Triangular Ties: India's Defense Talks with Japan and the US

Indian Defense; Australia+Indonesia; Japan+Africa; Australia's DIB

Aug 26, 2024

Hub Story: India’s Defense Talks with Japan and the US
Spoke Story: Australia and Indonesia Sign Defense Cooperation Agreement
Spoke Story: Africa and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Spoke Story: Australia Leverages Partners for its Defense Industrial Base

Hub Story: India’s Defense Talks with Japan and the US

India has conducted several high-level engagements with Japan and the United States this August. Before heading to Washington, India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh hosted their Japanese counterparts for a 2+2 ministerial dialogue. Both countries view the Japan-India relationship as vital. The two nations sit at the poles of the Indo-Pacific, and coordination with each other can be difficult. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe prioritized deepening the India-Japan relationship, and the two countries are still enjoying the benefits of Abe’s strategic outreach.

Japan views its relationship with India as a cornerstone of its strategy to maintain a stable and balanced power structure in the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo sees India as a critical partner in countering China’s expanding influence, mainly by aligning both countries’ visions for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japan places significant value on deepening ties with India not just in defense and security cooperation but also in economic initiatives like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which aims to promote sustainable infrastructure as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

India sees its relationship with Japan as a critical element of its Act East Policy and a key pillar in enhancing strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi views Tokyo as a trusted and reliable partner in balancing China’s assertiveness, particularly through Japan’s active role in promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and collaborating on regional security initiatives. Beyond defense cooperation, India highly values Japan’s significant investments in infrastructure, technology, and connectivity projects like the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, which not only align with India’s economic growth objectives but also demonstrate the mutual benefits of their strategic relationship.

Since the last 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2022, the two nations have considerably expanded joint military exercises with an eye on expanding more into space and cyber.

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Joint Statement Third Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting:

The Ministers appreciated the progress in the defence cooperation and exchanges among each component between the two sides since the last meeting in September 2022. They welcomed the first air visit by Japanese fighters and their participation at Tarang Shakti, the first multilateral exercise hosted by the Indian Air Force. They also welcomed the conduct of the inaugural edition of the bilateral fighter exercise 'Veer Guardian 2023' between the Japan Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) and Indian Air Force (IAF) and conduct of the bilateral exercises of all the three services in one calendar year for the first time in 2023. The Ministers further concurred on deepening bilateral cooperation in field of space and cyber. They reaffirmed the importance of multilateral defence cooperation and exchanges in the Indo-Pacific region. The Ministers expressed their commitment to continuing bilateral and multilateral exercises including “Dharma Guardian”, JIMEX and “Malabar.”

Expansion into space and cyber will probably be slow and limited. The technology sharing needed for robust cooperation will face bureaucratic hurdles as most nations are eager to protect technological advantages. Japan announced that it would export naval antennas that can rapidly detect missiles and drones to India. While the joint statement does share that there has been completion of joint collaboration on Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)/Robotics, it remains unclear what the extent of this project is.

The Strategist: India and Japan Take Small Steps Towards Stronger Ties:

India and Japan collaborated in a joint research project on unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) robotics—though it seems possible this did not lead to the development of any actual vehicles. The collaboration was revealed by the first 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2019 and mentioned again in 2020 by the Japanese Ministry of Defense as an example of defence equipment and technology co-operation with partner countries. The initiative was quite forward-looking, considering the development of such UGVs in the context of the Ukraine war.
The latest joint statement says the project is complete, but what this means is unclear. Japan has contracted for three THeMIS UGVs from Estonian firm Milrem Robotics, which suggests that the India-Japan research project has not produced any UGVs. The two countries did announce transfer of the unified complex radio antenna (UNICORN) and related technologies, communication gear that are deployed on Japanese stealth warships.

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during a four-day trip to the United States. The trip focused on advancing US-India industrial base cooperation. Last June, the US-India released a roadmap for US-India defense industrial cooperation. The US-India roadmap is DoD’s sister initiative to the White House’s initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which I discuss more here.

