U.S. naval ships have done routine maintenance in Japan, but most major repairs and maintenance are conducted in the United States. While that's a hassle during peacetime, it will be detrimental during wartime. The ability of the United States to receive major repairs from Japan during wartime is essential.

Joint missile development is also critical. In December, Japan revised its laws to allow for arms exports, specifically to support American aid to Ukraine. The United States has cut into munition stockpiles, and the U.S. defense industrial base is too weak to refill it efficiently. Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is licensed to manufacture Patriot missiles for export to the United States.

The joint missile production agreement is not just a positive development, it's a strategic necessity. It not only bolsters American aid to Ukraine but also fortifies Japan's defense industrial base. Most importantly, it hones the production line for a critical munition, a potential game-changer if a war in the Pacific were to erupt. As U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel rightly points out, "it is clear that the U.S. military-industrial base cannot meet all the security challenges." Leveraging allied industrial bases is one of Washington's untapped strengths. With China's significantly more powerful industrial base, the United States must find ways to navigate domestic constraints.

Spoke Story: U.S. and Philippines Look North to China

Since last fall, tensions between the Philippines and China have spiked due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea and more specifically the Second Thomas Shoal. China has increased its military presence and built artificial islands in the South China Sea, challenging the Philippines' sovereignty claims. The Philippines, backed by a 2016 international tribunal ruling, asserts its rights to the area and has received support from the United States, which conducts freedom of navigation operations to counter China's expansive claims. Tensions have escalated as China has blocked Philippine supply ships to the Second Thomas Shoal and asserted control, prompting the U.S. to reaffirm its defense commitments to the Philippines under their mutual defense treaty.

U.S.-Philippines military collaboration has continued to tighten as tensions with China rises. Defense News had a great deep dive into how the Philippines is expanding security cooperation with the United States and other partners, but Manila is also expanding military exercises to the northern part of the archipelago instead of keeping it traditionally more inland.

Defense News: US, Philippines Expand Exercise to Territorial Edges Amid Tension with China:

The exercise’s expansion is a direct reflection of the Philippines’ acknowledgment its territorial defenses are lacking… The exercise used to be confined to central military locations within the main island of Luzon, but now events are spread across the country from the most northern islands all the way to the southwestern island of Palawan.
The expansion of the exercise to places like Ilocos Norte, along the northwestern coast of Luzon island, “sends a message of confidence in our ability to protect as north as possible. It’s also a message of deterrence. So if any of our adversaries have any designs that involve the areas up north, we are saying that we are challenging your maritime and air presence in this area by our presence alone, or by our bilateral presence alone,” Logico said.

Manila also announced that they will be revitalizing the Subic Bay Airfield to better conduct operations in the South China Sea. Subic Bay was the central hub for U.S. miliary operations during the Cold War, but has since atrophied. Subic Bay now hosts an international airport that supports U.S. miliary equipment and other military activities, but the establishment of a military airfield is much more appropriate to address the Philippines current security challenge. New, harden military infrastructure at Subic will make the airfield much more resilient and a stronger staging ground for Joint Air-Sea-Land Operations.

The Philippines expanding military cooperation with the United States enhances regional stability and strengthens the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, countering China's aggressive territorial claims. This partnership bolsters mutual defense capabilities, ensuring quicker and more effective responses to security threats. As China continues to coerce the Philippines, I suspect this cooperation will only deepen.