The roadmap highlights several goals:

Dialogue between government and industry will be facilitated to address issues like licensing, export controls, defense trade barriers, and technology transfer, with a focus on regulatory improvements.
The US and India will identify cooperative defense projects to address shared military challenges, focusing on advanced technologies, co-development, and co-production opportunities.
The US aims to support India in developing logistics, repair, and maintenance hubs for aircraft and ships.
The US plans to integrate Indian defense industries into global supply chains of American defense and aerospace companies.
India will work to implement the Industrial Security Annex to enable deeper classified cooperation between both nations’ defense sectors.
Both countries will strive to finalize the Security of Supplies Arrangement (SOSA) and Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreement as soon as possible.

During Singh’s trip, the two countries were able to cross one agenda item off the list. India and the US have signed a Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) as well as a Memorandum of Agreement on the assignment of liaison officers.

The SOSA, a DoD initiative from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, is a non-binding agreement that aims to strengthen supply chain resilience and address disruptions by ensuring both countries provide reciprocal priority support for critical national defense resources.

Department of Defense: Security of Supply:

Bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSA) allow the DoD to request priority delivery for DoD contracts, subcontracts, or orders from companies in these countries. SOSA also allow the signatory nations to request priority delivery for their contracts and orders with U.S. firms.
Security of Supply Arrangements (or SOSA) are conducted under overarching Declarations of Principles for Enhanced Cooperation in Matters of Defense Equipment and Industry that have been signed with select nations. Security of Supply Arrangements (or SOSA) implement the “Meeting National Defense Requirements” section of these documents, which recognizes the potential for a certain degree of mutual interdependence of supplies needed for national security, and calls for the parties to explore solutions for achieving assurance of supply.

Currently, 18 nations have signed on to the program at varying levels of commitment. I wish DoD would provide a public report assessing the success of this program. The arrangements that the countries sign are non-binding, and subsequently, the firms that associate with the program are all voluntary and only strive to make reasonable efforts to prioritize American industrial demand. The extent to which this program has been successful is unknown. However, the SOSA might be best understood as the first step toward a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP), which is legally binding and has more actual benefits.

The second agreement announced at the Singh-Austin meeting was the liaison officers agreement. This agreement will not only allow Indian liaison officers to be stationed at US commands but also significantly expand coordination, interoperability planning, and information sharing, keeping all parties well-informed and prepared.

Beyond new agreements, President Biden notified Congress of the approval of a proposed sale to India of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sonobuoys and related equipment worth around $52.8 million for the multi-mission MH-60R Seahawk helicopters being inducted by the Indian Navy.

There is a big push in Washington to make India a logistics and maintenance hub for the US Navy. India is in a strategic location between the Middle East and East Asia. Its ports are safe distance from any combat operations that may take place, but close enough to get ships back in the action relatively quickly. There should be new announcements coming later this year on this initiative.

Spoke Story: Australia and Indonesia Sign Defense Cooperation Agreement

This week, Australia and Indonesia announced the signing of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement, which upgrades the security relationship to a “treaty level.” While the text of the agreement has not been released, some of the provisions are expected to include joint drills and reciprocal access to each other’s countries. This new agreement with Indonesia is part of Australia’s larger diplomatic push with Southeast Asia. The first paragraph officially announcing this agreement highlights Australia’s importance of ASEAN.

Joint Ministerial Statement on Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation:

Australia and Indonesia have a common commitment to the pursuit of a peaceful, stable, secure and prosperous region where sovereignty is respected. We have a positive vision and constructive outlook for our region with ASEAN at its centre, providing an essential stabilising influence.

Australia has lost a lot of standing recently in the eyes of many Southeast Asian countries. The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey, compiled by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, showcased how far Australia has fallen.

Ranked ninth (out of nine) in most influential economic power in Southeast Asia.
Ranked eighth in most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia.
And placed solidly in the middle when Southeast Asians were asked which third country they would pick to hedge against China and the United States.

To counter its dwindling influence, Australia announced last year, "Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040." All of the key initiatives include pretty standard provisions, including promoting Australian business integration into Southeast Asia's dynamic growth by supporting critical sectors like infrastructure, digital economy, and green energy. The strategy also emphasizes enhancing regulatory frameworks, removing trade barriers, and fostering people-to-people connections through programs like exchange initiatives and investment deal teams. Additionally, Australia aims to build resilient supply chains and strengthen collaboration through bilateral agreements and regional partnerships like the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Indonesia has quietly taken the mantle of first among equals in ASEAN. It's becoming a preferred nation as companies look to invest in the region, and it masterfully plays Beijing and Washington off each other. As Australia continues to make inroads with ASEAN, Indonesia is the natural starting point.

Spoke Story: Africa and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Japan hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) Ministerial Meeting this weekend. The TICAD Ministerial Meeting focused on strengthening Japan-Africa cooperation ahead of the upcoming leaders-level TICAD 9 Summit in 2025. The discussions emphasized collaborative solutions in areas like health, climate resilience, and economic reforms, while promoting entrepreneurship, particularly among women and youth, to support Africa’s economic transformation. The meeting highlighted Japan’s support for private-sector engagement and start-up ecosystems in Africa, aiming to drive innovative partnerships and address global challenges.

TICAD is an important tool that Japan uses to realize its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). The Indo-Pacific geographic paradigm is a Japanese concept adopted by nearly every major country (although China still prefers Asia-Pacific). Starting in the Trump Administration, Washington quickly embraced it and began incorporating the geographic concept into speeches, strategies, and white papers, even renaming US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command. Unfortunately, the American version narrows the region to encompass only the eastern border of India and Hawaii. The original Japanese version starts the Indo-Pacific father west on the eastern coast of Africa; in fact, when Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced the FOIP strategy, he did so in Nairobi, Kenya.

Japan prioritizes Japanese-African relations, often visiting and holding dialogues like TICAD to promote common prosperity. As Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with eastern African nations this weekend in bilateral side meetings, the press releases often mentioned the African nation’s central position in Japan’s FOIP strategy. Whether it’s smaller island nations like Mauritius or larger countries like Madagascar, Japan always highlighted its importance in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.

US-Africa relations remain a sore spot in American foreign policy. It’s a critical region that fails to gain the prominence of Europe, the Middle East, or Asia. Washington should rightly incorporate the eastern coast of Africa into its Indo-Pacific framing. If strategists in Washington were forced to broaden their conception of the Indo-Pacific, then it would help facilitate more momentum for Africa and help secure the region.

Spoke Story: Australia Leverages Partners for its Defense Industrial Base

This week, Australia made two significant advancements in supporting its defense needs by working with partner nations.

Australia has announced a partnership with Norway’s Kongsberg Defence to manufacture Naval Strike Missiles and Joint Strike Missiles in Newcastle, marking the only production site outside of Norway. The Australian government will invest A$850 million to establish the facility, which will begin production in 2027 and enhance the Australian Defence Force’s long-range precision strike capability while also serving export demands, particularly to the US and allies in the Indo-Pacific. This facility will position Australia as a critical player in missile production, addressing global supply chain constraints and supporting US forces in the region.

The Joint Strike Missile is one of the key weapons for the F-35. If production can be scaled, this new plant could help supply American and allied F-35s in the region. Kongsberg joins Lockheed Martin and Raytheon in supporting Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. GWEO invests A$4.1 billion to acquire more long-range strike systems and manufacture longer-range munitions in Australia. The enterprise already boasts some achievements:

Australian Ministry of Defence: Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise:

Accelerated the acquisition of guided weapons including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) long-range strike missiles, naval strike missiles and sea mines. Sea mines will be maintained in Australia with a view to technical transfer to enable local electronics servicing and load, assembly and pack of sea mines.
Agreed with the US to deepen cooperation on Australia's GWEO enterprise by collaborating on a flexible guided weapons production capability in Australia, scoping co-production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) by 2025.
Commenced domestic manufacture of BLU-111 aircraft bombs.

Additionally, South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace has opened its first overseas manufacturing plant in Geelong, Australia, known as the Hanwha Armored Vehicle Centre of Excellence (H-ACE). The facility will produce self-propelled howitzers, armored ammunition resupply vehicles, and Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles for the Australian Army as part of significant defense contracts. This plant, covering 150,000 square meters, marks a key expansion for Hanwha into the AUKUS market, allowing it to serve both Australia and allied nations amid rising defense needs in the Indo-Pacific region.

Worth Your Time:

Indo-Pacific:

Australia:

Japan:

South Korea:

Hub-and-Spokes